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**COUNTERVAILING FORCES:
ENHANCING CIVILIAN CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
THROUGH MADISONIAN CONCEPTS**

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of Cornell University

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctorate of Philosophy

by

Christopher P. Gibson

January 1998

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Chris Gibson grew up in Kinderhook, NY, approximately 20 miles south of Albany on the east side of the Hudson River. He attended Ichabod Crane High School and lettered in Baseball, Basketball, and Golf. He graduated from Siena College in 1986 with a BA in History. At Siena he was also commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the US Army through the ROTC program. He has spent the last 11 years as an Infantry officer in various command and staff assignments with the Berlin Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, and the US Military Academy, and currently holds the rank of Major. He was decorated with the Bronze Star Medal and Combat Infantryman's Badge during the Persian Gulf War. He received a MPA degree from the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs in 1995, and a MA in Government in 1996. He completed his doctorate in Government in January 1998, while serving as an Assistant Professor of American Politics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He is married to the former Mary Jo Gerardi and has one daughter, Kathleen born just weeks before his dissertation defense.

To Mary Jo

A wife, lover, friend, companion, mother, and professional who inspires me
...you can have it all, just not all at once

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There were many others who helped increase my understanding of US civil-military relations. Thanks to my colleagues associated with the Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, and to those participants at the conference entitled "A Crisis in Civilian Control? Contending Theories of American Civil-Military Relations," held at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard, 11-12 June 1996, especially to Professors Michael Desch, Deborah Avant, Peter Feaver, and Cori Dauber, the conference coordinators. Thanks also to those who provided comments at the Biennial Conference of Armed Forces & Society, held in Baltimore 24-26 October 1997, especially to Professor Jim Burk, Colonel Steve Wesbrook, and LTC Bob Hahn.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADC	Aide-de-Camp
Amb	Ambassador
ANSA/NSA	National Security Advisor to President
ARNG	Army National Guard
BSM	Bronze Star Medal
C/S or CofS	Chief of Staff
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief Naval Officer
D/CNO or D/CINC	Deputy
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
EUCOM	European Command
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HDASC	House Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
JAG	Judge Advocate General
Lieut J.G.	Lieutenant Junior Grade
NDU	National Defense University
NWC	National War College
ORSA	Operational Research and Systems Analysis
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PH	Purple Heart
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDASC	Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
SFAC	Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
SS	Silver Star
U/Sec Per & Read	Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness
USA	United States Army
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USCGA	United States Coast Guard Academy
USMA	United States Military Academy

USMC
USMCR
USN
USNA
USNR
V/CNO or V/C
XO

United States Marine Corps
United States Marine Corps Reserve
United States Navy
United States Naval Academy
United States Naval Reserve
Vice
Executive Officer

Chapter 1

Civil-Military Relations in the 1990s: A Military Out of Control?

During the first year of the Clinton Administration the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and the uniformed military was noticeably strained.¹ Time after time, top news stories brought attention to the problem.²

It began soon after the 1992 election when the new Commander-in-Chief was challenged openly by the military as he sought to end the ban on homosexuals serving openly in the armed forces. After six months of often public negotiation with the military, the President praised the ultimate compromise. But most experts agreed, not much had changed. The military could still discharge homosexuals once their sexual orientation was revealed. President Clinton's campaign promise to change that policy was defeated partially as a result of military influence.³

Other conflicts soon emerged that Spring. First, the President was treated coolly aboard the Naval Aircraft Carrier U.S.S. Roosevelt, requiring a four-star admiral to practically order the sailors aboard to show respect to their new

¹ Michael C. Desch, "United States Civil-Military Relations in a Changing International Order" in United States Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? eds Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (Washington, DC: Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 166.

² For a sampling see, John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy Just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, February 1, 1993, p. A10; Christopher Matthews, "Clinton, Drop Military Salute," The Arizona Republic, March 22, 1993, p. A11; Barton Gellman, "Turning an About-Face Into a Forward March," Washington Post, April 4, 1993, p. A1; Eric Schmitt, "Clinton, in Gesture of Peace, Pops in on Pentagon," New York Times, April 9, 1993, p. A8; Michael R. Gordon, "Joint Chiefs Warn Congress Against More Military Cuts," New York Times, April 16, 1993, p. A8; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, May 7, 1993, newswire; and David H. Hackworth, "Rancor in the Ranks: The Troops vs. the President," Newsweek, June 28, 1993, pps. 24-25.

³ Lawrence J. Korb, "The Military and Social Change," Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 5 (August 1996).

Commander-in-Chief. Then an Air Force Major General was relieved of his command for making contemptuous words against the Commander-in-Chief (he had called President Clinton a “draft-dodging, pot smoking, womanizer” at a formal social function in a room filled with subordinates and their wives).⁴ Shortly after that, the military’s most decorated Vietnam veteran on active-duty (Lieutenant General Barry McCaffrey) was snubbed by a mid-level White House aide, and word of that incident quickly circulated among military circles.⁵ All of this did nothing to make the services forget that President Clinton, as a younger man, had confessed to “loathing the military.” Civil-military relations were clearly off to an inauspicious start with the new administration.

Some studies, including one done by Pulitzer Prize winner Thomas Ricks of the Wall Street Journal, went beyond anecdotal evidence to document the alleged increase in partisanship in the military, in favor of the Republican party.⁶ Historians and political scientists were quick to brand the military as “out of control,”⁷ and the cause of Washington’s latest and “biggest scandal.”⁸ Indeed, the bumpy presidential

⁴ John Lancaster, “Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe,” Washington Post, June 8, 1993, p. A1; and, John Lancaster, “Air Force General Sets Retirement,” Washington Post, June 19, 1993, p. A1.

⁵ Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), p. 566.

⁶ Thomas Ricks, “On American Soil: The Widening Gap Between the United States Military and the United States Society,” Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations. Working Paper # 3 (May 1996). For statistics on officer partisanship, 1976-1996, see Ole Holsti, “A Widening Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence,” Harvard Project on Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 13, (October 1997).

⁷ Richard Kohn, “Out of Control,” National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17.

⁸ Edward Luttwak, “Washington’s Biggest Scandal,” Commentary 97 (May 1994): 29-33.

transition period, which was rife with civil-military conflict, prompted a series of research projects, including this one.⁹

At the same time, interest in comparative civil-military relations spiked due to developments related to the end of the Cold War. The (re) emergence of democracies in Central and Eastern Europe contributed to this rekindled interest as countries such as Hungary and Poland, among others, sought help from the United States in establishing healthy democracies with militaries firmly under civilian control. Because civil-military relationships are often reflective of the overall health of a governmental system, political theorists have shown interest in this area periodically over the years. The rise of nationalism attendant to the end of the Cold War has prompted new research in comparative civil-military relations, and this has had a synergistic effect, contributing to a better understanding of the American case.¹⁰ Despite these advances, however, further research and theoretical work is needed to enhance our knowledge of civil-military relations in this new strategic era.

The Argument

This thesis presents arguments on three levels: the *empirical*, *normative*, and *theoretical*. In the process, it attempts to move the debate over contemporary US civil-military relations beyond the juicy anecdotes and stories of insubordination found in the popular and scholarly literature, to an enhanced understanding grounded

⁹ For example, this was the impetus for the Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, 1995-1997.

¹⁰ The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany has taken the lead in this initiative. That foundation is dedicated to the instruction in national security and civil-military affairs for senior defense officials and military officers in emerging democracies in central and eastern Europe. In addition, the US Department of Defense, has a “military to military contact” program to assist in this area as well.

in systematic empirical evidence and in-depth analysis of decisionmaking. It identifies systemic trends among top-level presidential advisors, both civilian and military, that shape civil-military relations.

On the *empirical level*, this thesis documents the changing level of professional preparation among the key actors (who are identified later in this chapter). Professional preparation is defined as the extent of educational and national security work-related experience that an individual brings to the job--experiences garnered before one reaches the highest levels of the national security decisionmaking apparatus. Data are gathered over a thirty year period (1965-1995), and the findings allow for a more informed discussion of US civil-military relations.

One of the more important findings is that the turbulence witnessed during the first year of the Clinton administration, as described above and documented in greater detail later, was transitional in nature, caused by the relative advantage that the military enjoyed over their civilian counterparts in professional preparation. These problems are already beginning to work themselves out now that civilians in the Clinton administration have acquired considerable defense-related experience since 1993. Nevertheless, the findings highlight the delicate nature of presidential transition periods, particularly when a new party takes control of the executive branch for the first time in twelve years.

This thesis also engages the ongoing *normative debate* taking place within the civil-military relations field. The clash between President Clinton and the military opened up several important normative questions. Some of these questions include: Should civilian preferences *always* be adopted over military preferences? What if civilian and military leaders inside the Pentagon clash, should civilians always get their way? Under what circumstances is it appropriate for military officers to exercise influence in the decisionmaking process? And, with regard to the varying degrees of professional preparation among top-level presidential advisors, both civilian and

military, is there an optimal balance or should this relationship always be skewed towards the civilian side? This thesis addresses those questions too.

The case studies, which span from the days when Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense to the tenure of Colin Powell as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, help shed light on these questions. A major question to which this evidence is applied is whether measures should be taken to strengthen civilian control by the elected leaders in this country, the President and Congress. The central logic of James Madison, the principal author of the US Constitution, may be relevant here. More than anything else, Madison was a realist about human nature. He firmly believed that absolute power corrupted, regardless of individual virtue. To prevent the abuse of power, countervailing forces were necessary. The natural drive to dominate needed to be harnessed and directed in a positive way. By designing a system that pitted ambitious individuals against each other, absolute power and all of its deleterious effects was avoided. Virtue was in the system, not the people.¹¹

Civilian control of the right kind (by the nation's elected leaders) will be enhanced by fostering healthy competition inside the DOD among civilian and military officials. For this to happen these "agents" must share roughly equivalent levels of professional preparation. When they do, they serve as *countervailing forces* in a decisionmaking process ultimately controlled by the duly elected representatives of the people. The empirical research reported here supports this normative contention. During periods when Pentagon relations were balanced, not only were civil-military relations more harmonious, but national security policies were probably better too. The Bush administration, whose top-level civilian and military officials both had a high degree of professional preparation, is the best example of this point--

¹¹ James Madison, "Federalist #51", The Federalist Papers, edited by Isaac Kramnick, (New York, Penguin Books, 1987), pps. 318-322.

with foreign and national security policies generally considered that administration's greatest accomplishments.

At different times over the past 30 years both sides in the DOD (civilian and military), held significant relative advantages in professional preparation, creating problems for civilian control and/or policy development. For example, in the 1960s when the McNamara team dominated the military, poor choices were made that led to the quagmire and national nightmare of Vietnam. Conversely, in 1993, when the situation was reversed and the military enjoyed the relative advantage, policy outcomes reflected this change creating serious questions about civilian control. My research suggests that civil-military relations and national security policies are optimized when professional preparation is high among *both* civilian and military officials at the Pentagon. Therefore it follows that Madisonian concepts, if incorporated within the DOD, could enhance both civil-military relations and national security policy.

Finally, this thesis also engages the current *theoretical debate* taking place in the field of civil-military relations. The variables and coding criteria employed to capture and explain the changing dynamic among civil and military leaders are derived from a variant of new institutionalism.¹² This approach seeks to explain changes in public policy by examining structure, rules, and norms. While examination of all three of these variables is critical to a complete understanding, changes in norms

¹² For more on new institutionalism see, James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds. (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers And Mothers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

are particularly important in this study.¹³ Over the past three decades, military attitudes towards graduate level education and political-military and joint assignments (assignments with other branches of the service) have changed dramatically. These attitudinal changes and resultant changes in career paths have affected policy in many ways, the most significant of which has been the emergence of a new generation of military elite capable of wielding more influence at the top-levels of the national security decisionmaking network. Civilian norms changed as well, generally in the opposite direction, as evidenced by the decline of graduate students in security studies programs after Vietnam and in the diminished interest in serving in governmental positions in general and defense-related posts in particular.¹⁴ Indeed, times have changed since the heady days of the Kennedy administration, and public perceptions about the efficacy and trustworthiness of their government may have something to do with these changes.¹⁵

Apart from changes in norms, significant changes in structure and rules have also affected policy development and subsequently civil-military relations. Two Congressional Acts in particular (the 1958 and 1986 Defense Reorganization Acts)

¹³ The field of international security studies has seen some important work done in this area in the last decade. See, for example, S. Krasner, "Sovereignty: An Institutionalist Perspective," Comparative Political Studies 21:1 (April 1988): 66-94; J. Meyer, "Political Structure and the World Economy," Contemporary Sociology, (1982): 263-266; J.E. Thompson, "Norms in International Relations: A Conceptual Analysis," International Journal of Group Tensions 23:1 (1993): 67-83; and Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," American Sociological Review 51 (April 1986): 273-286.

¹⁴ Stephen Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," International Security Quarterly 35 (June 1991): 211-239; and, Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies," International Security Quarterly 12 (1988): 5-27.

¹⁵ A poll published by United States News & World Report (September 29, 1993), reported that whereas 79% of Americans trusted their government to do the right thing most of the time in 1963, that percentage dropped to just 29% by 1993.

created new structure, altered existing structure, and changed rules in ways that ultimately affected policy development and civil-military relations. The 1958 Act strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense, and this legislation facilitated the power and influence that Defense Secretary McNamara was able to wield during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.¹⁶ The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act moved the relationship in the opposite direction, although ironically it was designed to (among other things) strengthen civilian control. By design, the Act fostered interservice harmony, which politically empowered the military, and facilitated a more united expression of preferences. This change was surprising, given that interservice rivalry had been exploited by Congress in the past, as an oversight mechanism to maintain control and influence over the military. Goldwater-Nichols altered structure and rules (promotion criteria and assignment patterns), and these changes accelerated a post-Vietnam trend of rewarding political skills within the officer corps.¹⁷

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars in the field of civil-military relations have been searching for an explanation for the changing dynamic between civilian and military leaders and the institutions they head, which some argue has been increasingly characterized by more assertive military influence over civilian leadership.¹⁸ Traditional explanations no longer seem to apply to the post-Cold War

¹⁶ Daniel J. Kaufman, "National Security: Organizing the Armed Forces," Armed Forces & Society 14 (Fall 1987): 85-112.

¹⁷ Thomas L. McNaugher and Roger L. Sperry, "Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense," in Who Makes Public Policy? The Struggle for Control between Congress and the Executive, Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley, eds., (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1994), pps. 219-258.

¹⁸ See, for example, Kohn, "Out of Control." For other prominent works with similar arguments, see: Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, No. 5; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the United States Military," Wake Forest Law Review, 29:2; Luttwak, "Washington's

era.¹⁹ The two most influential works are those of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, which have dominated the field for the past 40 years.²⁰

Huntington identified two factors that influenced the type of civilian control employed by nations--functional and societal imperatives. The former dealt with threats to the state (both foreign and domestic). The latter dealt with matters of ideology and structure (e.g., constitutional design). Since Huntington claimed that the societal imperatives were constant in the American case, all variance in methods of civilian control for the first two hundred years of US history was left to be explained by the functional imperative. During times of acute external threat, when a large military was necessary, civilian control was maintained by civilianizing the armed forces, forcing it to embrace civilian values. Huntington called this method "subjective control."²¹

In times of peace and tranquillity, the US dismantled the defense establishment to prevent military influence on the Lockean liberal way of life. Huntington argued that the US was not sufficiently prepared to confront the USSR during the Cold War because classic liberalism (which, according to Huntington, is patently antimilitary) was not philosophically suited to meet the challenges posed by a totalitarian competitor. Only a change in the societal imperative could ensure national

Biggest Scandal;" and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing United States Civil-Military Relations," paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.

¹⁹ For an excellent summary of this see, Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society, 23:2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.

²⁰ Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, Professional Soldier (New York: The Free Press, 1960).

²¹ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ch. 4.

survival. He later argued that this was precisely what happened, that the US embraced a more conservative ideology in the 1970s, and finally accepted the existence of a large peacetime standing army and defense expenditures.²²

Normatively, Huntington argued that the US needed to move beyond “subjective control” (civilianizing the military) to embrace “objective control.” This normative approach relied on the military and not civilian forces, which Huntington viewed as too fractured to provide a unitary voice and the leadership required to confront the communist bloc. He argued, perhaps counter-intuitively, that the greater the degree of military professionalism, the firmer the civilian control. Huntington maintained that military professionalism could be inspired by providing a “narrow sphere” of autonomy, enabling the institution to make decisions on a number of issues deemed to be purely military. Given that bounded freedom, the military would focus on maintaining combat readiness and eschew politics. Because of the corporate nature of the professionalism, those that got out of line would be policed from within.²³

Events since the end of the Cold War raise serious questions about the continued usefulness of Huntington’s framework. For example, military assertiveness during the first year of the Clinton administration occurred at a time when levels of military professionalism and autonomy were at their highest since the Vietnam War. Professionalism in the military has increased since the 1970s (as a simple comparison of Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War will attest to), yet civilian control, if anything, is

²² Samuel P. Huntington, “The Soldier and the State in the 1970s,” in Civil-Military Relations, Andrew W. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington eds., (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1997), pps. 5-28.

²³ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pps. 83-85.

questioned more today than two decades ago.²⁴ Moreover, the proliferation of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) since the end of the Cold War makes the distinction between the civilian and military spheres ever more difficult. Huntington's argument may have been right in this regard during the Cold War when military focus was on traditional combat missions and skills, but today, because of OOTW requirements, a higher priority has been placed on skills such as negotiation, mediation, and diplomacy, skills historically performed by civilians. The emphasis on these skills has enhanced the political power of the military.²⁵

To a degree, of course, these skills were performed by soldiers in the past, but they were executed by specially selected and trained individuals within the ranks. Most soldiers honed combat skills leaving non-traditional skills to combat supporting elements (e.g., military policeman and foreign area specialists, just to name two). Now, in the post-Cold War era, basic infantryman are trained to execute these tasks. This is affecting military culture, politicizing the officer corps and accelerating trends caused by the military's reactions to McNamara and Vietnam. Since these non-traditional skills are now required for mission success, promotion and career progression rules are being altered to foster their development.²⁶ This will be discussed in greater length later.

Morris Janowitz founded the "sociological school" as an alternative to Huntington's approach.²⁷ However, Janowitz's work differed little from

²⁴ There are many books that document this claim. See, for example, James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War (Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 1995).

²⁵ US Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations, (Fort Monroe, Va: Training and Doctrine Command, 1994.)

²⁶ Jim Tice, "Four-Stars to Approve OPMS XXI mid-July," Army Times, June 30, 1997, p. 6.

²⁷ Janowitz, Professional Soldier.

Huntington's empirically. Although Janowitz focused more extensively on elite analysis and the officer socialization process, he too relied heavily on military professionalism to explain US civil-military relations. Janowitz did make several important contributions. Among them, was a description of the changes in military culture brought on by confrontation with the Soviets, identifying the ascension of the "military manager" type officer at the expense of the traditional "warrior." He also contributed to the field by injecting a bureaucratic politics perspective, thus fostering a better understanding of military behavior during the national security decisionmaking process. But in the end Janowitz embraces Huntington's "subjective control" calling for civilian penetration of military culture and more Congressional oversight.²⁸

According to Janowitz, instead of leaving civil-military relations solely to military professionalism, political leaders should take measures to indoctrinate the leadership of the armed forces about the virtues of civilian control. Moreover, civilian control should be bolstered by establishing and ensuring the domination of civilian counterparts in functional areas where responsibilities of civilian and military officials overlapped. The former Soviet Union employed a similar strategy to maintain civilian control over the Red Army. In fact, the deputy commander of regimental units and higher was a political commissar who had the functional responsibility for political training and tactical oversight.²⁹

²⁸ Janowitz, Professional Soldier, ch. 17.

²⁹ For more on civil-military relations in the former Soviet Union, see Timothy Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); and Colton, Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

More important to this study, however, Janowitz's framework presumed a civilian leadership with extensive military and national security experience to enforce civilian control and make decisions about the direction of military policy. This was entirely plausible at the time that Janowitz first wrote his book (1960), since top-level federal government positions were inundated with World War II veterans. However today, when military experience among elected officials continues to decline, Janowitz's policy prescriptions do not provide a viable and effective framework for the relationship.³⁰ Therefore, because both objective and subjective control of the military are ill-suited to the post-Cold War era, I offer an alternative--a more Madisonian approach.

Like Deborah Avant³¹ and Peter Feaver³² this thesis employs a principal-agent perspective--a comparison between civilian "principals" and "agents" and military "agents." This "principal-agent" model was first developed in the field of microeconomics.³³ Since the Constitution provides for civilian control of the military, with the president as Commander-in-Chief, the usefulness of the principal-

³⁰ Mark J. Eitelberg and Roger D. Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War." in United States Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? Don Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew eds., (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995), pps. 34-67.

³¹ Deborah Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), also "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? A Principal-Agent Explanation of Military Reticence In the Post-Cold War," Security Studies 6:2 (Winter 1996-97): 71-113.

³² Peter Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations." Harvard Project on United States Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations. Working Paper # 4, May 1996.

³³ Edward Mansfield, Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pps. 380-381. For a good literature review of principal-agent modeling in political science, see Roderick D. Kiewet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).

agent model with civilians as principals and soldiers as agents is, at first glance, quite appealing. The model is complicated, however, because of the problem of "dual principals"--that is, the United States system provides for both presidential and Congressional control of the military. Avant and Feaver also argue that both the civilian authorities and the military have asymmetry of knowledge in their respective realms, with the military possessing more technical and operational knowledge and civilians having more competence assessing strategic and political decisions regarding casualties and the use of force. The data and analysis provided in this thesis suggest that the latter assertion is on dubious ground given the military's increased activity in the civil-military issue network since Vietnam and the variation in experience levels of presidential appointees over time. Still, my research relies on and builds upon the principal-agent framework, particularly the critical interfaces where civilian and military officials hold roughly equivalent functional responsibilities.

However, this work differs in other important ways from Deborah Avant's and Peter Feaver's. First, it goes beyond their discussion of "dual principals" (Congress and the President) to examine empirically relationships among those identified as "*dual agents*," that is, the top-level DOD civilians and senior members of the uniformed military of roughly equivalent functional responsibility. These key players operate at the highest levels of the defense decisionmaking network, and have taken on a greater role in the decisionmaking process--a trend made possible because of declining military expertise among the nation's elected officials.³⁴ While it has been, for the most part, the uniformed military that has filled that role in the 1990s, it is possible that an equally influential coterie of civilian defense intellectuals within the DOD (or "civilian agents") may arise in the future. Arguments for such an outcome will be explored later.

³⁴ Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," pps. 34-67.

Second, this work challenges Feaver's claim that "professionalism," as an independent variable, has reached its limits of theoretical usefulness. In a recent article Feaver states, "...as for explaining the problem of civilian control, I am not persuaded that the concept (professionalism) has more utility beyond that which Huntington, Janowitz, and especially Abrahamsson (following Finer) have already generated."³⁵ Professionalism may have reached its potential for explaining military behavior, but its usefulness in explaining *civilian behavior* inside the DOD, and the relative balance of power among the agents therein, has yet to be tapped. This project attempts to do just that. The central argument is that the principal-agent relationship has been altered by qualitative changes over time in the levels of professional preparation of key senior civilian and military officials and by the structural changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which have accelerated these learning experiences among some of the most talented and aspiring younger officers.

The Issue Network

Empirical analysis of the changing levels of professional preparation among the top-level civilian and military officials is organized by employing the concept of "issue network," first developed by Hugh Heclo.³⁶ This concept facilitated the principal-agent analysis found in this thesis. Although not an exact fit (since Heclo initially developed the "issue network" as a pluralistic response to elite theory's "iron triangle"), the characteristics of issue networks are roughly similar to the decisionmaking clusters in the national security apparatus.

³⁵ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," p. 169.

³⁶ Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in The New American Political System, Anthony King, ed. (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), pps. 87-124.

Heclo defines the issue network as "a shared-knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public policy."³⁷ This network operates at many different levels both within and outside of Washington, DC. Broadly defined, issue networks form when like-minded individuals from government agencies, academia/think tanks, interest groups, and the media gravitate towards each other and form alliances across institutional boundaries. Because the goal of any issue network is to influence the outcomes of the decisionmaking process, it provides a useful unit of analysis for issues at the interface of civilian and military spheres of dominance.

While the broadly-defined national security issue network includes thousands of individuals throughout the Washington, DC area and beyond, this study identifies three critical civilian-military interfaces in the Pentagon policy cluster where officials from both the civilian and military spheres are responsible for roughly the same functions.³⁸ By gathering data on those who have held these key jobs, and by analyzing their intellectual and professional background, we can better understand how power was wielded on the agent side of the principal-agent equation. The three key interfaces are outlined in Table 1 below.

³⁷Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," 103.

³⁸ See Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Explaining Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations: A New Institutionalist Approach," Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 8 (January 1997).

Table 1
Top Tiers of the DOD
National Security Issue Network

	Civilian	Military
Level I:	Secretary of Defense	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Level II:	Civilian Secretaries	Uniformed Service Chiefs
Level III:	Deputy Secretary of Defense Under Secretaries for Policy, Personnel and Readiness, and Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E)	Key Members of the Joint Staff: The Director, the J3 (operations) and J5, (plans) and since Goldwater-Nichols the Vice Chairman, JCS, J7 (interoperability) and J8 (resources and assessment)

In later chapters it will be argued that changing levels of professional preparation have affected the decisionmaking process and, subsequently, US civil-military relations. The decline in military experience among elected officials combined with the erosion of strategic consensus has created an opening for a more influential Department of Defense. Since the 1960s, changes in professional preparation at the DOD, in favor of the military, have contributed to the trend of increased military influence in the decisionmaking process, because the JCS has been filling the void created by the decline of expertise among the principals and their civilian agents at the Pentagon. Heclo argued that issue networks often transcend party lines. This scheme permits an examination of periods of both Republican and Democrat control of the White House and Congress, to consider the claim sometimes made that the GOP generally has better relations with the military than Democrats.

Methodology

This dissertation employs both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in a manner consistent with recommendations from political scientists Gary King, Robert

Keohane, and Sidney Verba in Designing Social Inquiry.³⁹ For this project, the dependent variable is the content of policy or, more precisely, whose preferences (civilian or military) were adopted in cases when they differed. This variable is measured by examining the decisionmaking process, specifically preferences and outcomes. Data are drawn from government publications, personal interviews, autobiographies, memoirs, and secondary sources, particularly Michael Desch's data set on civil-military conflict.⁴⁰

The independent variable (professional preparation) consists of two indicators that measure, for each of the key actors identified, their highest education levels achieved and professional experience as gleaned from examination of prior assignment histories. These two indicators, education and assignment history, were chosen after careful thought and consideration for how one influences another.⁴¹ The

³⁹ Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (hereafter, "KKV"), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

⁴⁰ Michael C. Desch, "Losing Control?" Also found in Desch, Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment (Forthcoming).

⁴¹ My thoughts on this subject were shaped by three general factors: 1) scholarly works that discuss leadership, influence, and decisionmaking, 2) results from the interviews conducted for this project, and 3) personal experience as a former commander and staff officer. For scholarly works on leadership see, for example, B.M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: Macmillan, 1985); J.W. Gardner, On Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1990). C.N. Greene, "The Reciprocal Nature of Influence Between Leader and Subordinate," Journal of Applied Psychology 60, (Spring 1975): 187-193; K. Kim and D. Organ, "Determinants of Leader-Subordinate Exchange Relationships," Group and Organizational Studies 22 (Fall 1978): 375-403; R.M. Hogarth, Judgment and Choice: The Psychology of Decision (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1980); C. Schwenk, "Cognitive Simplification Processes in Strategic Decisionmaking," Strategic Management Journal 5 (Spring 1984): 111-128; and R.E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990).

data set includes a career summary for each individual in the top-tiers of the issue network, followed by a numerical value derived from coding criteria. Composite scores and averages are also included to allow for analysis and comparison across time and among civilian and military officials.

These two indicators do not capture everything that comprises professional preparation, but they are important components of this concept, and they also have the virtue of being empirically measurable. A high degree of professional preparation is assumed to bestow credibility on actors involved in the decisionmaking process and enhances influence.

This methodological approach was initially presented to a number of scholars in the field.⁴² Constructive criticism helped vet and hone the coding criteria, as did suggestions from several of my interviewees, most of whom were intimately involved in the decisionmaking process at one time or another over the past 30 years.⁴³

Format

The rest of the argument is developed in the six subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 provides a substantial review of the literature on United States civil-military relations, with particular focus on the contributions and weaknesses of other arguments and where this research differs. Unlike traditional literature reviews, however, this chapter deals with the empirical *and* the normative, as they are inextricably linked in this policy arena. For example, Huntington's normative approach to civil-military relations, "objective control," had an influence on the actual development of military training. The Huntington normative framework was used to

⁴² Before the Harvard Seminar on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, December 6, 1996.

⁴³ A complete list of those interviewed is found immediately following the bibliography.

train and socialize soldiers, particularly officers before and after commissioning.⁴⁴

Chapter 2 also provides some historical analysis relevant to US civil-military relations, in order to provide a context for the theoretical discussion.

Chapter 3 presents the explanatory model, operationalizes the variables and outlines the coding criteria. Leaning on new institutionalism, this chapter develops an argument for why structure, rules and norms matter when analyzing US civil-military relations and the national security decisionmaking process. Further, new institutionalism, broadly defined, is connected with the “principal-agent” framework and the concept of the “issue network.” By examining indicators of professional preparation in conjunction with structure, rules and norms, insight may be gained into how decisions are made and why tensions occur in a principal-agent relationship.

The data and analysis are presented in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 deals with “the principals” (defined as the president and the chairmen of the key defense-related committees in Congress). It also examines the key *non-DOD* advisors to the President for national security, that is, the Vice President, the National Security Advisor, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs. This chapter documents the changing levels of professional preparation among these key actors. Their decline in national security expertise has created the intellectual space and opportunity for top-level military officers to exert more influence in the decisionmaking process. Chapter 5 verifies this claim by documenting the changing level of professional preparation among the “agents”-- top-level civilian and military officials at the Pentagon. As mentioned earlier, this thesis expands the definition of “agent” to include political

⁴⁴ For example, the core course in American Politics at the United States Military Academy dedicates an entire lesson to Huntington’s concept of objective control. Huntington is also taught at Officer Basic Courses, the first formal instruction that officers get after commissioning.

appointees in the DOD. A thorough examination of the agents is critical to an understanding of the changing dynamic in United States civil-military relations over the past three decades.

Chapter 6 presents a series of cases drawn from extensive interviews, autobiographies, memoirs, and biographies with some of those key actors identified in chapters 4 and 5. This chapter further corroborates the empirical data with “thick description.” In total, six Presidential administrations are covered, from Johnson to Clinton, except for the brief and unelected Ford administration. The cases from these three decades will illustrate the relationship between changing levels of professional preparedness among the actors, policy preferences, outcomes, and civil-military tension.

The conclusion summarizes the argument and discusses future trends and policy recommendations to address the balance of power at the DOD. To assist the reader, a glossary of common terms and acronyms is provided in chapters 4 and 5.

Chapter 2

Beyond Huntington and Janowitz

The origins of US civil-military relations date back to the Founding Era, and over the past two hundred years much has been written about this relationship. The hundreds of works on this topic can be grouped into three major eras of distinguishable thought. The first era began with the Founding and continued until the 1950s, characterized by small standing peacetime armies and a defense strategy based primarily on state militias. The second era began shortly after World War II when political scientists started to analyze the effect that a large peacetime force would have on the United States way of life. Scholars in the 1950s declared a crisis in civil-military relations and called for new efforts to identify a model of civilian control that generated sufficient national security strength to confront the communist challenge without harming American liberalism. Although many scholars answered this call, only two discernible theoretical approaches emerged: the normative frameworks of Huntington (“objective control”)⁴⁵ and Janowitz (“subjective control”).⁴⁶ Both of these models contributed to the field of political science, providing a plausible explanation of US civil-military relations during the Cold War. But Huntington’s influence extended into the policy sphere, too, primarily because his definition of military professionalism (which posited an apolitical officer corps) was embraced by the armed forces. Officers and officer candidates were inculcated in the Huntington normative framework.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Maintaining civilian control through military professionalism.

⁴⁶ Maintaining civilian control through civilianizing the military.

⁴⁷ Examination of assigned readings at the US Military Academy supports this point. See, for example, “The Military Profession,” Lesson 3, Military Science 101, United States Military Academy, West Point; “Officership: How Do Civil-Military Relations rely upon and in turn affect, the Professionalism of Officers?” Lesson 18, SS202: Introduction to American Politics, United States Military Academy, West Point.

Recently (in the 1990s), scholars have agreed that new theoretical models are needed in the post-Cold War era. The behavior of top military officers since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols has created doubts about whether the armed forces still accept Huntington's definition of professionalism. For clarity, the three time periods are hereafter referred to as the Pre-Cold War (1787-1945), Cold War (1946-1989) and post-Cold War (1990-present). This chapter explains why existing empirical and normative models no longer apply and critiques some of the recent theoretical works offered in their place.⁴⁸

*The Civil-Military Problematique*⁴⁹

The origins of civil-military relations can be traced to the beginning of organized society. Man⁵⁰ in the state of nature, as envisioned by Hobbes, was in perpetual civil war and life was "nasty, brutish and short."⁵¹ In this condition, man was responsible for his own safety, which required perpetual vigilance. Man soon found it advantageous to enter into collective arrangements--organized society--to reduce vulnerability and to enhance security.⁵² Social Contracts were constructed in

⁴⁸ To date there have been twelve Working Papers published through Harvard's Olin Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations. In addition, see the edited volume put out by CSIS in 1995, Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, eds. US Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995).

⁴⁹ An excellent discussion of this is found in Peter Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society 23:2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.

⁵⁰ Man here is meant in the universal sense. Woman works just as well.

⁵¹ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) C.B. Macpherson, ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p. 186.

⁵² John Locke, Second Treatises of Government (1690) C.B. Macpherson, ed., (Indianapolis, In: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980), p. 66.

which the people agreed to give up vigilantism with the understanding that the state was responsible for protection and the redressing of grievances. Later, as societies grew in size and complexity, divisions of labor were established to enhance efficiencies. This applied to security tasks too. States then contracted for security, usually but not always, from its own citizens. Warriors were hired to protect the state. In sum, citizens in societies reduced vulnerability by entrusting their security to the sovereign who, in turn, delegated this task to the protectors of the state--the soldiers. But a central problem soon emerged: how does society then protect itself from the protectors? Several choices were available. At one end of the spectrum the state might keep the number of warriors and percentage of wealth dedicated to national defense to a minimum, thus ensuring that the protectors were never strong enough to threaten the protected. The risks associated with this option were obvious, not enough national defense might invite external challenge and the state could be destroyed by its enemies. At the other end of the spectrum, the nation might maintain a very large military and dedicate a significant percentage of its wealth to national security. But this option could drain the society of its wealth needlessly and destroy the state from within. Therefore, the *problematique* that arises is: how to design a military strong enough to deter and defeat aggressors yet small and dependent enough that it does not destroy the nation by either coup or economic ruin.⁵³ To facilitate national security and to prevent coups states must decide where on the continuum they want to be, and what methods of civilian control of the military they will employ. Therefore, sooner or later, all states deal with civil-military relations. The US was no exception to this even as it despised military power, particularly as it was practiced by the British prior to the revolution.

⁵³ Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," p. 154.

The Pre-Cold War Period: From The Founding to World War II

To appreciate the current controversy over civil-military relations, it is necessary to first put the American case in context, because, despite its expected arrival at the civil-military problematique, US history differed in important ways from the rest of the world and unique experiences shaped governmental processes and institutions.⁵⁴ Grounded in Renaissance ideas from the works of Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers designed a political system where "ambition was made to counteract ambition."⁵⁵ The various political institutions of governance (Congress, Judiciary and the Presidency) were designed to prevent the accumulation of power and to preserve individual liberty. The Declaration of Independence contained the initial construction of the US Social Contract as the colonists united to overthrow English rule and replaced it with a new form of government, deriving its legitimacy from the consent of the governed and designed to protect life, liberty, and property. As with the Renaissance writings, the American Social Contract, at its very core, was about reducing vulnerability and providing for security and stability. Citizens agreed to obey laws and the State assumed the responsibility of enforcing agreements and statutes, ensuring the preservation of "inalienable rights," and the protection of its citizens. By necessity, to preserve its way of life, those who entered into society had to, in some way, contract for their national survival, and thus, those who took up arms became the protectors of the State. Therefore, with the creation of the American Social Contract, we witness also the origins of US civil-military

⁵⁴There are many works for the American Exceptionalism argument. For examples, see Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1955), and Sven H. Steinmo, "American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Cultural or Institutional," Dynamics of American Politics, Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pps. 106-131.

⁵⁵James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, Isaac Kramnick, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), see #51, pps. 318-321.

relations. But central questions soon emerged as to how the US should provide for national defense and how civilian and military institutions would interact.

The Founding Fathers spent considerable time and effort deliberating about how they would organize the national defense.⁵⁶ Influenced by their recent history with King George III and the British Regular Army, they feared a strong military establishment. To ensure that the uniformed military did not become too powerful, in addition to constitutional stipulations designed to ensure civilian control, the Founding Fathers established only a very small peacetime military, relying primarily on State Militias for the national defense.

At the same time, the Founding Fathers also sought to prevent the chief executive from using the military for foreign excursions and personal glory as Kings had done in Europe for centuries. Therefore, while they made the President the Commander-In-Chief, they gave other organizational, budgetary and war-making powers to Congress. Much has been written about who has the authority to make war in this country, but that question is beyond the scope of this project. It is reasonable to conclude that the very existence of the vast literature on this topic provides evidence for the position that the Founding Fathers intended the various political institutions to share in their control over the military.⁵⁷ Thus, as it was with domestic

⁵⁶In several Federalist Papers, Hamilton and Madison discuss how the United States Constitution would affect national defense and civil-military relations. In particular, see Federalist Papers #8, 23-29, 47, 48, 51, 68, 70, and 72.

⁵⁷ Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt. Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1989). Robert F. Turner, Repealing the War Powers Resolution: Restoring the Rule of Law in US Foreign Policy (New York: Brassey's, Inc., 1991); Louis Fisher, "Congressional Checks on Military Initiatives," Political Science Quarterly, 109:5 (1994): 739-762; Abraham Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power: The Origins (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1976).

and foreign matters, military policy was to be made through compromise among the competing factions of the day--this was the Madisonian way.⁵⁸

One of the leading scholars of the Founding era is the same author who ignited the most recent round of civil-military debate, Richard Kohn. His two most important works covering the early period were; Eagle and the Sword: The Federalists and Creation of the Military Establishment, 1783-1802,⁵⁹ and, The Constitution and The United States Army,⁶⁰ which he edited and contributed a chapter. Kohn's views about the Founding Era are consistent with his post-Cold War arguments. He views the civil-military relationship as one that should exhibit absolute and unquestionable domination of the former over the latter, in every respect.

In addition to the constitutional arrangements to safeguard liberty, Kohn argued that the Founders were so concerned about the deleterious effects that a peacetime Army could have on liberal democracy that they took auxiliary measures to establish the state militias as a *countervailing power* to the Army. If the Army was inclined to interfere with domestic politics or threaten liberty it would, at the very least, have to consider the strength of the state militias before acting. Although a radical idea for that time, the notion of state militias and individuals as countervailing forces to federal power was very consistent with Madisonian concepts for government, concepts apparent throughout the Constitution.⁶¹

⁵⁸ To see Madison's discussion of the dangers of factions and for the need to separate power to control them, see Federalist Paper #10.

⁵⁹ Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975).

⁶⁰ Richard Kohn, ed., The Constitution and The US Army (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: The Army War College, 1988).

⁶¹ Kohn, The Constitution and the US Army, ch. 1.

Given their recent history with King George, it was not surprising that the Founders were suspicious of peacetime armies. Further evidence of this kind can be found with the Third Amendment that prohibits soldiers from arbitrarily occupying the homes of American citizens, one of the main complaints of colonists prior to the Revolution. The fear of soldiers meddling in politics was not entirely without basis in the American context either. Kohn described a plot to take over the new government by some former Revolutionary War officers--one of whom included Alexander Hamilton. The coup failed when George Washington refused to support it. But this was not the kind of safeguard the Founders had in mind. If the new nation relied on virtuous individuals to save it from coups, the Republic would not long survive. That is why the Constitution established structural and auxiliary safeguards for civilian control of the military.⁶²

The work done by the Founders in the name of liberty created what some historians have called "*the American way of war*,"⁶³ deterrence through a naval presence and ground wars fought initially by a small professional force augmented when necessary by a citizen-Army comprised of state militias and a temporary draft. This model provided for the national defense while ensuring liberty was not threatened by a meddling peacetime force. The Founding Era paradigm remained essentially unchanged for nearly 200 years, despite attempts to modify it by both civilian and military reformers alike. First came the military reformers, including the visionary Emory Upton, a West Point history professor who was an expert on the emerging professional armies of Europe. But as Stephen Skowronek pointed out,

⁶² Kohn, Eagle and Sword. See also, Edward M. Coffman, "The Constitution and the US Army: The Officer." in The Constitution and the US Army, edited by Richard Kohn, pps. 26-27.

⁶³ Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973).

Upton's attempt to change the American way of war from reliance on State Militias to a larger, more professional peacetime force (paralleling reforms that were going on in European Armies at the time, especially the Prussian military), ultimately failed because of the political opposition offered by governors, Congressmen from the South, and labor leaders, in a political system dominated by "courts and parties."⁶⁴ The demise of the Upton reform effort demonstrated the importance of domestic politics in the defense decisionmaking process long before the advent of military industrial complex and the Cold War.

Although it did not cause a paradigmatic shift in the way the US prepared for and fought wars, Progressive Era reforms led by Elihu Root, President Teddy Roosevelt's Secretary of War, did professionalize the regular army through enhanced officer education, and the creation of a general's staff. In addition, these reforms ultimately inspired the creation in 1916 of the National Guard out of the old state militia system. This structural change superimposed federal standards and control mechanisms over the heretofore state-dominated arrangement. All of these initiatives helped to bring the American defense establishment into the 20th century and make it at least somewhat comparable to European systems.⁶⁵ It should be noted, however, that these reforms constituted a compromise between the forces that wanted to change the American way of war and those who wanted it to remain the same; no paradigmatic shift took place and the US still relied on the expansive Army concept during wartime.

Throughout the 1930s, international politics and the rise of fascism and communist power prompted new scholarly research on the effects of large peacetime

⁶⁴ Stephen Skowronek, Building A New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pps. 85-120.

⁶⁵ Skowronek, Building a New American State, pps. 212-247.

forces on political systems in general, and personal liberty and freedom, in particular. The two most prominent works of this era were Alfred Vagts' A History of Militarism,⁶⁶ and Harold Lasswell's "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence," initially published in the American Journal of Sociology.⁶⁷

In his discussion of civil-military relations, Vagts distinguished between "the military way" and "the militaristic way." The passage below illustrates the difference between the two.

...Since modern armies are not so constantly engaged in combat as were the ancient armies, they are more liable to forget their true purpose, war, and the maintenance of the state to which they belong. Becoming narcissistic, they dream that they exist for themselves alone. An army so built that it serves military men, not war, is militaristic.⁶⁸

Vagts argued that when militaries cease to be selfless servants of the state and instead work towards promoting their own agendas and interests, they exhibit "militaristic" behavior. This is distinguished from the expected behavior--that of preparing for and winning the nation's wars when directed to do so by the appropriate civilian authorities. At first glance this seems to be a useful distinction. But as many authors have pointed out, it is hard to imagine any bureaucracy not pursuing its own interests. Certainly there is a huge body of literature that predicts bureaucracies will act this way.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937).

⁶⁷ Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence." American Journal of Sociology (January 1941): 455-468.

⁶⁸ Vagts, A History of Militarism, p. 15.

⁶⁹ There are many works that one could consult to learn more about bureaucracies pursuing their own agendas. Among them two prominent ones are, Morton Halperin, "Why Bureaucrats Play Games" Foreign Policy 2 (1971): 70-90, and Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966).

Lasswell's central argument was that the distinction between the civilian and the military becomes blurred when nations live in a constant state of preparedness for war. Skills become merged and values such as efficiency and loyalty take on paramount importance. Bureaucrats become even more important than elected officials and state-sponsored and managed propaganda efforts are rationalized in the name of national survival. Eventually the "Garrison State" needs a war to maintain credibility.⁷⁰ Even though this piece was written in response to the rise of fascism in the 1930s, it is easy to see why that argument resonated in America with the advent of the Cold War.⁷¹

Both of these authors provide a bridge between the first and second time periods because they wrote during an era when existing assumptions were being stretched to their limits as the world prepared for a long and bloody war. They warned that large peacetime Armies would adversely affect governmental behavior and human interactions. The problem, of course, was that to defeat the forces of fascism in the war that seemed imminent, liberal democracies had to expand their armed forces, restrict civil liberties and tighten national security provisions.

The Cold War Era

After World War II the American people expected a rapid and complete demobilization of the Armed Forces. That did not happen.⁷² Initially a large peacetime force was required to carry out occupation duties in Germany, Japan and in

⁷⁰ Lasswell, "The Garrison State," 455-468.

⁷¹ Andrew Goodman, "Atomic Fantasies and Make-Believe War: The American State, Social Control, and Civil Defense Planning, 1946-1952," Political Power and Social Theory 9 (1995): 91-120.

⁷² Louis Smith, "The American Tradition of Civil Dominance," American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), pps. 17-36.

other places throughout the world. Although by mid-1947 significant progress had been made in discharging soldiers, emerging confrontation with the USSR prevented the full-scale demobilization experienced following all previous wars in American history. This phenomenon touched off a flurry of research activity in the field of civil-military relations as scholars assessed the impact of the first large peacetime force in United States history.⁷³

In early 1951, Louis Smith provided an over-arching historiography of American civil-military relations from the Founding Era forward.⁷⁴ Consistent with earlier works, Smith characterized the American tradition as one of civilian dominance over the military, primarily by keeping that institution small and relying on the National Guard for the bulk of combat power in major wars. Further, civilian adventurism was to be averted by having dual supervision over the military between the President and Congress. Madisonian logic was employed to ensure that ambition would counteract ambition. But to Smith, just as Shay's Rebellion of 1786 caused the Founders to re-think, and ultimately change the civil-military relationship and defense establishment under the Articles of Confederation, the onset of the Cold War required fundamental change as well. He argued that, like it or not, large peacetime forces were the reality of the post-war environment and liberal democracies would have to adjust to that fact. The American tradition would have to be altered.⁷⁵

⁷³ Harold D. Lasswell, *National Security and Individual Freedom* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1950); Smith, "The American Tradition of Civil Dominance," pps. 17-36; Arthur A. Ekirch, *The Civilian and the Military* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Huntington, *Soldier and the State*; Walter Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History* (New York: Putnam, 1956); Walter Millis, Harvey Mansfield, and Harold Stein, *Arms and the State: Civil-Military Elements in National Policy* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958).

⁷⁴ Smith, "The American Tradition of Civil Dominance," pps. 17-36.

⁷⁵ Smith, "The American Tradition of Civil Dominance." pps. 35-36.

That new reality provided the starting point for Samuel Huntington, a scholar concerned about the state of US civil-military relations in the 1950s. His first major work, The Soldier and the State,⁷⁶ provided a theory of political-military affairs, an extensive historical treatise on the history of US civil-military relations to that point, and a new normative framework for civilian control of the military. In many respects his argument for how to maintain civilian control, despite the presence of large peacetime forces, still dominates thinking on this subject today, although new theoretical work is attempting to replace or modify his model. Huntington's empirical model (using functional and societal imperatives as independent variables and methods of civilian control as the dependent variable) was sketched in chapter 1. However, his argument deserves a fuller development here.

Huntington identified two methods of civilian control of the military employed by US policymakers prior to the Cold War--*extirpation* and *transmutation*. The former was the method of reducing the size of the military after wars were completed. Extirpation ensured civilian control by keeping the military small enough to prevent encroachment on the liberal way of life. Moreover, state militias served as a countervailing force in the unlikely event that the professional military sought to seize political power. In contrast, in times of crises when the armed forces had to be greatly expanded, transmutation was employed--the military was civilianized.

...When it has been necessary to maintain armed force, American liberalism has insisted upon a rigorous subjective civilian control, the refashioning of the military institutions along liberal lines so that they lose their peculiarly military characteristics. This is a policy of transmutation.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957).

⁷⁷ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 155.

These methods were no longer available to policymakers during the Cold War. Faced with the Soviet threat which necessitated large peacetime forces, the extirpation option was ruled out.⁷⁸ Transmutation, on the other hand, was never designed to be a permanent method of civilian control. Because it entailed politicizing the officer corps (military officers embracing the politics of the dominant regime) there were other civil-military concerns with this approach over the long-term.⁷⁹ These conditions led Huntington to argue for a new method of civilian control--one reliant on military professionalism. Huntington argued that his approach--“objective control”--would enhance national security and ensure civilian control, seemingly escaping the civil-military problematique.

To implement objective control Huntington argued that civilian authorities needed to construct a narrow sphere (within the national security issue area) within which the military would determine their own policies. By enticing the military with some autonomy, Huntington hypothesized that senior military officers would self-impose strict non-partisanship norms throughout the ranks, and preparation for war would be the primary concern of soldiers. Non-partisanship and apolitical stances would not be forced upon the military: rather, they would be fostered and cherished by the military itself as it policed its own ranks of inappropriate political behavior. In return, soldiers would be permitted to make operational decisions on matters pertaining to actual combat. Decisions above that level would be determined by civilian authorities. This, it was thought, would foster professionalism throughout the ranks.⁸⁰ Soldiers would be permitted to become the “managers of violence” and military culture would become separate and distinct from American society. In fact,

⁷⁸ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ch 13.

⁷⁹ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ch 6.

⁸⁰ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pps. 83-85.

Huntington argued that this divorce between the civilian and military was inevitable as the “military mind” was inherently more conservative than traditional Lockean liberal society.⁸¹

Huntington’s model relied heavily on military professionalism. He defined a profession as an institution that evidences “expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.”⁸² Expertise came through training, but it was also fostered by a life long commitment to acquiring professional knowledge.

...Professional knowledge, however, is intellectual in nature and capable of preservation in writing. Professional knowledge has a history, and some knowledge of that history is essential to professional competence. Institutions of research and education are required for the extension and transmission of professional knowledge and skill. Contact is maintained between the academic and practical side of a profession through journals, conferences, and circulation of personnel between practice and teaching.⁸³

Expertise for the officer meant “the management of violence.” The responsibility was grave--the protection of the state. The corporate nature of the officer corps ensured that behavior antithetical to the principles of officership would be ruthlessly eradicated from within.⁸⁴ Through objective control, military professionalism (expertise, responsibility, and corporateness) would be enhanced and the continuance of civilian control in an era of expanded peacetime forces would be ensured. In this way, Huntington agreed with Vagts that militaries should focus on winning wars, not on politics and promoting their own bureaucratic interests.

⁸¹ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, ch 4.

⁸² Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 8.

⁸³ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 8.

⁸⁴ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 11.

There are problems with Huntington's treatment of military professionalism. First, his argument is tautological. Militaries that are professional do not interfere in politics and militaries that do intervene in the political process are unprofessional--no substantial argument for causality is offered. In addition, this narrow definition of appropriate military behavior foreclosed the kind of political-military advice that President Kennedy subsequently demanded of the JCS in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs.⁸⁵ More important, as Samuel Finer pointed out, military professionalism does not necessarily eradicate political skills in the officer corps. Finer found that in Latin American countries some features of professionalism actually helped the military subvert civilian control. For example, because professionalism enhances decisiveness and organizational skills, these traits facilitated coup planning, coordination, and execution.⁸⁶

Despite its weaknesses, Huntington's model did an adequate job explaining the US civil-military relationship during the Cold War. The functional imperative (the relative degree of external threat) was the dominating factor in the change of control methods (from extirpation to transmutation), precisely what the model predicted. Moreover, and more important, the military embraced Huntington's normative framework providing a synergistic boost to the model's assumptions. The military accepted the argument that true professionalism required a norm eschewing politics.

⁸⁵ In NSAM 55, President to CJCS, 28 June 1961, Kennedy demanded that his Joint Chiefs provide politically sensitive military advice and as if they were the decisionmaker, not the advisor. See, Willard J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), p. 60.

⁸⁶ Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), pps. 24-26.

However, Huntington's model is weakened in the post-Cold War era, for several reasons, some of which have already been mentioned in chapter 1. The primary weakness is his causal claim pertaining to military autonomy. Huntington argued that when autonomy was granted military professionalism would increase, and as that occurred, military political activity would decrease. This causal link has faltered in the post-Cold War era. Autonomy and power have further increased for the military since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols.⁸⁷ Military professionalism was cited as a major contributing factor for the successes of the Persian Gulf War.⁸⁸ Yet, military political activity and influence have increased at the same time.⁸⁹ Moreover, the distinction between the operational and strategic/political spheres has blurred in recent years. Although arguably this distinction always has been fuzzy, with the proliferation of OOTW, the differences between soldierly and diplomatic/political skills have become nearly indistinguishable in some instances. Indeed, recent Army manuals illustrate this fact. FM 100-23 Peace Operations, cites *mediation* and *negotiation* as two critical skills for military officers in OOTW.⁹⁰ This is a far cry from the traditional soldierly skills of hand-to-hand combat, marksmanship skills, and physical fitness. The point is not that mediation and negotiation are completely new skills for the military, for they are not (witness the contributions of General George C. Marshall in particular). Rather, the significance of this is that the Army has incorporated these skills into their written guidance to commanders. Beyond FM 100-

⁸⁷ Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal."

⁸⁸ James Blackwell, Thunder in the Desert. (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), pps. 213-238.

⁸⁹ Kohn, "Out of Control."

⁹⁰ U. S. Army, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Va: Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), p. 17.

23, two other manuals, in particular, provide political-military guidance. FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, co-written with the US Marine Corps, provides guidance for the execution of disaster relief missions in the US. This manual also discusses the opportunities that these deployments create for advancing military interests.

...Additionally, domestic support operations provide excellent opportunities for soldiers to interface with the civilian community and demonstrate traditional Army values such as teamwork, success-oriented attitude, and patriotism. These demonstrations provide positive examples of values that can benefit the community and also promote a favorable view of the Army to the civilian population.⁹¹

In other parts of the manual, the guidance has an aggressive tone with political implications.

...Army commanders will frequently coordinate with the civilian emergency managers, both professional and volunteer. They are often referred to as the 'coordinators of emergency services' or similar titles and, in smaller jurisdictions, may be the fire chief, police chief, or other official. In these circumstances the Army will--establish achievable objectives, establish clear termination standards and tailor forces to the mission.⁹²

Moreover, DA Pamphlet 600-80 Executive Leadership, is explicit about the political nature of the Army general.

...Requirements (for senior leaders) in this area include: regularly communicating with the Congress and the Administration acting as a spokesperson for the organization with other federal agencies, the media, significant influentials at the national level, and the public at large; building and maintaining a network of

⁹¹ US Army and US Marine Corps, FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, (Fort Monroe, Va: Training and Doctrine Command, 1994) p. 1-4.

⁹² FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, p. 1-6.

information sources that can be used to understand and influence the environment.⁹³

Because these manuals are *new*, comparative methodologies where systematic and even quantitative analyses are done on the changes to existing doctrine are not possible.⁹⁴ The creation of these manuals supports the idea that military tasks are increasingly political and diplomatic in nature. Moreover, these manuals provide general guidance for *all* commanders, not just the especially politically astute ones like Marshall and MacArthur.

It is apparent from reviewing the new doctrine, and from examination of other sources, that objective control is no longer working from a normative perspective either. Since Vietnam, military norms have been changing to the point that it is no longer clear that the senior leadership accepts Huntington's narrow definition of professionalism, despite the fact that it continues to be taught to junior officers.⁹⁵ In reaction to the McNamara and Vietnam experiences, the military today does not eschew politics. In fact, it actively seeks to influence the political process although the decline in civilian national security expertise in recent years has contributed significantly to this trend. Huntington's work still provides some insight today, 40 years after it was initially published. But the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of OOTW has created the need for new scholarship and theory to explain civil-military relations and to provide a framework for policy recommendations that ensures civilian control while promoting sound defense policy.

⁹³ US Army, DA Pamphlet 600-80 Executive Leadership (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, 1987), pps. 10-11.

⁹⁴ See, for example, Elizabeth Kier, Changes in Conventional Military Doctrines: The Cultural Roots of Doctrinal Change (PhD Diss. Cornell University, 1992).

⁹⁵ My evidence is presented in chapter 5 where I show that, different from previous eras, the senior leadership was chosen despite extensive political and political-military experiences.

Writing in 1960, with an updating in 1971, Morris Janowitz offered an alternative normative and explanatory model to Huntington's.⁹⁶ Similar to many authors of his time, Janowitz approached American politics from the pluralist theoretical perspective. He treated the military as a pressure group.⁹⁷

...the military profession and the military establishment conform more to the pattern of an administrative pressure group, but one with a strong internal conflict of interest. It is a very special pressure group because of its immense resources, and because of its grave problems of national security. The military have accumulated considerable power, and that power protrudes into the political fabric of contemporary society. It could not be otherwise. However, while they have no reluctance to press for larger budgets, they exercise their influence on political matters with considerable restraint and unease.⁹⁸

Because he believed that even professional and loyal military officers would still attempt to influence the political process in pursuit of institutional goals, Janowitz normative framework for US civil-military relations favored “subjective control” of the military. Like Huntington, Janowitz acknowledged differences among civilians and the professional military, but Janowitz distinguished among three different types of military officers too; heroic leaders, managers, and technocrats. According to Janowitz, the services could not succeed without all three. Further, to ensure proper civil-military relations a balance had to be struck among these different

⁹⁶ Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

⁹⁷ For other works from the pluralist perspective see, Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press, 1961); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952; Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, 2nd edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951); James Q. Wilson, Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973); and Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969).

⁹⁸ Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. viii.

military types. Too many heroic leaders (like MacArthur) might provide excellent battle leadership, but might also degrade civil-military relations as demagogues might be inclined to ignore civilian leadership and appeal directly to the people. Too many technocrats might facilitate weapons procurement and development, but combat effectiveness might suffer, and civilian control over the budget process might be degraded as well. Managers were useful for Janowitz as they often brokered the peace among heroic leaders and technocrats while ensuring efficient usage of resources. In the atomic era, Janowitz believed that the importance of the heroic leader would decrease since future wars might only involve nuclear weapons, or at least be dominated by nuclear strategy. This would allow the managers and technocrats to achieve parity in prestige, if not surpass the heroic leaders.⁹⁹

According to Janowitz, subjective control was partially maintained by having the three factions compete among one another, thereby requiring civilian forces to broker and keep the peace. At the same time, this balance would promote efficient use of resources, and adequate combat leadership and research and development. Additionally, the relationship between civilian and military institutions would be one of mutual respect. Civilians would listen to military advice, but the military would defer to civilian guidance and direction. This rather imprecise idea is similar, in some ways, to Huntington's "narrow sphere of autonomy," but Janowitz did not advance a concrete definition as such. It was based more on a mutual understanding and respect for the disparate roles of the two.¹⁰⁰

However, the bedrock of civilian control ultimately resided with an intense management regime--not military professionalism (although Janowitz, too, believed military professionalism was an important component of civilian control). According

⁹⁹ Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, chs. 2-3.

¹⁰⁰ Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pps. 365-367.

to Janowitz, civilian leaders needed to superimpose societal values on the military. Moreover, this approach required active civilian leadership and the management of military officer promotions and assignments. It is evident that Janowitz's model, in general, presumes a high level of national security experience among elected and politically appointed leaders in the DOD. For the 1960s and 1970s this was a plausible method of civilian control as the experienced World War II generation was very prepared to perform these tasks. However, in the 1990s with declining civilian military experience and increasing interservice harmony, subjective control is an increasingly risky normative model for civil-military relations.

Some of Janowitz's observations about the military are probably outdated as well. He accurately captured the "fox-hole" mentality and anti-intellectualism found within the leadership ranks in the 1960s in an Army dominated by World War II veterans.

...Negativism towards intellectual pursuits is rooted partially in the fear that unguided intellectualism produces irresponsibility. Clearly, action, and responsibility for one's action, are more valued than reflection in any organization where combat is the basic goal. Thus, despite its propensity to introduce technological change, the military establishment remains resistant to sudden innovations or brilliant insights which might cause doubt and temporary paralysis. Among professional soldiers, anti-intellectualism can also express itself in an uncritical veneration of the military treatises of the past which, with almost metaphysical reverence, are taken as permanent contributions to military doctrine. Another manifestation of anti-intellectualism is the reduction of complex problems to technical formations. Ideas are judged as practical or impractical after there has been a staff study by men who can exaggerate the power of their "generalist" thinking.¹⁰¹

But today's leadership is different. The promotion of intellectual development was another norms change brought on by the McNamara and Vietnam experiences. These changes have been noticed outside the military too. Even Congressman Ronald

¹⁰¹ Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 431.

Dellums, often a military critic in the 25 years he has served in Washington, DC, has acknowledged this trend.¹⁰²

Although he founded the sociological school as an alternative to Huntington, Janowitz also emphasized the importance of military professionalism for the US civil-military relationship. Although Janowitz recognized the bureaucratic politics associated with military behavior in the political sphere, and the narrowing skill differential between military and civilian elites, like Huntington he identified military professionalism as important to civilian control.¹⁰³ Thus his formulation is as problematic as Huntington's in an era in which the military's attitude towards political behavior is changing. New norms are undermining the Huntington and Janowitz models.

The military definition of professionalism is not the same as it was during the Vietnam War. Today's professional aims to be, at once, a consummate soldier and politician.¹⁰⁴

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam War had a profound impact on the United States military and the reforms initiated in the wake of that conflict affected not only combat readiness and effectiveness, but civil-military relations as well. Indeed, the Vietnam War

¹⁰² Interview with Congressman Ronald V. Dellums, (D-CA), conducted 12 June 1997 in his office.

¹⁰³ Feaver, *The Civil-Military Problematique*, p. 166.

¹⁰⁴ Although they view this trend as an unfortunate development for both the Army and US civil-military relations, this is one of the findings of the study completed by Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell and Jane Mahaffey. See, *Who Will Lead: Senior Leadership in the United States Army* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1995), p. 227.

transformed the institution's self-image and values. Norms and practices changed which subsequently altered the civil-military relationship.

A respectable fighting force at the outset, the US military by the end of the war was a demoralized institution plagued by drug problems, racial strife, "fraggings", absenteeism, low morale and ineffectiveness.¹⁰⁵ In the aftermath of the Vietnam War the military initiated a set of internal reforms in a style not seen since Emory Upton and Elihu Root and the renaissance of the late 19th and early 20th century.¹⁰⁶ At the same time the military was attempting to rebuild, it was also moving to an all-volunteer force (AVF), and coping with the traditional reductions in force structure and spending levels that historically followed the aftermath of a war.¹⁰⁷

After Vietnam, there were many disaffected military officers who wanted to revive the institution. General William E. DePuy was one of those committed to reforming the post-Vietnam Army. DePuy had served two tours in Vietnam, the second as a division commander. Both through Vietnam service, and during his follow-on assignment at the Pentagon, DePuy recognized the deficiencies in established doctrine, and the need to develop a new "theory of victory" for the Army. DePuy was instrumental in changing the doctrine of the United States and reorienting the Army away from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the prospective European battlefield where recent changes in Soviet organization and doctrine had caused serious concern for strategic planners.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵Haynes and Johnson, Washington Post, September 16, 1971, p. A12.

¹⁰⁶ James Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

¹⁰⁷Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command & General Staff College, 1994), ch 1.

¹⁰⁸Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5 Operations (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), ch. 1.

Doctrine's rise in importance was yet another significant norm change within the military after Vietnam. Prior to Vietnam, doctrine was de-emphasized and the existing battlefield guidance lacked a unifying theme and vision of success. The doctrinal debate that took place after that conflict was one of the earliest examples of intellectual renewal in the military.¹⁰⁹ DePuy's efforts sparked a comprehensive reform movement within the Army. Adopted in 1976, his doctrine, termed "Active Defense" envisioned mobile formations of tanks and mechanized infantry defending Europe. Although it was a marked improvement over the previous doctrine, it was highly criticized for relying too much on defense, not providing guidance for integration of all available military resources (i.e. Air Force, Naval Gunfire, and Attack Helicopters), and for focusing too narrowly on the European theater.¹¹⁰

DePuy's doctrine was soon replaced by General Donn Starry's Airland Battle doctrine in 1982. This battlefield doctrine invigorated the military with its emphasis on maneuver warfare (an offensively-oriented plan that focuses on key objectives and not necessarily enemy forces), integrated army-air force employment, and reliance on overwhelming combat power and decisive action. Airland Battle doctrine provided the vision that linked together all reform efforts. The doctrine introduced the critical concept of the "deep attack" that called for joint Army and Air Force teamwork and focused on destroying the enemy's follow-on echelons and disrupting his command and control and logistics operations thus creating the conditions for decisive offensive action.¹¹¹ This new doctrine required changes in organizational structure,

¹⁰⁹ Frederick Kagan, "Army Doctrine and Modern War," Parameters 27:1 (Spring 1997): 134-151.

¹¹⁰ John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle (Fort Monroe, Va: TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, 1984), ch. 1.

¹¹¹ For more on Airland Battle see Army Field Manual 100-5 Operations (Fort Monroe, Va: TRADOC, 1982, 1986, 1993).

procurement, training and leader development and accelerated reform efforts throughout the Army.¹¹²

DePuy has received credit for bringing doctrinal debate to the center of Army thinking, even if his ideas were eventually replaced.¹¹³ The evolution of Airland Battle doctrine not only provided the recipe for military revival, it also gave the nation's civilian leaders the capacity to influence international politics in a manner not seen since before Vietnam. Since the adoption of Airland Battle doctrine in 1982 the military has conducted combat operations in Grenada, Panama and the Persian Gulf, with marked improvement each time. This doctrine has figured prominently in the nation's ability to project its power abroad.¹¹⁴

Intellectual renewal and enhanced esprit de corps were two primary goals of post-Vietnam reforms. Doctrinal reform was part of that program. Another component was a change in the military's attitude towards graduate education. The new outlook on graduate school was, in large part, caused by the military's reaction to the McNamara "Revolution in Pentagon Management" (discussed in detail in chapter 6). Briefly stated, McNamara's management reforms changed the language and operating procedures within the Pentagon in ways that favored well educated Ivy Leaguers and Rand Corporation analysts at the expense of combat-experienced military officers. To better understand systems analysis and other management techniques employed by the Whiz Kids, the military realized it needed more

¹¹² For a treatment of the doctrinal debate from the civilian perspective see, Daniel Wirls, Build-Up: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pps. 82-91. Wirls agrees with this perspective but argues that those military reformers succeeded by aligning themselves with the broader reform in Congress--an argument not disputed here.

¹¹³ Ibid. p. 2.

¹¹⁴ Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and AntiWar. (New York: Time Warner Company, 1993), pps. 48-63.

education. More officers were subsequently sent to graduate school.¹¹⁵ Of course, the military had been sending officers to graduate school for years, but after the McNamara experience, officers were sent for advanced degrees in American politics, international relations, business administration, and systems analysis, in addition to the traditional physical science degrees (to support particular weapons systems like nuclear weapons, bombers and the like) sought in the past. In short, the military endeavored to become proficient in the skills emphasized by the McNamara system. The significant increase in graduate degrees among senior officers since Vietnam is demonstrated in the table below.

Table 2
Percentage of Officers With Advanced Degrees
Colonel through General, All Services¹¹⁶

	1971	1982	1994
O-6 Colonel	45.4	74.5	89.4
O-7 Brigadier General	62.1	80.7	88.5
O-8 Major General	43.0	79.3	86.9
O-9 Lieutenant General	30.6	68.4	86.5
O-10 General	12.5	73.5	88.9
Overall	45.8	74.7	89.2

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management

This table sharply reveals the change in military norms towards post-graduate education. At the end of the Vietnam War less than half of the senior officers had

¹¹⁵ Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper, 1969); Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1965); William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper, 1964); and Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ansell and Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead? Senior Leadership in the United States Army (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1995).

¹¹⁶ Advanced degrees are those above the Bachelor's level (i.e. MA, MPA, PhD, etc.).

advanced degrees. Only two decades later this figured doubled. To be promoted to the most senior ranks, officers had to have a graduate degree. Norms changed as a result of the institutional signal sent off by the promotion board results. More than any other means, these results convey to junior officers what is expected of them. The message of graduate schooling came through very clear. Throughout the ranks, behavior and attitudes soon conformed to the change in norms.

Another area where attitudinal changes occurred was the *vocal* military opposition to the use of force, especially when goals were not clearly identified and attainable.¹¹⁷ Of course, as other studies have shown, the military was no more bellicose than their civilian counter-parts even before Vietnam.¹¹⁸ However, in the post-Vietnam era, the military has been more vocal in its opposition. This was not the case with the JCS during the McNamara era.¹¹⁹ Emboldened by an increase in public support (see table below), and a desire to prevent another unpopular ground war, the military since Vietnam has endeavored to influence civilian authorities to use force only as a last resort and to be cautious about the dangers of ill-defined and unattainable objectives.

¹¹⁷ Deborah Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?"

¹¹⁸ Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); and David H. Petraeus, "The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam: A Study of Military Influence and the Use of Force in the Post-Vietnam Era," (PhD. diss., Princeton University, 1987).

¹¹⁹ H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the lies that led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997, ch. 5.

Table 3
Post-Vietnam
Confidence in American Institutions¹²⁰
 (Percentage saying "great deal" or "quite a lot")

	1975	1981	1983	1989	Mar 1991	Oct 1991	1995
Military	58	50	53	63	85	69	64
Congress	40	29	28	32	30	18	21
Big Business	34	20	28	*	26	22	21
Organized Labor	38	20	28	*	25	22	26
Organized Religion	68	64	62	52	59	56	57

Source: Gallup Poll. *Denotes years that data was not compiled for those areas.

Military reluctance to use force has had profound effects on civil-military relations and has been a source of controversy since Vietnam. For example, when former Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger issued a pronouncement that delineated six prerequisites for the commitment of United States troops, that policy was drafted by senior military officers and often conflicted with the policy recommendations from the Department of State and the advice of its Secretary George Shultz, in particular.¹²¹ The reluctance of the military to recommend the use of force has caused some to complain that this circumscribing of options is an example of a civil-military relationship out of control.¹²²

Defense Reform: Congress and the President

The foregoing discussions should not be construed to argue that the sole impetus for all post-Vietnam military reforms came from within. In fact, both

¹²⁰Leslie McAneeny and David W. Moore, "American Confidence in Public Institutions Rises: Military Remains Number One," *Gallup Poll Monthly* 356 (May 1995): 11-13.

¹²¹Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil Military Relations." *National Interest* (Spring 1994): 8.

¹²²Richard Kohn makes this argument in "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil Military Relations."

Congress and the President played significant roles in the defense reform debate in the 1980s. Some members of Congress were particularly influential. One--Senator Gary Hart--seized upon this issue to propel his candidacy for the presidency in 1984.¹²³ Senator Sam Nunn and Representative Newt Gingrich also earned reputations as defense intellectuals during this period.¹²⁴

Daniel Wirls has argued in Build-Up, that the Defense Reform movement of the 1980s was actually a compromise position constructed by moderates and a demonstration of the salience of domestic politics in national security decisionmaking.¹²⁵

...Generally avoiding the controversy surrounding the nuclear arms race, a coalition of members of Congress, public interest groups, military officers, and civilian analysts began to champion reform of conventional war strategy, conventional weaponry, military organization, and the arms procurement process. Although it would take longer for military reform to become a force to be reckoned with in American politics, with Congress as its institutional base, it was eventually to eclipse both the buildup and the peace movement as the dominant defense policy agenda.¹²⁶

By the mid-1980s, the public zeal for continued high levels of defense spending was waning. Some Liberals were pushing for a unilateral nuclear freeze, which was popular among a substantial group in society. At the same time, staunch conservatives continued to push for an increase in defense spending. Wirls argued that a middle position was created as a compromise among these two polar

¹²³ Wirls, Build-Up, p. 89.

¹²⁴ Newt Gingrich describes his contributions in the areas of defense reform and the post-Vietnam military renaissance in his forward to Alvin and Heidi Toffler's, Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, Inc., 1995), pps. 15-16.

¹²⁵ Wirls, Build-Up, pps. 102-132.

¹²⁶ Wirls, Build-Up, p. 79.

alternatives. Perhaps it was possible to have a strong defense, but one that would be efficient too. If the US was going to spend a lot of money on defense, then at least that money should be spent wisely, and the money saved could be applied to domestic needs. This moderate position was attractive to large numbers of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress, and the momentum of this coalition allowed that institution to take the lead in defense reform.¹²⁷

The Reagan administration, realizing the importance of the issue and not wanting to get too far behind the Congress, launched a commission of its own to investigate the defense establishment. Ultimately, however, the Packard Commission was not as influential as the Congressional efforts that were codified into law with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.¹²⁸

Defense reform was attempted throughout the early 1980s but was unsuccessful until Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. The key sponsors for this Bill came from both Houses of Congress and both political parties. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), former presidential candidate, and a major general in the United States Air Force Reserve was Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee during the debates on defense reorganization. Congressman Bill Nichols (D-AL), a combat veteran of World War II, was chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee when it was looking into defense reform from 1983-1986. These two men were instrumental in the reform movement, but this bipartisan effort was significantly influenced by the Locher Report resulting from a

¹²⁷ Wirls, Build-Up, pps. 102-132.

¹²⁸ David Packard and the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, An Interim Report to the President, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 28 February 1986).

Congressionally sponsored investigation of the defense establishment released in 1985.¹²⁹

The changes that ultimately were adopted in this piece of legislation significantly altered both process and product throughout the defense establishment and is key to the argument in this dissertation. Thus a fuller discussion of the purposes and politics of this legislation is called for here. As James Locher (the Professional Staff Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee principally responsible for the Congressionally chartered reform effort) stated, the two broad objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act were to strengthen civilian control over the military and to enhance joint interoperability (inter-service harmony and teamwork).¹³⁰ Congress, long opposed to such reform, changed its view only after testimony made it clear that national security depended on these changes.¹³¹ Grenada, especially, revealed the weaknesses inherent in the existing system as the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army could not even communicate with each other because their radios were incompatible. Moreover, planning was ineffectual as the priority went to ensuring that each service was adequately included in the ground tactical plan

¹²⁹ US Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Defense Organization: The Need For Change. Staff Report. 16 October 1985. Also, for an excellent series of articles on the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, see the special edition of Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn 1996).

¹³⁰ Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pps. 337-338.

¹³¹ See, Congressional Record, P.L. 99-433 Hearing 5.13, "Organization, Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 7," Hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, November 3, 1983, pps. 277-310.

instead of choosing the optimal course of action.¹³² Mindful of these shortcomings, Congress identified eight specific goals for this reform initiative.¹³³

The Goals of Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

- 1.) To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority.¹³⁴
- 2.) To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
- 3.) To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
- 4.) To ensure that the authority of commanders is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
- 5.) To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
- 6.) To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
- 7.) To improve joint officer management policies.¹³⁵
- 8.) Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration.¹³⁶

The Consequences of Goldwater-Nichols: Intended and Unintended

The Act ultimately affected five sets of actors within the DOD, 1) the Chairman and the rest of the JCS, 2) the Commanders-in Chiefs (CINCs) of the

¹³² Mark Adkin, *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada* (Lexington, Mass: Heath and Company, 1989).

¹³³ James R. Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols." *Joint Force Quarterly* Autumn, 1996. pps. 10-16.

¹³⁴ The major concern was over military effectiveness and responsiveness to civilian direction. This concern was spotlighted after the failed Iranian Hostage Rescue Operation. More civilian control over the budget and procurement process was sought as well.

¹³⁵ Officers who served with the Joint Staff had notoriously bad promotion rates and follow-on assignment patterns. Goldwater-Nichols sought to address these concerns.

¹³⁶ Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," pps. 10-11.

respective unified commands, 3) the Military Departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), 4) the Secretary of Defense and the inner workings of his immediate staff, and finally, 5) the career category of joint warfare specialists within the uniformed military.¹³⁷

The Chairman was empowered by elevating him above the rest of the JCS, making him the principal military advisor to the president and secretary of defense. Moreover, the Act required the Chairman to report to the President and to Congress from time to time with advice on strategy and force structure, and gave him more power and control over the Joint Staff that heretofore had been largely influenced by the respective services. In addition, the Act created the position of Vice Chairman, JCS. This precluded the corporate JCS and the ranking service chief from over-influencing policy decisions when the Chairman was out of town. Previously, whenever the Chairman left Washington, DC, the highest ranking member of the JCS became Acting Chairman. This confounded jointness as the services often took advantage of those periods when their top officer was at the helm. Moreover, the Vice Chairman was appointed as head of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) to ensure jointness in the procurement process which was judged woefully inadequate after Congressional testimony covering operations in Grenada revealed a lack of interoperability among the services' communications equipment.¹³⁸

The chain of command was changed to extend from the President to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman, JCS (not a formal member of the chain,

¹³⁷ Sharon K. Weiner, "Congressional Influence On The Evolution of Jointness in the U.S. Military," Harvard Project on Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations. Conference Paper presented at the Harvard Conference entitled "A Crisis in Civilian Control?" held at the Olin Institute, 10-12 June 1996.

¹³⁸ See Congressional Record, P.L. 99-433 Hearings 5.14, "Organization Structure and Decisionmaking Procedures of the Department of Defense, Part 8," hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, November 9, 1983, pps. 312-358.

but a military facilitator) to the CINCs. This change was designed to clarify the chain of command and has produced mixed reviews. The precise role of the Chairman remains ambiguous, as evidenced by the controversy over Powell's power and influence during the Gulf War.

Previously the various service chiefs wielded enormous power in budgetary and personnel decisions. This came at the expense of the CINCs. Thus, Goldwater-Nichols was viewed as essential to enhance combat effectiveness and to reduce service parochialism; CINCs had previously fared poorly often losing out to the pet projects of the respective services.

The position of Secretary of Defense was strengthened to clarify his role in relation to the other service secretaries and with regard to the chain of command. The Secretary of Defense was next in line after the President. But the key change for the Secretary was the authority given to him to assign his own tasks to the Assistant Secretaries of Defense. Both Secretaries of Defense Richard Cheney and Les Aspin believed this empowered them to organize the DOD and to provide purpose and direction while enhancing loyalty and accountability to their respective agendas.¹³⁹

Finally, the Act attempted to change the internal service cultures to enhance inter-service harmony or "jointness." Congress did this by changing the promotion rules covering advancement to General officer. According to Goldwater-Nichols, to be promoted to one-star rank, officers had to be "joint qualified." That is, they had to have 22 months of experience in a joint assignment (i.e., working in a position that necessitated interaction with the other branches of the armed services). The career specialty of "joint service officer" was created, and Congress mandated that these officers had to have promotion rates equal to the rest of the service. These changes required officers to alter their career tracks away from branch-specific jobs to

¹³⁹ Locher, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols," p. 11.

positions with the other services. Although this was not well received initially, ten years after the fact, it appears that the law is working as intended in this regard. Interservice harmony has increased and highly qualified officers are seeking out these joint jobs.¹⁴⁰

In fact, jointness has increased to such an extent since the passage of defense reform bill that some political scientists now claim that civilian control is in jeopardy. Edward Luttwak's provocative piece, asserted that the military's increased political influence was an unintended consequence of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation and was "Washington's Biggest Scandal."¹⁴¹

The Post-Cold War Era

When the President and members of Congress debated defense reform in the early and mid-1980s they were especially concerned about the ability of the US armed forces to stand up to the Soviet challenge. The early Reagan years were filled with several intense situations and confrontations with the former Soviet Union. Tensions were particularly acute after the USSR downed the Korean Airliner 007.¹⁴² President Reagan called the USSR an "evil empire." The Pershing missile was deployed in central Europe in 1982--1983 amid extensive public protests in Germany and the United Kingdom, and strong objections from the Soviet Union.¹⁴³ While all this was going on, the Reagan administration, with the acquiescence of Congress, was initiating a trillion dollar defense build-up.

¹⁴⁰ McNaugher and Sperry, "Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense," pps. 244-246.

¹⁴¹ Edward Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary (Spring 1994).

¹⁴² Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985), pps. 1015-1017.

¹⁴³ Wirls, Build-Up, p. 65.

To the surprise of many, however, the later years of the 1980s were marked by peace accords and treaties. Then, even more surprisingly, for the first time in history, totalitarian regimes voluntarily gave up power one by one in 1989 and 1990, and by the end of 1991 the old Soviet Union no longer existed. Political scientists were shocked, anxiously sifting through their footnotes of manuscripts written in the 1980s to find some prediction of this momentous event. Practitioners too, tried to grasp the enormity of change.

Attempting to shape the US security posture in the new international environment and complying with the provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act requiring the nation's top military officer to provide recommendations on strategy and force structure, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, presented "Base Force."¹⁴⁴ This plan called for sizable cuts in military manpower (about 25% over five years), but essentially preserved the "essence" of all of the services. Because Powell took the lead on this issue, and was an important political figure as well, President Bush and members of Congress embraced this strategy, premised on the assumption that the US needed to be capable of fighting two major regional conflicts (MRCs) "nearly simultaneously."

Michael Desch at Harvard has constructed a data set that chronicles the increase in military influence since World War II. Although I do not agree with all of his coding decisions, he has demonstrated fairly well that military officers are indeed wielding more influence in political-military decisionmaking in the post-Cold War era. This may have contributed to the bumpiness in US civil-military relations seen at the outset of the Clinton administration. Desch's data set is presented in the table below. Dates and conflicts are listed followed by an "X" corresponding to whose preference (civilian or military) was adopted. Note that, unlike to the first two time

¹⁴⁴ Powell, My American Journey, p. 444.

periods (the World War II era and the Cold War), in the post-Cold War era military preferences have been adopted more often than civilian preferences.

Table 4
Major Civil-Military Conflicts & Outcomes:
1938-1994¹⁴⁵

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted Civilian or Military
World War II Era		
11/38	Increases in Aircraft Production (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
7/39	Military Order No. 1 transferring military planning to White House (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
1940	National Guard Activation (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
6/40	Aid short of war to U.K. (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
1941	Undeclared Anti-Submarine Warfare vs. Germany (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
5/41	Lend Lease to China (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
5-6/41	United States forces to bases in Western Atlantic (FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
7/41	Oil embargo on Japan (Acheson/FDR=yes; JCS=no)	X
7-8/41	Reinforcement of Phillipines (FDR=yes; military=no)	X
11/41	“Ultimatum” to Japan (Hull/FDR=yes; military=no)	X
3/42	Full lend lease to Soviet Union and new protocol signed (FDR=yes; military=no)	X
5/42	Molotov promised 2nd front by 1942 (FDR=yes; military=no)	X

¹⁴⁵ Michael C. Desch, “Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing US Civil-Military Relations” (Tenth Draft), Conference Paper presented at the APSA September 1995. This data set is also found in Michael C. Desch, Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment (forthcoming).

Table 4 (Continued)

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted Civilian or Military
1/43	Conditions on Lend Lease (FDR=no; military=yes)	X
5/43	FDR/Chennault vs. Stilwell/War Dept. over Operation ANAKIM	X
8/43	JCS vs. FDR over British OVERLORD priority	X
12/43	JCS vs. FDR on BUCCANEER	X
8/44	FDR vs. Leahy/War Dept over recalling Stilwell from China	X
1944	Commission for Joseph Alsop (FDR/Chennault=yes; Marshall/Stilwell=no)	X
1944	Promotion of Colonel Phillip Faymonville (FDR/Hopkins=yes; Marshall/Davies=no)	X
1944	Promotion of FDR's son Elliot (FDR=yes; Marshall/Arnold=no)	X
Cold War Era: 1945-1989		
1945	Control of nuclear weapons	X
1946-47	DOD reorganization and service unification	?
1949	Revolt of the Admirals (B-36 vs. super carriers)	X
1948-49	Berlin Blockade (Truman=hardline; mil.=accommodation)	X
1948-53	Integration of Blacks in the military (Truman=yes; military=no)	X
1948-52	Truman defense budgets	X
1950	Korean War Strategy (Truman vs. Gen MacArthur)	X
1952-60	New Look (Eisenhower/AF vs. Army)	X
1952-60	Eisenhower defense budgets	X
4/54	Nuclear use around Dien Bien Phu (Ike/Ridgeway=no; JCS:Radford/Twining=yes)	X

Table 4 (Continued)

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted Civilian or Military	
5/54	Nuclear use during Taiwan Straits Crisis (JCS=yes; Ike=no)	X	
1959	B-70 decision (AF=yes; Ike=no)	X	
1962	Cuban Missile Crisis (JFK vs. JCS)	X	
1963	TFX decision (AF and Navy=no; McNamara=yes)	X	
1960-68	PPBS (McNamara=yes; military=no)	X	
1965-68	Vietnam ground war strategy (civilian=limited; military=full mobilization)	X	
1965-67	Vietnam air war strategy (LBJ=gradual; JCS=all-out)	X	
1960s-70s	Limited Nuclear options (civilian=yes; AF=no)	X	
1973-76	Detente (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
1972	SALT I (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
1973	Integration of women (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
5/77	Withdrawal of United States forces from Korea (Carter=yes; military=no)		X
5/77	"Revolt of the Navy" (Carter vs. carrier; Navy=pro)	X	
6/77	Cancellation of B-1 (Carter=yes; AF=no)	X	
1978	SALT II (Carter=yes; JCS=no)	X	
1981	"Zero Option" for United States Soviet Nuclear Arms Control (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
2/82	Protracted Nuclear War (Reagan=yes; military=no)		X
1982	Lebanon intervention (Reagan/Shultz=yes; Weinberger/JCS=no)	X	
mid-1980s	Invasion of Central America (Reagan=yes; military=no)		?

Table 4 (Continued)

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted Civilian or Military
1983-1986	JCS/DOD Reform (Goldwater-Nichols) (civilians=yes; services=no)	?
1986	SOLIC (civilian=yes; military=no)	X
Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1994		
1990	Gulf War Strategy (Bush=offensive; Powell=sanctions)	X
1993	FY 1994 Defense budget (Clinton/Aspin vs. Powell)	X
1992	Use of Force in Bosnia (civilians=yes; Powell=no)	X
1992-94	"Gays in the military" (Clinton=yes; JCS/Nunn=no)	X
1993-94	Military Strategy "Win-Hold-Win" (Clinton/Aspin) vs. "Win-Win" (JCS)	X
1993-94	Change in Roles and Missions (Clinton/Nunn=yes; JCS=no)	X
1994	Use of Force in Haiti (Clinton/Talbot=invade; Perry/JCS=no)	X
1994	No restrictions on women in combat (Clinton/West=yes; JCS=no)	X

There are obvious problems associated with the Desch data set, especially over-simplification and lack of clarity regarding the individual entries, but his attempt to systematically approach the question of military influence provides a good departure point for future analysis. Moreover, his conclusions as they stand now, generally support the claim of increasing military influence in the post-Cold War era.

My research on preferences and outcomes, based primarily on interviewing and presented in chapter 6, generally matches Desch's findings, with a few exceptions.

***Beyond Huntington and Janowitz:
Explanations for Post-Cold War US Civil-Military Relations***

What were the causes of the qualitative changes in United States civil-military relations documented above? For the past several years scholars have debated this question and the responses vary, including: 1) an over-reaching military; 2) an inexperienced Commander-in-Chief; 3) cultural changes alienating the military from the rest of society; 4) changes in the international environment; 5) decreasing military budgets; and 6) changes corresponding to a changing dynamic among principals and agents.

The Kohn Argument: An over-reaching military

One of the first commentaries on this development was that of Richard Kohn, a historian from the University of North Carolina. His polemic "Out of Control" that appeared in the National Interest in the Spring of 1994, inspired a lively debate on United States civil-military relations.¹⁴⁶ In that article, Kohn described the military as alienated from society and the national leadership, a situation that he claimed was an emerging crisis in American politics. Although Kohn's argument was carefully constructed, he overstated his case and missed two critical explanatory variables in explaining the changing balance in United States civil-military relations. Contrary to Kohn's views, as public opinion polls show, there is sufficient counter-evidence that

¹⁴⁶Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, (Spring 1994): 3-17, and Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington and Richard Kohn, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, (Summer 1994): 23-31.

the military is quite connected with the American people.¹⁴⁷ Although there are some disturbing trends in US civil-military relations, which are discussed below in some detail, it is not at all clear that there is a “crisis”--at least not yet. The key argument, however, is plausible; namely, that soldiers are becoming increasingly involved in politics. But because he misses two key reasons for this development (the proliferation of Operations Other Than War [OOTW], and the changing balance of intellectual and experiential power among top-level civilian and military officers inside the Pentagon, in favor of the latter), his policy recommendations are unpersuasive.

Kohn is on stronger ground in identifying the growth in size of the military since World War II, the military's reaction to former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's micromanagement style, the fear of another Vietnam, and the peculiar circumstances of a very powerful, popular and political general (Colin Powell) and an inexperienced and vulnerable commander-in-chief (President Clinton), as factors that contributed to the growth of military influence in the political sphere.¹⁴⁸ The data presented in chapters 4 and 5 support Kohn's claims.

However, Kohn probably overstates the extent to which the military dominated civilian authorities in the post-Cold War era. Even Desch's data set displays a near parity of civilian and military preferences adopted in this period.¹⁴⁹ What makes this cause for concern, of course, is the shift in the relative influence in decisionmaking among civilian and military officials since the 1960s.

¹⁴⁷ Leslie McAneny and David W. Moore, “American Confidence in Public Institutions Rises: Military Remains Number One,” Gallup Poll Monthly 356 (May 1995): 11-13.

¹⁴⁸ Kohn, “Out of Control,” *passim*.

¹⁴⁹ Desch's data set shows the military prevailing in 5 cases and civilians in 3.

Kohn makes three charges against the military. Those charges include: that the military has become bitterly and *openly* partisan in favor of Republicans; that the military has meddled in politics; and, his most serious allegation against the military, that it has shown contempt for and resisted civilian control. Kohn's evidence (mostly anecdotal) is summarized below. Regarding partisanship, Kohn cites an incident where Strom Thurmond was introduced to a group of military officers at the Army's Command and General Staff College, and when the master of ceremonies noted that Thurmond had changed his party affiliation (to Republican) since arriving in Congress, the audience allegedly cheered. Kohn also argued that the military's initial distaste for President Bill Clinton provided further proof of its partisan nature.¹⁵⁰

To support his claim of meddling in politics, Kohn cites an allegedly subversive movement within the military to undermine Les Aspin's credibility after the firefight in Somalia cost the lives of 18 Rangers in October 1993. Kohn also criticized the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, for publishing an editorial in the New York Times and an article in Foreign Affairs.¹⁵¹ Kohn argued further that when the JCS provides only one possible course of action to the president it meddles in politics by "stacking the deck" to get its way. Kohn cited the "gays in the military" controversy as evidence that the military was meddling in the political sphere. He blamed the military for "rolling" the inexperienced and vulnerable commander-in-chief, causing his presidency to get off to a weak start.¹⁵²

To support the charge that the military is increasingly questioning civilian control of the armed forces, Kohn described a story he had heard about a general who

¹⁵⁰Kohn, "Out of Control," pps. 3-4.

¹⁵¹Colin Powell, "United States Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/93): 32-45.

¹⁵²Kohn, "Out of Control," passim.

complained about civilian interference during the Gulf War by a "meddling Deputy Undersecretary of Defense."¹⁵³ Further, he pointed to a thesis written by Air Force legal officer, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Dunlap, at the National War College that hypothetically stated the conditions it under which the military might stage a coup in the United States.¹⁵⁴

The first claim enjoyed significant support. The military, a conservative institution, does favor the Republicans over Democrats, but generally does so privately. However, the conservative Republican leanings are hardly anything new, and they pose neither a constitutional nor political crisis.¹⁵⁵

There are no comprehensive records of individual military officer party affiliation, although some survey data exists.¹⁵⁶ This is probably fortunate for officers because overt partisanship could hurt chances of promotion for otherwise qualified senior officers. The survey data, however, does conform an increasingly Republican and conservative officer corps. From 1976 to 1996 the percentage of military officers who affiliated with the Republican party jumped from 33% to 67%. But only 5% came at the expense of the Democratic party, the rest of the increase was made up of officers who changed from independents to GOP supporters.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ Kohn, "Out of Control," p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the United States Military."

¹⁵⁵ Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 237.

¹⁵⁶ For party affiliation see, Foreign Policy Leadership Project (FPLP), "Party Identification: Military and Civilian Leaders in the FPLP Surveys of American Opinion Leaders, 1976-1996. For data on political identification/ideological see Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pps. 236-241.

¹⁵⁷ This sampling of military officers was taken at the National War College and from a random selection from the Pentagon phone book. The Foreign Policy Leadership Project data set is presented in Holstei,

A recent study done at the United States Military Academy on the Corps of Cadets found similar results.¹⁵⁸ From a random sampling of the Corps of Cadets 13% identified themselves Democrats, 29% Independents, and 58% Republicans. The findings for ideological affiliation were; 11% liberal, 21% moderate, and 67% conservative.

These two surveys support the claim that the military is increasingly Republican and increasingly conservative. This could pose problems for civilian control during Democratic administrations. However, this study suggests that professional preparation may mitigate the effects of partisan affiliation. When Democratic administrations enjoy high scores in professional preparation they will enhance their influence in the decisionmaking process and offset the partisan leaning of the officer corps.

Moreover there is reason to believe that the Republican bias in the officer corps may not be permanent. Changes in the political landscape of Washington, DC may affect the partisanship affiliation of the military in the future. The balanced budget zeal and expanded vision for military forces expounded by some of the conservative right has caused concern within the military. Former Congressman and Presidential Candidate Bob Dornan of California is a good case in point. His bellicose rhetoric is anathema to the vision of the current coterie of military officers who ascribe to the Weinberger/Powell doctrine. Moreover, the budget cutting ideas of John Kasich (R-OH) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA), who has talked about making the Pentagon a triangle, has caused the military to re-evaluate relationships on Capitol Hill. In 1996, the prospect of a Dole administration concerned the Army leadership too. Dole's closest advisor on military matters was Senator John McCain (R-AZ).

¹⁵⁸ This survey on the Corps of Cadets was completed by Major Karen Lloyd of the Department of Social Sciences.

McCain's ideas for restructuring the armed forces emphasize "stand-off" missiles and "smart weapons" requiring much fewer Army divisions. Obviously this is favorably received by the Navy and Air Force, which stand to gain the most if that approach is adopted, but the Army naturally opposes these ideas. Another McCain idea that concerns the Army is his support for "tiered readiness"--designating a few Army divisions for high levels of funding and allowing the rest to degrade in readiness. Dole's relationship with McCain and the rumor that he was a likely candidate for Secretary of Defense caused some high-level Army officers to support Clinton's re-election.¹⁵⁹ Thus it is not at all clear that the military preference for Republicans will last over the long term.

Kohn also argues that the military is overtly meddling in the Washington, DC political process--a much more serious charge than mere political affiliation. While military people as citizens have a right to their own individual political views, to knowingly interfere in politics is in violation of the Founders' intent and longstanding accepted norms. The problem, of course, is defining what precisely constitutes meddling in politics. When does proper and appropriate advice turn into meddling in politics? The question has become especially unclear since the end of the Cold War. As the United States has sought ways to approach the new strategic environment, the military has taken on a larger role in the decisionmaking process. This increased involvement is related to the near obsession of high level military officers to avoid another Vietnam.¹⁶⁰ The proliferation of OOTW (several variants of peacekeeping operations, counter-drug operations, international and domestic disaster relief, and refugee operations) has also played a role in accelerating this trend. Further, as this

¹⁵⁹ These observations come from a meeting with high-level advisors to the Chief of Staff of the Army which I participated in on 13 August 1996 at West Point.

¹⁶⁰ This is a general theme found in General Colin Powell's autobiography, My American Journey.

research shows, another important factor has been the long term changes in political-military experience among top-level civilian and military officials over the last 30 years.

General Powell created a stir when he published an op-ed piece in the New York Times and an article in Foreign Affairs.¹⁶¹ Like other Vietnam veterans who rose to the top of the ranks, Powell was committed to preventing that kind of debacle from happening again. The reactions to his remarks were mixed. General Powell's actions were just as controversial inside the military as they were in the Washington, DC policy community and beyond.

The major problem with Kohn's argument is that he blamed the military for their increased influence in the decisionmaking process without first doing a systematic study of the civilian side of the civil-military relationship. This caused him to understate the extent to which declining national security expertise among the civilian leadership has contributed to the changing dynamic. The difference between these two interpretations have consequences for public policy. If declining civilian control has been caused by an over-reaching military, then measures are justified to rein in this behavior. However, if the military was simply filling a void created by civilians, then it makes more sense to concentrate on the civilian side, finding ways to increase their national security knowledge and experience. The policy recommendation that naturally follow from Kohn's argument--essentially "dumbing-down" the military so that they no longer pose an intellectual challenge to their civilian counter-parts may not only be unwise, but may not be possible without repealing the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which requires military political sophistication.

¹⁶¹Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous." NY Times, October 8, 1992; and Powell, "United States Forces: Challenges Ahead" Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/1993).

This study argues that the turbulence witnessed at the outset of the Clinton administration was not caused by an over-reaching military, although at times this was indeed a problem. Rather, other longer-term factors associated with the relative balance of top-level civilian and military professional preparation affected the decisionmaking process and altered the dynamic.

Explanations Beyond Kohn: Personalities, Culture, and International Forces

Kohn's article stimulated new interest in US civil-military relations. Reactions to it spanned the full spectrum, from full agreement to outright rejection. This section discusses some of the other explanations for increased military political influence. Of course, none of them are sufficient by themselves. A comprehensive explanation must incorporate aspects of all of these approaches.

Some authors have argued, like Kohn, that a single variable (e.g. an over-reaching military) can explain the changing dynamic. One of these explanations points to President Clinton's lack of military experience as the main cause for the change in US civil-military relations.¹⁶² Given his limited understanding of service life, he bungled the relationship with clumsy policy decisions (e.g. gays in the military) pursued without due consideration of the military viewpoint.

However, President Clinton is not the first Commander-in-Chief to assume those responsibilities without having military experience. In fact, one of the most highly regarded presidents in United States history, FDR, did not serve in the armed forces either, although he did serve as Assistant Secretary of the Navy earlier in his

¹⁶² See Gregory D. Foster, "Raw Recruits vs. Old Troopers," Wall Street Journal, July 14, 1994, p. 11 and, Gary Wills, "Clinton's Troubles," The New York Review of Books, September 22, 1994, p. 7.

career. More important, in the second half of the first Clinton Administration civil-military relations have improved.¹⁶³

Tom Ricks and Lawrence Korb argue that the strained relationship stemmed from the divergence of civilian and military values.¹⁶⁴ This explanation has some appeal, especially since other scholars have employed successfully a similar approach in comparative studies of civil-military relations.¹⁶⁵ Ricks cites survey data from students at several military schools, including Basic Courses (attended at the beginning of a military career), and Command and General Staff Colleges (CGSCs) (attended at mid-career) and evidence from a former assistant professor at West Point to make his case. In the survey data, Ricks points to the finding that 50% of those polled at the Marine Basic Course identified themselves as “conservative” while 69% identified themselves as “conservative” at their CGSC. This implies that military service causes one to become more conservative over time.

¹⁶³ There are many indications that the relationship is much better today than in 1993-1994. For one, President Clinton is said to have a good rapport with his Chairman, JCS, General Shalikashvili. Also, in December 1996, President Clinton was the first President in 22 years to go to the Army-Navy football game, where he received a warm reception. The military also sided with the President in 1996, against the GOP Congress, on the SDI issue, which I will discuss more about in chapter 6. In addition, I mentioned earlier the group of senior Army officers who were privately supporting President Clinton’s re-election. More systematic evidence and analytical discussion to support this claim is found in chapter 6.

¹⁶⁴ Thomas E. Ricks, “On American Soil: The Widening Gap Between The United States Military and United States Society.” Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 3 (May 1996), and Lawrence J. Korb, “The Military and Social Change.” Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 5 (August 1996).

¹⁶⁵ See in particular, *International Security*, 19:4 (Spring 1995). This edition had three articles that employ the “strategic culture” argument including: Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters,” pps. 5-31; Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” pps. 32-64; and Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars,” pps. 65-93.

However, other aspects of his work seem to contradict this claim. Ricks also included responses to the question of “are military or society’s values closer to those of the Founders?” The percentage of Basic Course officers claiming that military values were closer was 81%, while the CGSC response for the same question was only 64%.¹⁶⁶ As another indicator of alienation of the armed forces from society, Ricks cites former Army Major Dana Isaacoff, who taught in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point from 1991-1995. According to Isaacoff, when she polled students in her classes, she routinely found that of 17 students in any given class, all “17 claimed to be Republicans, 0 Independents, and 0 Democrats.”¹⁶⁷

Ricks identified three primary causes for the cultural divide between military and civilian society. 1) The end of the draft, which has reduced the number of Americans with military experience and has contributed to the heightened sense of corporateness and professionalism of those serving in the all-volunteer force; 2) the base-closing activities throughout the country, which has left the majority of remaining bases in the South, reducing the exposure to other places and communities throughout the country; and finally, 3) the increased trend to privatizing logistics and maintenance activities which has reduced the number of soldiers with skills easily transferable to civilian world.¹⁶⁸

Although his argument is similar to Ricks’ in some ways, Lawrence Korb’s work focuses on instances when the military was used by the President to effect social

¹⁶⁶ Ricks, “On American Soil.” p. 12.

¹⁶⁷ Ricks, “On American Soil.” p. 11. On a side note, this does not match my experience nor the systematic survey data found in Karen Lloyd’s survey. Although the majority of my cadets identified themselves with the Republican party, the outcome seldom was 17 Republican, 0 independent, 0 Democratic.

¹⁶⁸ Ricks, “On American Soil.” p. 10.

change in America. Korb cites this as the primary cause of civil-military strain. To support this claim Korb points to three cases; 1) integration of African-Americans into all White units, 2) women in combat roles, and finally, 3) homosexuals serving openly in the military. He concludes by claiming that military intransigence over changing policy towards homosexuals caused bad feelings among *both* civilians and military personnel and was the primary cause for contemporary strained relations. Further, by yielding to the military, President Clinton weakened civilian control and set a bad precedent for future commanders-in-chief.¹⁶⁹

One difficulty with this cultural approach is that work done by Huntington and Janowitz during the Cold War identified and, to a degree documented, the diverging civil and military cultures in a period when civil-military relations were less contentious and military political influence was less than in 1993 and 1994. Indeed, one of the main points of Huntington's work The Soldier and the State, was that the "military mind" and military values were significantly different from the rest of society.¹⁷⁰ If we accept that both Huntington and Ricks are right, than a cultural explanation is not very convincing. In methodological terms, if there has not been major change in the explanatory variable, but there has been a noticeable shift in the dependent variable, then another explanation is needed. In this context, the cultural argument does not seem to add a lot to the current debate.

Michael Desch argues that structural changes in the international environment have been the primary cause for an altered civil-military relationship.¹⁷¹ Desch claims

¹⁶⁹ Korb, "The Military and Social Change." pps. 39-41.

¹⁷⁰ Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pps. 59-79.

¹⁷¹ Michael C. Desch, Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment (forthcoming), chapter 1. For more on this theoretical approach see, Andrew Bacevich, "Clinton's Military Problem -- and Ours," National Review, December 13, 1993, pps. 36-40.

that the post-Cold War era has proven Lasswell wrong. Lasswell argued that during times of international tension, nations will keep large peacetime standing armies that will meddle in politics and adversely affect liberty and democratic processes. In short, civilian control of the military will erode. Conversely, in times of peace and less international tension, because the military bureaucracy is smaller, civilian control is enhanced. Stated succinctly, Lasswell argued that as it relates to civilian control, size matters. Yet, according to this logic, in the post-Cold War era, when the United States military has been reduced 25%, civilian control should have been enhanced, but most scholars agree it has not.¹⁷²

Desch constructs a 2x2 matrix based on external and internal threats to the state to offer his explanation for the differences in civil-military relations among states (See below).

Table 5
Quality of Civilian Control of the Military

EXTERNAL THREATS		
	Hi	Low
Hi	Poor	Worst
INTERNAL THREATS		
	Low	Good
Low	Good	Fair

According to this model, during periods of high external threat and low internal threat, civil-military relations are at their best. Desch explains his logic in the passage below.

¹⁷² Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, 1997.

...A challenging international security environment should bring to power a civilian leadership experienced in, knowledgeable about, and attentive to national security affairs. An external threat will tend to unify the various potential and actual factions in a military, but orient them outward. An externally oriented military will have little interest in participating in domestic politics, especially if the state is supplying them with resources sufficient to execute their external missions.¹⁷³

Desch claims that this explains the relatively stable relations among the civilian leaders and the military in the United States during the Cold War (although he does acknowledge important exceptions, e.g. MacArthur v. Truman).

In contrast, during periods of high internal (e.g. rebels attempting to overthrow the established government) and low external threat, civil-military relations are at their worst.

...Without a challenging external threat, it is likely that civilian leadership will not be experienced in, knowledgeable about, or attentive to national security affairs. An internal threat to the military will unify it, but with an inward orientation making direct military intervention into politics quite likely and raising its chances of success. In such a situation, civilian institutions are also likely to be weak and deeply divided.¹⁷⁴

In the other two boxes however, (low external and internal threats and high external and internal threats), Desch acknowledges it is harder to predict the patterns of civil-military relations. Both circumstances could produce anywhere from good to fair relations depending on internal factors unique to civilian and military culture and ideology within a given nation.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structure: The End of the Cold War and Weakening United States Civilian Control." Paper presented at a Conference on, "A Crisis in Civilian Control? Contending Theories of American Civil-Military Relations," Harvard University, 11-12 June 1996. p 8.

¹⁷⁴ Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structure." p. 9.

¹⁷⁵ Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures," p. 11.

The major problem with Desch's model is that it fails to provide insight for contemporary experience--low internal *and* external threats.¹⁷⁶ There is yet another problem, common to structural models. By identifying macro structural factors as independent variables, these models cannot explain variance in the dependent variable when structural changes do not occur. As with the cultural arguments, what happens when Y changes and X does not?

In the American case, civil-military relations have improved since 1995 in the absence of major structural changes in the international environment. Desch makes a contribution to the field of comparative civil-military relations, but a more comprehensive explanation is still needed for the American case.

Military Budgets and Civil-Military Conflict

Another possible explanation for heightened civil-military tension (although less so for the level of military political influence) could be related to resource allocation. It seems reasonable to surmise that when resources are reduced the military may resent these decisions and attempt to subvert civilian control creating civil-military strife. To examine this hypothesis I looked at military budgets and civil-military strife. The graphs below provides data on defense budgets and the size of the defense establishment. The first graph shows actual defense spending controlling for inflation. The second graph shows the same data but as a percentage

¹⁷⁶ Kenneth Waltz, "The New World Order," Millennium (1993): 187-195.

of the overall federal spending level.¹⁷⁷ The third graph displays the percentage of the national workforce employed by the Pentagon.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Data collected from, Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, 1997.

¹⁷⁸ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for 1997, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1996), pps. 158-159.




Figure 1 Defense Outlays (real dollars)¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, 1997.




Figure 2 Defense Outlays¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, 1997.




Figure 3: Defense Population (as % of National Population)¹⁸¹

¹⁸¹ Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller), National Defense Budget Estimates for 1997, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1996), pps. 158-159.

During the Clinton administration military budgets initially fell in real terms and as a percentage of total federal outlays; thus, at first glance, resource allocation appears a good explanation for the increased civil-military tensions of 1993 and 1994. Further, the relationship was more harmonious during the Reagan era when military budgets were increasing. Up to this point the hypothesis looks convincing. Closer examination reveals problems, however. During the Johnson/McNamara years, when military budgets were increasing to fight the Vietnam War, civil-military tensions were high, as the military contended with the whiz kids and their new management systems and over how the war was being fought. More significant however, was that in another era when budgets were falling (1990-1992) civil-military relations and national security policies were at their most harmonious level in 30 years.¹⁸²

Lasswell's argument also had a budgetary component, but approached civil-military tension from the opposite direction. He argued that in a liberal democracy as the percentage of the military budget increased in relation to overall national spending, civil-military tensions would also increase. After a period of time the liberal democracy would give way to a militarized "Garrison State" resulting in open civil-military conflict and the strong possibility of a coup. Conversely, when military budgets fell, civil-military tensions would decrease. Clearly his predictions have not been borne out.

Still, the budgetary explanations contribute to a more complete understanding of United States civil-military relations, as increasing military budgets are often associated with better relations. Certainly, diminishing military operating budgets were part of the reason for civil-military conflict in the 1950s when General Matthew Ridgway and President Eisenhower were at odds over how much to cut the Army

¹⁸² Data and analysis found in chapter 4-6 will substantiate this point.

after the Korean Conflict.¹⁸³ If true, then expectations about civil-military harmony may need to be lowered in this age of fiscal constraint. But this explanation still does not give us a comprehensive understanding for why civilian and military officials do not always get along, or why the military seems to dominate policymaking in some eras.

New Institutionalism and the Principal-Agent Framework

Shortly after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, some scholars in the field of civil-military relations began exploring the applicability, for the American case, of a theoretical framework first developed in the field of microeconomics to explain behavior among managers and employees in the firm.¹⁸⁴ This approach, called the “principal-agent” model, sits within the broad theoretical framework of new institutionalism.

New institutionalism, developed in the 1980s,¹⁸⁵ seeks to combine the “thick description” and appreciation of history that qualitative scholars favor with the analysis of the strategic decisionmaking process by political actors that “rational

¹⁸³ For more on the Ridgway and Eisenhower conflict see, A.J. Bacevich, “The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955,” Journal of Military History 61 (April 1997), pps. 1-31, and David T. Fautua, “The Inconsonant Culture: Civilian Control of the Military and the Case of President Eisenhower, General Ridgway and General Taylor,” Armed Forces & Society (Forthcoming).

¹⁸⁴ Edward Mansfield, Microeconomics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), pps. 380-381. For a good literature review of principal-agent modeling in political science see, Roderick D. Kiewet and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).

¹⁸⁵ The seminal work in this area was edited by Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, Bringing The State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

choice" and users of quantitative methods often emphasize for the conduct of social scientific inquiry.¹⁸⁶ This theoretical approach studies history to learn how various issues and policy alternatives get on the agenda in the first place, and then seeks to determine why the key players decide issues the way they do.

This approach claims that the organization of an agency or institution has a direct bearing on the decisionmaking process. When institutional structure, norms and/or rules are changed, different policy outcomes can be expected. To understand how decisions are made, one must identify these critical variables (structure, norms and rules), and then analyze the actions of the key players within that context. For example, new institutionalist theory would predict that the structural changes brought on by the National Security Act of 1947 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 would alter the decisionmaking process and ultimately the policy outcomes of the affected parts of the government.

According to republican theory, legitimacy is derived from *the consent* of the governed.¹⁸⁷ Representatives are elected from among the people to act as their

¹⁸⁶In addition to the works by Evans et. al. and North, other prominent works in the new institutionalist approach include, James March and Johan Olsen, "New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," American Political Science Review 78 (1984): 734-49; Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics." Comparative Politics 16 (January 1984): 223-46; Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New Institutionalism,'" in The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations ed. Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1993); and Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers And Mothers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

¹⁸⁷ Political theorists have debated the precise definition of democracy for centuries. I have no interest, at least in this project, of getting into that fight. Although it is true that US political thought is dominated by the ideas of John Locke, as I use it in this passage, I am specifically referring to J.J. Rousseau's construct of the "general will" and his conception of republicanism. The US is not a true democracy in Athenian terms. It is a republic where the people elect their representatives and then make judgments about the efficacy of governmental policies and elected officials.

proxies in matters of governance. In the national security realm, elected officials delegate to the uniformed military varying degrees of authority to make tactical, and often operational, decisions in times of war and crisis.¹⁸⁸

The structural arrangements, norms and rules that civilians and military officials accept provide the institutional framework from which decisions about national security are made. In this context, questions about agent autonomy, when and how much should be delegated, leadership, managerial and supervisory styles, and punishments and incentives for agents--in other words, civil-military relations--are constructed and answered.

As Deborah Avant points out, “every time principals delegate authority to an agent they create the problem of agency--the agents may not do what the principal wants.”¹⁸⁹ This is especially so when agents know more than the principals about the matters at hand. Problems with *asymmetry of information* make the art and science of delegating particularly important. How will the principal know if the agent is performing the task at the optimal level? What about advice from the agent -- is it skewed to advance the interests of the agent? Will courses of action be circumscribed by the agents, thereby removing the optimal decision from the choice of alternatives? This is often referred to as *adverse selection* in the principal-agent literature.¹⁹⁰

These are all legitimate concerns in any principal-agent relationship and they apply to the United States civil-military relationship as well. As Peter Feaver points out, “the military agent’s status as an expert on the management of violence confers significant informational advantages over civilians on matters ranging from tactics to

¹⁸⁸ Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? A Principal-Agent Explanation of Military Reticence in the Post-Cold War,” p. 5.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

logistics to operational art.”¹⁹¹ Further, once the principals decide how much, and what they will delegate to the agents, they next have to choose *monitoring techniques* to ensure mission accomplishment and compliance with initial guidance. Feaver argues that principals choose among five basic techniques, often combining them to strengthen control. The five techniques include; 1) contract incentives, 2) screening and selection criteria, 3) overt monitoring (“police patrols”), 4) less intrusive monitoring techniques (“fire alarms”) and, finally, 5) institutional checks.¹⁹²

How civilians choose to manage the military definitely has an impact on their relationship. When more intrusive methods are employed (e.g. “police patrols”) such as the PPBS system and requirements-driven process imposed by Secretary of Defense McNamara, relations with the military agent become strained as mistrust and micromanagement permeate the relationship. When less intrusive methods are used (e.g., contract incentives), relations may improve but civilians have less certainty that their will is being carried out. Thus the principal faces tough choices about managerial styles. This is complicated by what theorists call *moral hazard*. That is, when agents are aware of what indicators the principals are using to determine effectiveness and mission accomplishment, this may encourage *optimizing on*

¹⁹¹ Feaver, “Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations,” p. 11.

¹⁹² Feaver, “Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations” p. 33. As mentioned in the text, there now exists a fairly extensive body of literature in both the fields of microeconomics and American politics on principal-agent theory. See also Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast (known in the literature as “McNollgast”), “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 6 (1987): 243-277; McNollgast, “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75 (1989): 431-482; Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 2 (1984): 165-179.

indicators. The agent may simply perform well on the indicator, but less efficiently on the actual behavior the indicator was intended to sample.¹⁹³ For example, if a teacher gives the same exam year after year and that fact becomes known to the student body, some students may elect to study only the previous exam questions. When the results are computed, the teacher may unwittingly believe his/her students have mastered the material when in reality they have only optimized on the indicator. In the military, what if successful integration of women was measured primarily by the number of female general officers on active-duty? Just because the military promotes several female colonels does not necessarily mean that significant progress has been made. The critical point is that principals need to be very selective and attentive to the indicators they choose to sample actual and desired behavior.

One traditional monitoring technique used throughout American history has been the institutional check provided by inter-service rivalry. Elected officials used this technique throughout the Cold War with varying degrees of success.¹⁹⁴ Goldwater-Nichols weakened this monitoring technique by enhancing interservice harmony. Still, this type of check is not extinct, to be sure, and especially if the budget situation deteriorates, one can expect that this monitoring technique will be available for future civilian leaders.

The media often play the role of *fire alarm* quite well in the US political process. Television programs such as “The Fleecing of America,” and others of that kind provide the taxpayers and elected officials with information of fraud, waste, and abuse within the defense establishment. *Screening and selection* are monitoring techniques that have not been used extensively in the past but which may in the

¹⁹³ Avant, “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control?” p. 5.

¹⁹⁴ See Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, “The Bureaucratic Perspective” in Readings in Foreign Policy, Halperin and Kanter, eds., (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1973), pps. 3-40.

future. This processes pertains to policies of accessions, retention, and promotions. Just as the nomination process for top-level politically appointed positions and judgeships has received more attention in recent decades, one can envision similar practices brought to bear on the military if civilians perceive a deterioration in civilian control of the military.

Finally, civilians can always loosen the degree of oversight to entice military compliance with civilian direction. Some argue that Republicans employed this monitoring technique throughout the Reagan administration to get the services' support for extensive "military keynesianism." This is analogous to Huntington's autonomy /professionalism argument. All of these monitoring techniques mentioned above have implications for civil-military relations. Just as it seems plausible to hypothesize that civil-military harmony decreases as budgets decrease, we can expect a positive correlation between intrusive monitoring techniques (like those of McNamara) and civil-military strife.

Critical Assessment of the Principal-Agent Model

The two biggest theoretical distinctions between this work and that of Avant and Feaver are 1) the broadening of the definition of the term "agent" here to include DOD civilians, and 2) and adoption in this work of a normative argument for moving beyond objective (Huntington) and subjective (Janowitz) control to embrace a "Madisonian" conception of the United States civil-military relationship with regard to the dynamic between DOD civilians and the uniformed military.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ I first made this argument in a piece co-authored with Don M. Snider for the Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations. See Working Paper # 8, "Explaining Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations: A New Institutional Approach." January 1997.

In addition to the existence of "dual principals" (Congress and the President) recognized by Avant and Feaver, one must consider the relationship between the "dual agents" (DOD civilians and the uniformed military). Later it will be demonstrated that these two sets of agents have taken on an increased role in the national security decisionmaking process because of several factors partly related to the decline of military expertise among the nation's elected leadership. Although the military has wielded significant influence in the post-Cold War era to date, the possibility that civilian agents may fill that role (or at least match their military counterparts) in the years to come should not be foreclosed. Indeed, in the concluding chapter I will make the case why America needs to foster the development of a new generation of civilian defense intellectuals. By fostering a balance in professional preparation among top-level civilian and military officials at the Pentagon a healthier and more productive relationship could be forged.

Another problem with the current principal-agent literature, at least with Feaver's conception of it, is the treatment of *asymmetry of information* -- a key concept in principal-agent models. Feaver argues that competencies inherent in one's profession can produce asymmetries of knowledge that cannot be broached. For example, he maintains that the military officer has a special "moral competence" (because of combat experience or the potential for it, and civilians often defer to soldiers on matters pertaining to the use of force; after all, it is the soldier who will face the risks and bear the costs associated with these decisions). They also possess "technical competence" (soldiers know the trade of war better than their civilian counterparts). Similarly, Feaver contends that civilians possess a "political competence" (the ability to judge risks, weigh casualty predictions and make the best

decisions about what is in the nation's best interests) that cannot be equaled by their military counterparts.¹⁹⁶

This often may be the case, but there is a problem with making this claim *a priori*. The research reported here has turned up examples that contradicted all of these assumptions. Secretary McNamara defied the military on numerous occasions, and in general did not defer to their moral or technical competence. Conversely, in recent years, because of both domestic and international forces, the military component within the DOD has become increasingly powerful, often prevailing over their civilian counterparts. With the principals (Congress and the President) divided over many issues, the ascendant military "agents" have been prevailing more often than in the past. This trend has been helped by the military's ability to control technical and operational debates while not yielding in strategic and political debates. Therefore, I disagree with Feaver's treatment of knowledge and expertise. Whereas he treats them as constants, I treat knowledge and expertise as variables, sometimes dominated by civilian or military officials and at other times balanced among these agents.

Nevertheless, the principal-agent framework is a useful tool to analyze US civil-military relations. With modifications based on the criticisms reported above, I have constructed a model to analyze the professional preparation of the key players (both civilian and military, principal and agent) to determine who was in the best position to influence the decisionmaking process. This approach also provides the vehicle for advancing policy recommendations and the adoption of the Madisonian normative framework which is advanced to fill the void created by weaknesses in the objective and subjective control models of Huntington and Janowitz respectively.

¹⁹⁶ Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations." p. 17.

Chapter 3

The Explanatory Model: Dual Agents, Issue Networks, and Professional Preparation

In this chapter a model for explaining and testing US civil-military relations is developed. In addition to the new institutionalist writers discussed in the previous chapter, two other authors have significantly influenced the development of the model, Hugh Heclo and John Kingdon. Heclo, disagreeing with the elitist “iron triangle” view of policy development (where bureaucratic agencies, congressional committees, and interest groups collude to create policy at the expense of the public good), has argued instead that the policymaking process is highly competitive, with several alliances or networks within an issue area vying for power and influence.¹⁹⁷ The members of these issue networks come from far and wide, including individuals actually in government (Congress, the executive branch and the bureaucracy), and outside of it (interest groups, think-tanks, the media, the defense industry, and academia).¹⁹⁸

Kingdon argued, consistent with Heclo’s conception of the issue network, that small clusters of key decision-makers often make policy in the American political system.¹⁹⁹ Sometimes this entails a “visible cluster” (mostly comprised of elected officials including members of Congress and the President), while at other times, an “invisible cluster” (politically appointed officials in the executive branch, Congressional staff assistants and members of the bureaucracy) significantly influences policy development.²⁰⁰ By combining Heclo’s and Kingdon’s ideas with

¹⁹⁷ Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” p. 88.

¹⁹⁸ Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment,” p. 104.


¹⁹⁹ John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1995), pps. 18-19.

²⁰⁰ Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, pps. 30-34.

existing principal-agent and new institutionalist literature, a model of national security decisionmaking can be constructed that stresses the importance of professional preparation to influence others--a framework that also captures the importance of structure, norms and rules and individual strategic behavior.

***The Principal-Agent Framework and
National Security Decisionmaking in the 1990s***

Building on the literature presented in the previous chapter, the diagram below depicts the national security principal-agent relationship. Although this arrangement calls for principal direction and control of the defense establishment, declining national security expertise among the principals (documented in chapter 4) has enhanced the role of the agents at the Pentagon.



**Figure 4: The National Security
Principal-Agent Model**

The Issue Network

The focus of this issue network analysis is on how changes in structure, norms, and rules over the past 30 years have affected the professional preparation patterns among civilian and military officials at critical interfaces. Thus, in a broader sense, this analysis fits within new institutional theory. More specifically, this model incorporates the changes in *military norms* regarding the importance of education and political-military assignments, especially in the wake of the Vietnam and McNamara experiences; the *structural* changes attendant to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and the *rules* changes covering promotions and joint duty assignments. These changes are hypothesized to affect professional preparation and therefore related to balance of power questions at the Pentagon. This approach provides data to empirically test whether the perceived imbalance in the relationship in the first two of years of the Clinton administration was caused by an over-reaching military, as some argued, or by other, perhaps more systemic and longer term factors related to relative expertise and professional preparation on both sides of the civil-military equation. Of course, it may be possible that both trends are occurring--that the increasing military involvement in political decisions is a product of both increasing political sophistication and decreasing civilian capacity.²⁰¹ Since this is still an empirical question, collecting data on professional preparation within the issue network will help test the hypothesis.

²⁰¹ A stark example of such manifestation was the role played by the military in the intense infighting between State and Defense Departments during the long development of the Clinton administration's national security document dealing with the UN. For more on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 see United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." State Department Publication 10161 (Washington DC: United States Department of State, May 1994), 4-5.

While the broadly defined national security issue network includes thousands of individuals throughout the Washington, DC area and beyond, this study identifies *three critical civilian-military interfaces* in the Pentagon decisionmaking cluster where officials from both the civilian and military spheres are essentially responsible for the same functions. By gathering data on those who have held these key jobs and by analyzing their intellectual and professional background we can better understand how power was wielded on the agent side of the principal-agent equation. The three key interfaces are listed below:²⁰²

Top Tiers of the DOD National Security Issue Network

	Civilian	Military
Level I:	Secretary of Defense	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Level II:	Civilian Secretaries	Uniformed Service Chiefs
Level III:	Deputy Secretary of Defense Under Secretaries for Policy, Personnel and Readiness, and Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E)	Key Members of the Joint Staff: The Director, the J3 (operations), and J5 (plans), and since Goldwater-Nichols the Vice Chairman, JCS, J7 (interoperability) and J8 (resources and assessment)

The Variables and Hypotheses

The dependent variable is the content of policy, more precisely, whose preferences (civilian or military) were adopted in circumstances when they differed. This variable is measured by examining preferences and outcomes for 20 of the most prominent cases of civil-military conflict from 1965-1995.²⁰³ This data is gathered

²⁰² See, Gibson and Snider, "Explaining Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations," January 1997.

²⁰³ Case selection is discussed in chapter 6.

from many sources; government documents, personal interviews, autobiographies, biographies, and other secondary sources. After the data was compiled, they were compared with Desch's data set (presented in chapter 2), and the results were similar, although not identical. They both identified the same general trend, that military political influence has increased since the end of the Cold War. For simplicity and clarity, the descriptive data for the dependent variable was converted into three possible outcomes for each case examined: civilian dominance, military dominance, or negotiation/compromise.

The independent variable (professional preparation) consists of two indicators that measure, for each of the key actors identified in the defense policy issue network, education levels and national security experience. This biographical information was gleaned from various sources including: Who's Who,²⁰⁴ Politics in America,²⁰⁵ The Government Manual,²⁰⁶ Federal Staff Directory,²⁰⁷ Four-Stars,²⁰⁸ General Officer Management Offices at the Pentagon, and Lexis-Nexis. These indicators of professional preparation were chosen after careful thought and consideration for how one becomes influential in the decisionmaking process.²⁰⁹ There is not a single

²⁰⁴ Who's Who (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, Inc., 1997).

²⁰⁵ Allen Ehrenhalt, Politics in America (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987).

²⁰⁶ Office of the Federal Register, The Government Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995).

²⁰⁷ Ann L. Brownson, ed., Federal Staff Directory (Mount Vernon, Va: Staff Directories, LTD., Spring 1996).

²⁰⁸ Dean R. Heaton, Four-Stars: The Super Stars of United States Military History (Baltimore: Gateway Press, Inc., 1995).

²⁰⁹ My thoughts on this subject were shaped by three general factors: 1) Scholarly works that discuss leadership, influence, and decisionmaking, 2) results from the interviews conducted for this project, and 3) personal experience as a former commander and staff officer. For scholarly works on leadership see, for example,

pattern to explain this, as what produces influence in one case may not necessarily apply in another. But as mentioned in the first chapter, these two indicators, education and professional experience, provide a good predictor of how credible one will be in decisionmaking circles. The purpose of the former indicator hardly needs justification: individuals with extensive education levels generally enjoy greater potential to excel in positions of increasing responsibility.²¹⁰ The latter indicator, assignment history, is examined to gain insight into the depth of knowledge, experience, and “networking” capability an individual brings to the job. Although institutional position is very important, decisionmaking at this level takes place among professionals who build confidence and trust in each other, allowing necessary compromise for closure on decisions. Such individuals respect the experiences and wisdom of their peers, and this is the very essence of credibility that is a prerequisite for influence in the decisionmaking process. The data on individuals serving in positions within the issue network can reveal whether there has been an appreciable change overtime between the qualitative backgrounds of civilian and military personnel, and their preparation for key decisionmaking positions, supporting an

B.M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York: Macmillan, 1985); J.W. Gardner, On Leadership (New York: Free Press, 1990). C.N. Greene, “The Reciprocal Nature of Influence Between Leader and Subordinate,” Journal of Applied Psychology 60, (Spring 1975): 187-193; K. Kim and D. Organ, “Determinants of Leader-Subordinate Exchange Relationships,” Group and Organizational Studies 22 (Fall 1978): 375-403; R.M. Hogarth, Judgment and Choice: The Psychology of Decision (New York: John Wiley & Son, 1980); C. Schwenk, “Cognitive Simplification Processes in Strategic Decisionmaking,” Strategic Management Journal 5 (Spring 1984): 111-128; and R.E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990).

²¹⁰ See, for example, Diane Ravitch, National Standards in American Education (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995), and Jeanne Oakes, Multiplying Inequalities: The Effects of Race, Social Class, and Tracking on Opportunities to Learn Mathematics and Science (Santa Monica, Ca: Rand, 1990).

explanation of how civil-military relations have been affected in the post-Cold War era.

A specific professional preparation equation can be derived for each critical civil-military interface. For example, when the Department of Defense is responsible for developing new joint doctrine the key civilian and military actors involved with this issue are the civilian Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the military J5 officer--a three-star with the joint staff responsible for policy development. Using this approach, biographical data from the key players are plugged into the equation below. The prediction is that side with the highest value for the independent variable will tend to enjoy more influence on the final product (the y variable).

x_1 (education) + x_2 (experience) \rightarrow y (policy outcome)

Under SecDef for Policy ($x_1 + x_2$) - J5 Plans Officer ($x_1 + x_2$) = y

If y is a positive value then outcome will reflect civilian preference

If y is a negative value then outcome will reflect military preference

Therefore, the central hypothesis is that as education and experience increase, one's ability to influence the decisionmaking process also increases. Decisionmaking in the national security arena is often characterized by small, collegial bodies deciding among alternatives in an environment cognizant of scarcity--not everyone can get what he or she wants.²¹¹ These decisionmaking "clusters" (as Kingdon calls them) or "issue networks" (as Heclo called them, and applied here) put a premium on pedigree--credentials matter. One attains respect through academic achievement, but especially from superior job-related performance, which is often then rewarded by promotion and the granting of a more prestigious position of increasing authority and

²¹¹ Interview with Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in the Bush Administration, held on June 10, 1997, in his office The School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

responsibility. Thus respect and access are often correlated, and they both are a pre-condition (or necessary condition), for influence. But they are not sufficient conditions for one to be influential in the decisionmaking process.

In addition to respect and access, one must also have trust. Capturing trust empirically proved elusive, however. Trust, and other interpersonal skills, are part of the “standard error” or “randomness” in this equation. This model captures how well someone is prepared to influence the decisionmaking process, but does not determine or predict exactly when that potential is realized. Therefore, this model is probabilistic. Former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin is a prime example of this limitation as, according to the model, he should have been highly influential given his vast experiences in the defense field--Aspin scored 16 in 1993. But he lacked rapport with the military.²¹² Aspin had trouble influencing others because he had inadequate interpersonal skills.²¹³

Despite this limitation, this framework allows for a test of the hypothesis that increased education and experience affects the decisionmaking process. The policy implications associated with the outcome of this hypotheses testing are clear. If it is true that the civil-military equation has changed over the past thirty years in favor the military (and the findings show that it has), and that this is at least partially the cause for the change, then national policy-makers have a good place to start as they consider

²¹² This point was made again and again by interviewees. One respondent in particular, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe asserted that Aspin was the primary cause for the deteriorating civil-military relationship at the outset of the Clinton administration.

²¹³ Given its limitations, for those who apply this methodology to comparative civil-military relationships with unsatisfying results should probably examine the interpersonal skills of the key actors involved in national security politics. Structural arrangements in other countries may allow some individuals to enjoy more authority than others and thus their personalities may need to be weighted accordingly in the analysis.

reform. Changes in public policy that promote civilian professional development, specifically education and enhanced national security experiences would logically follow.

Several testable hypotheses emerge from this causal argument stressing professional preparation. In the 1960s, civilian agents held a great advantage over their military counterparts with regard to education and political-military experience-- those factors that create influence at the decisionmaking interfaces. Although principals were firmly in control and knowledgeable about defense matters, President Kennedy and later President Johnson had great faith and trust in McNamara and delegated to him extensive authority.

Starting in the 1970s, and largely as a consequence of the public's disdain of the Vietnam War and the military's reaction to McNamara, there were significant changes in norms for both civilians and the military. As a consequence of these changes, fewer and possibly less capable civilians sought entrance into the security field (specializing in security/military policy was viewed as militaristic, uncritical, and condoning the war effort).²¹⁴ Conversely the military, in an effort to avert another Vietnam experience and to compete intellectually with their civilian counterparts, simultaneously made a concerted effort to increase the quantity and quality of its policy specialists.²¹⁵

²¹⁴Stephen Walt argued that graduate studies enrollment in the security studies field declined because of the Vietnam War. He continued, however, that a renaissance in security studies began in the mid-1970s, citing increased private funding and new scholarly publications as evidence. See, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *ISQ* 35 (June 1991): 211-239. Joseph Nye and Sean Lynn-Jones also argue that the Vietnam War had an adverse impact on the security studies field, see "International Security Studies," *ISQ* 12 (1988): 5-27. For a critique of Walt, see E. A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector," *ISQ* 36 (1992): 421-438.

²¹⁵ Interview with General (retired) Bernard Rogers, former Army Chief of Staff, conducted on June 19, 1997, at his house in McLean, Virginia.

These claims can be tested too, verifying changes in relative professional preparation over this time period, and ascertaining whether these changes alter the decisionmaking process at the top-tiers of the national security issue network. By the 1980s the military had achieved rough parity with their civilian counterparts with regard to graduate education and political-military experience. This trend continued into the 1990s, accelerated by the end of the Cold War and the decline of nuclear deterrence sub-field of security studies that had been mainly populated by civilians. The declining civilian expertise in the network created a void that has been increasingly filled by highly trained military specialists adept in civil-military negotiations and capable of dominating the executive and congressional decisionmaking apparatus, particularly within Washington, DC. The changing education and experiential backgrounds of those working within the issue network, marked by fewer capable civilian experts and more, better trained and experienced military specialists, altered the decisionmaking environment resulting in the adoption of more military preferences relative to those of the civilian leadership.

***The Connection between Professional Preparation,
Influence, and Civil-Military Conflict***

Although not the primary enterprise of this project, this thesis also argues that there is a relationship between the dependent variable--influence in the decisionmaking process--and civil-military conflict. This analysis is consistent with the new institutionalist claim that there is an interaction between process and product. In short, professional preparation affects product, which in turn, affects process. Professional preparation may ultimately provide a partial explanation for why some civil-military relationships go from healthy to acrimonious, a well researched but little theorized aspect of the discipline.

Of course, when examining the civil-military relationship it is expected that when preferences clash, tension will be present. At the same time, it is also important to remember that tension and conflict are not inherently bad. In fact, in a democracy it can be quite good and even intentional--Madison after all argued that since humans were not Angels the only way to prevent the abuse of power was to have "ambition counteract ambition," and tension and conflict are implicit in that relationship.²¹⁶

Other authors have extolled the benefits of an open and competitive relationship too. Applying psychological frameworks in general, and group dynamics analysis in particular, Irving Janis called for safeguards against the natural inclination to suppress disagreement in decisionmaking bodies. In fact, Janis found norms of conformity so strong in groups that otherwise brilliant individuals, collectively and repeatedly, made patently poor decisions. The "Bay of Pigs" fiasco, Pearl Harbor, and the decision to escalate the war in Vietnam were only three examples where so-called "group think" prevented sound decisions in US foreign policy.²¹⁷

One of the main points of this dissertation is that the normative framework for US civil-military relations needs to be changed to accept more conflict in the right places (not among elected officials and the military, but among civilian and military officials inside the DOD). In some respects, the dynamic of the civil-military relationship inside the Pentagon is similar to the dynamics of a marriage. Unhealthy conflict and unbalanced relationships are causes for concern. Therefore, it is worthwhile to learn more about the conditions that produce conflict so that the relationship can be managed.

²¹⁶ Madison, Federalist Paper, # 51.

²¹⁷ Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982), pps. 1-98.

The counseling field is increasingly recognizing that competition, and even conflict, is a desirable dynamic, and a natural by-product of equal relationships. Relationships dominated by one side or another tend to lead to the inferior partner repressing and stifling true feelings and preferences until provoked or agitated beyond containment. When this happens the result is episodic hurtful conflict and destructive behavior. This is contrasted with the healthy conflict witnessed in relationships that display a free give-and-take dynamic.²¹⁸

Beyond the normal tensions expected when preferences clash, it is hypothesized that the relationship worsens when: 1) the civil-military relationship at the Pentagon is unbalanced--dominated by one side; 2) military preferences are adopted over the preferences of elected officials (as with the "Gays in the military" decision in 1993); 3) a civilian preference is adopted that threatens some aspect of military "essence."²¹⁹ When bolstered by popular support, military discontent may be publicly aired in these circumstances; and 4) when the President and Congress or when Republicans and Democrats are divided over what to do and the military is used by one of the parties or visa versa. In these circumstances the uncertainty over whose preferences will be adopted aggravates the relationship and increases the stakes over who wins. In these four cases the civil-military relationship goes from normal (or some might say acceptable) tension levels to confrontation.

²¹⁸ John Gray, Men, Women and Relationships (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pps. 31-50, and pps. 261-263.

²¹⁹ Here I am referring to the Halperin and Kantor definition of organizational essence. See, Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kantor, "The Bureaucratic Perspective," in Understanding International Relations, Daniel J. Kaufman, Joseph J. Collins, and Thomas F. Schneider, eds., second edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 1218.

Coding²²⁰

Before moving to specific professional preparation analysis, further clarification of the coding rules is necessary. Attempts to quantify and rate political-military experience are controversial and difficult--this one is no exception. Indeed, as indicated earlier, part of what it takes to be influential within the network is exceptional interpersonal skills that defy quantification. But while acknowledging that personality plays an important role in networking capability, this study attempts to capture the relative advantage that some individuals enjoy over others by virtue of their educational background and wisdom gained through experience.

Coding professional preparation required careful consideration. When coding educational levels, credit was given for highest degree earned up to a maximum of three for JDs and PhDs (see Table 6 below for specifics). Although the JD degree is generally attained in a shorter time than the PhD, they were given equal weight here because the criteria were designed to capture the relative prestige attached with educational achievements by the Washington policy community, specifically the national security issue network. The professional degrees (MPA and MBA), although in many cases immediately relevant to national security positions, were still coded a notch below the doctorates in deference to the highest academic achievement, which is recognized by the policy community. Finally, the National War College was credited at one for both civilian and military graduates of that institution.

²²⁰ An earlier version of these coding criteria is found in Gibson and Snider, "Explaining Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations," pps. 30-32.

Table 6
Coding Rules For Education

Type of Degree	Value For Highest Degree Earned		
	1	2	3
Academic Degrees			
MA/MS		X	
PhD			X
Professional Degrees			
MPA/MBA		X	
LLB		X	
JD			X
Professional Military Educational			
National War College (NWC)	X		

Coding working experience proved a more difficult challenge. The intent was to establish uniform, objective standards for this indicator, but some civilian career paths provide undeniably greater depth of experience and more interpersonal influence within the network (e.g., politically appointed civilians with prior military service, especially decorated combat experience). Moreover, paths to the top of the national security issue network are often different for civilian and military officials. Consequently coding criteria were established, but subjective judgments were made in a few cases.

As Heclo argued, issue networks are composed of individuals from across occupational boundaries. Although individuals may not be working in a top interface position, they still may have some influence on the decisionmaking process, and, more important for this project, they may be in a professional position that is increasing their potential to serve in higher positions of responsibility in the future. Thus credit was given for jobs that provided political-military experience even if it was not at the top-tiers of the civil-military interface. Following Heclo's definition of the issue network, credit was given for positions within the DOD, NSC, DOS, or

other cabinet-level agencies dealing with national security matters, some positions held in academia that dealt with national security matters, and positions with think tanks, Congressional staffs and the media meeting the same criteria. Because some positions dealt with political-military matters more than others, credit was weighted accordingly (see Table 7 below for specifics). Positions held within the DOD and NSC, and some positions within Congress and the DOS received a full one credit for each year served. Jobs held in other areas where political-military concerns existed but were not foremost received either 1/4 or 1/2 credit for each year. Credit stopped accruing for defense-related business sector and think-tank experiences at 4, and academia and media experiences at 2, based on a subjective call of where diminishing returns begin for these positions in terms of reputation building within the top-tiers of the national security issue network. Although all of these experiences on the periphery of the policymaking community foster enhanced professional preparation, after mastering these areas, professional preparation is only further enhanced by policy assignments inside government. Interview results subsequently validated this decision. Academic credentials certainly mattered, especially the PhD. But key actors were expected to possess more public policy and “hands-on” experience than academic experience. Still, according to this criteria, academics could score a total of 9 without even having any actual public policy experience (3 for the PhD, 2 for teaching at a college or university, and 4 for think-tank experience). Well-rounded civilian defense officials had high scores reflecting a mix of academic and policy-related experiences.

Table 7
Coding Rules For Assignment History

Type Position	Value Per Year		
	.25	.5	1
DOD			X
NSC			X
DOS (significant Pol-Mil Affairs experience)			X
DOS (lesser Pol-Mil experience)		X	
Congress (significant Pol-Mil exp)			X
Congress (lesser Pol-Mil exp)	X		
Think Tank (Pol-Mil experience)		X (Max:4)	
Business Sector (Defense Related)		X (Max:4)	
Academia (Nat'l Security/Social Sciences)	X (Max:2)		
Media (Pol-Mil experience)	X (Max:2)		
Prior Military Service (Civilians Only)	X	X (Wartime)	X (Decorated in War)
Joint Service Credit			X

The next two chapters provide and discuss the data and findings on professional preparation for the principals and the agents using these coding rules. Each table found in these chapters provides data on education and assignment history. But in addition to the qualitative data listed, below each name a numerical value for each person is provided.

Two military examples are provided. General Powell's numerical value is 14 because according to the coding rules he received credit for the following: 2 for his graduate degree (MBA), .5 for his one year White House Fellowship, 1 for being the military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for one year, .5 for being the military assistant to the Secretary of Energy for one year, 3 for the three years he served as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 3 for the three years he served as the Deputy, and then principal National Security Advisor to the President, and finally 4 for serving as the Chairman, JCS from 1989-1993. The value 14 is derived by adding all of these values together (2, .5, 1, .5, 3, 3, and 4= 14).

General Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff at the time the decision was being made to escalate in Vietnam, received a score of 3. Despite his combat

heroics in World War II and Korea, General Johnson only earned points for his Pentagon assignments from 1963-1966.

For a civilian DOD example, William Perry has a numerical score of 10.25 because according to the coding rules he received credit for the following: 3 for his Doctorate, .25 for his military service from 1946-1947 (it would have been assessed at .5 if it had been during wartime and at 1 if he had been decorated for that wartime service), 4 for his four years in the Carter Administration DOD, 2 for his time in academia, including affiliation with the Center for International Security at Stanford University, and 1 for his tenure as Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1993-1994. Thus, when added up 3, .25, 4, 2, and 1 equal 10.25. Note that although Perry stayed on until 1997, as with all individuals examined in this study, his numerical score for professional work experience cuts off at the second year mark of the administration (thus 1994 for Perry). Therefore, all quantitative data listed provided in chapters 4 and 5 are snapshots of individuals' potential to influence the decisionmaking process at the second year mark (1966, 1970, 1978, 1982, 1990, and 1994), and not necessarily for the entire time period covered.

To conclude examples, a description for how the numerical values of two other civilians is provided, one LTG (retired) Brent Scowcroft, a presidential aide, and the other, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA). Scowcroft gets a 27 because according to the rules he receives: 3 for his Doctorate, 1 for graduating from the National War College, 2 for his time as an assistant professor of political science at West Point, 1 for his two years as an assistant military attaché in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 2 for his time as professor and Head of the political science department at the United States Air Force Academy, 3 for his time on the Air Force long-range planning staff, 2 for his time as staff assistant to the assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, 1 for being the Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, 1 for being the Military Assistant to the President of the United States, 2

for being the Deputy National Security Advisor, 2 for the time he spent as President Ford's National Security Advisor, 3 for his time as a Presidential Advisor for Arms Control, 2 for his time as Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates and 2 for the first two years he spent as President Bush's National Security Advisor. When you add up this extensive list you get a total score of 27.

Congressman Ronald Dellums gets a score of 11.5. That number is derived by adding up the 2 points for his Master's degree, 1 for his time with the United States Marine Corps, and 5.5 for the years in Congress and service as the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee from 1993-1995.

More details on the careers of these four individuals and of the others covered in this study, are found in the tables in the next two chapters. These tables are useful in illustrating the qualitative changes in professional preparation among civilian and military members in key policy interface jobs over the six time periods examined.

Chapter 4 The Principals: Congress and the President

This chapter documents the declining national security expertise among members of Congress and the President since the 1960s. This decline in knowledge and expertise has created the intellectual space and opportunity for personnel (or agents) in the Department of Defense to take on a more significant role in policy-making.

The desire for elected officials to have national security-related experience has taken on greater importance in this country over the years. During the Founding Era this was a moot concern as many of the national leaders (Washington, Hamilton, et al.) were leaders of the Revolution as well. The same was true throughout most of early United States history. In fact, nearly 50% of the Presidents up to the end of the 19th century were Generals prior to becoming Commander-in-Chief. In total, there have been 12 former Presidents who were Generals previously.²²¹

The civil-military relationship was thus very intertwined. The nation depended primarily on citizen-soldiers for its survival and often drew its leaders from the same pool. This influenced the development of United States political culture. During its first century the United States exhibited some of the same characteristics described by Rebecca Schiff in her contemporary analysis of Israel.²²²

²²¹ In chronological order the 12 former presidents who were generals include: Washington, Jackson, W. Harrison, Taylor, Pierce, A. Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, B. Harrison, and Eisenhower. Of these 4 were career officers (Eisenhower, Grant, W. Harrison, and Taylor). In total 26 of the 42 presidents to date have had active military service. Of the 16 who did not serve in uniform, several others (FDR and Taft, just to name two) served as top-level civilians in the defense establishment. Source: William A. DeGregorio, The Complete Book of US Presidents: From George Washington to Bill Clinton (New York: Wing Books, 1993).

²²² Rebecca Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: Israel as an 'Uncivil' State." Security Studies, (Summer 1992): 636-658.

Schiff argues that in Israel the distinction between civil society and the defense establishment is practically non-existent. The same was largely true in early America. In addition to the numerous Americans who belonged to the state militias, many citizens answered the call for volunteers in time of war or crisis or were drafted when the country needed them. Of course, one major difference between early America and modern-day Israel is the level and proximity of threat from foreign powers, which for contemporary Israel is quite high while in early America it was less so, primarily for geographical reasons.

For the United States, as fate would have it, just about every generation of Americans came to be tested in battle beginning with the American Revolution and continuing on through the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Indian Conflicts, the War with Spain, and including the great World Wars in the Twentieth Century. Thus, for early America the burden of national defense was widely distributed across society.

Partially as a consequence of periodic wars and drafts, civilian leadership for the first two hundred years since the Founding had a fairly extensive amount of military experience of some kind. This began to change during the Vietnam War, however, because of the pervasiveness of draft deferments and exemptions granted, especially to those pursuing advanced degrees, the same segment of society that often aspires to top-level positions in the federal government. This trend was reinforced in 1973 when President Nixon ended the draft completely. These developments partially explain the changes in the data patterns found in this chapter pertaining to military service among top-level civilians in the DOD over the six time periods in this study.

The World War II Generation

During World War II, millions of Americans served in the Armed Forces. Shortly after the end of that conflict a new generation of civilian leadership emerged battle-tested and ready for the new challenges. The freshman class elected to Congress in 1946 consisted of many veterans and among them were two future presidents, John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon. In addition, Gerald Ford, also a war veteran, was elected to Congress in 1948, and two other future presidents saw combat in that war too, Lyndon B. Johnson and George H. Bush, who at age 17 was the youngest pilot in the Pacific Theater.

Several factors contributed to this generation making such an impact on national security policy. In addition to their extensive experience which prepared them to influence defense decisionmaking, this generation also had to deal with the Cold War and the real and perceived aspects of the Soviet threat. To confront this challenge a large portion of the intellectual resources of the United States was committed to national security. Ivy league graduates gravitated towards the security studies field and President Kennedy beckoned them to national public service, “ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country.”²²³ And so they came. Part of their story will be told in the next chapter, but the data below will show their extensive experience and preparation for these duties. This generation made enormous contributions across the full spectrum of the American political landscape, including the Congressional and Executive branches of government.

But the Vietnam War and Watergate damaged the reputation of the federal government and the attractiveness of public service, particularly in the national security realm. This, coupled with the end of the draft significantly reduced the pool

²²³ For an interesting philosophical discussion of this see, David Segal, “What’s Wrong with the Gore Report,” The Washington Monthly (November 1993): 18-23.

of Americans with military/defense-related experience and this has had an impact on American politics, national security decisionmaking, and civil-military relations. As Table 8 (below) illustrates, the percentage of Congressional members with military experience has declined considerably since the mid-1980s, and likely will continue to drop in the years to come. Given the smaller percentage of Americans with military experience, there is a good probability that future Presidents will, like Clinton, have no military service prior to becoming commander-in-chief. All of these trends will require a re-evaluation of existing paradigms of civil-military relations and public expectations.

Analysis of the Data

In general, the data (presented in tables immediately following the findings) provided support for the argument that the intellectual and experiential balance of power has shifted towards the military since the 1960s. There were however, some surprises.

Finding 1: The aggregate data demonstrate a 30% decline in military experience among members of Congress.

The table below shows that members of Congress increasingly are arriving in Washington without military experience. This is largely a consequence of the end of the draft and the absence of a major conflict requiring conscription. This has come at a time when the experienced World War II generation has been steadily passing from the political scene.

Although the military has been very active since Vietnam, and especially since the end of the Cold War, deployments have never reached the scale of World War II, and since 1973 those going on those deployments have been volunteers, many of

whom have elected to stay in the service after deployment. The recent Persian Gulf War involved the deployment of over 500,000 men and women, including roughly 100,000 reserves and National Guardsmen. But since that conflict happened only seven years ago, only a handful of Persian Gulf veterans have been elected to Congress. All of this means that in the near future this trend will continue in the same direction.

Table 8
Percentage of Members of Congress
with Military Experience²²⁴

	1982	1990	1994
House			
Active Duty	50.5	39.2	34.0
Reserve/Active	56.8	48.4	40.5
Senate			
Active Duty	63.4	56.4	49.0
Reserve/Active	76.2	69.3	58.8
Combined			
Active Duty	52.9	42.4	36.9
Reserve/Active	60.5	52.3	43.9

Source: Eitelberg and Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," p. 54.

Finding 2: National Security Experience in the Executive Branch declines when a new party assumes control of the White House for the first time in 8 or more years.

Of the six time periods examined in this study, a different party took control of the White House in four, while the same party retained control in two. The summary tables presented later (Tables 12 and 13), show that periods of continuity

²²⁴ Mark Eitelberg and Roger Little, "Influential Elites and the American Military after the Cold War," United States Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition? ed Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1995), p. 54.

(Time Period 1: The Johnson administration and Time Period 5: The Bush administration), had the highest scores. Periods of major transition (one party transferring control to another) had the lowest scores for professional preparation. Of course, the data in Table 12 is skewed, to a degree, by the numerical values of the President during those time periods. Johnson and Bush were the most experienced Presidents, in terms of national security. But Table 13 demonstrates that continuity in partisan control of the White House facilitates high values of professional preparation. Both Johnson and Bush hired (or kept on) experienced non-DOD national security advisors. All of Johnson's key national security advisors (except Vice President Humphrey) were Kennedy holdovers. This decreases transitional turbulence. Bush had James A. Baker III and Richard Clarke (the Director of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department), both of whom worked for Reagan, although in different capacities.

In contrast, during periods of major presidential transition national security experience in the executive branch diminishes. This was the case for the Clinton administration. Decreasing scores in professional preparation in the executive branch may adversely affect national security policy and heighten civil-military tension. The case studies covered in chapter 6 testify to this point.

Finding 3: Although the aggregate data on all Congressional members (Table 8) indicates a decline in overall national security experience, this was not true for those individuals serving in key defense-related Committee Chairmanships.

In Table 12 we see that Congressional expertise in 1994 actually increased from 1990. In fact, the value for 1994 was the highest Congressional score recorded in the study. This figure was significantly influenced by the continuity in key Congressional chairmanships during this period. Murtha, Nunn, Pell, and Inouye

retained their posts from 1990 to 1994. This gave Congress a high degree of continuity and defense expertise from which to draw upon.

However, this trend was attenuated by the turnover in one of the most important Congressional posts related to the military--House Armed Services. Congressman Dellums took over that position in 1993. Ordinarily professional staff members help ease those transition periods, but this was not the case then as outgoing Chairman Les Aspin took several key aides with him to the DOD. When the gays in the military controversy exploded, the Dellums team was still in the process of learning what it takes to lead and thus had a lesser degree of influence on the situation than what would have been expected for that ordinarily powerful committee.

Also hampering the influence of Congress in 1994 was the disagreement between two of the most important Congressional members from the same party over the gays controversy. SASC Chair, Senator Sam Nunn, and HASC Chair, Representative Ronald Dellums feuded over the direction of substance and process during this debate with Dellums stridently calling on the President to fulfill his campaign promise while Nunn threatened to challenge the President, even to the point of sponsoring legislation to counter any executive order. The Democratic Congressional majority was not united in strategic direction either with competing visions of post-Cold War strategy emanating from these two committees with Dellums favoring a more activist role and Nunn advancing a more restrictive foreign policy direction. Therefore, at a time when the Congress could have been especially influential in comparison to the President and the DOD, it was divided over the direction of policy. Of course, Nunn eventually played a significant role, but only after he aligned himself with the military. During times of executive-congressional struggle both parties vie for the support of the agent. The split in Congress and the division within the Democratic party allowed the military to be more influential at the

beginning of the Clinton administration when the Congress otherwise might have dominated to a greater degree.

But the findings for Time Period 6 are still important because they refute conventional wisdom that the decline in Congressional national security experience is both dramatic and across the board. The data pertaining to the key committee chairmanships offers an interesting counterpoint to the data on Congress as a whole. When (if) strategic and political consensus returns, Congress appears prepared to wield significant influence relative to both the President and the uniformed military in the national security decisionmaking realm, providing committee chairmanship expertise remains constant or improves.

The tables below provide the qualitative and quantitative data for Presidents, key members of Congress, and non-DOD Presidential advisors (the Vice President, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of State and the Director of Political-Military Affairs at State). The coding criteria, initially presented in chapter 3, is provided again to assist the reader. In addition, a list of abbreviations is also included to aid in interpretation of the data.

**Table From Chapter 3
Coding Rules For Education**

Type of Degree	Value For Highest Degree Earned		
	1	2	3
Academic Degrees			
MA/MS		X	
PhD			X
Professional Degrees			
MPA/MBA		X	
LLB		X	
JD			X
Professional Military Educational			
National War College (NWC)	X		

**Table From Chapter 3
Coding Rules For Assignment History**

Type Position	Value Per Year		
	.25	.5	1
DOD			X
NSC			X
DOS (significant Pol-Mil Affairs experience)			X
DOS (lesser Pol-Mil experience)		X	
Congress (significant Pol-Mil exp)			X
Congress (lesser Pol-Mil exp)	X		
Think Tank (Pol-Mil experience)		X (Max:4)	
Business Sector (Defense Related)		X (Max:4)	
Academia (Nat'l Security/Social Sciences)	X (Max:2)		
Media (Pol-Mil experience)	X (Max:2)		
Prior Military Service (Civilians Only)	X	X (Wartime)	X (Decorated in War)
Joint Service Credit			X

List of Abbreviations

ADC	Aide-de-Camp
Amb	Ambassador
ANSA/NSA	National Security Advisor to President
ARNG	Army National Guard
BSM	Bronze Star Medal
C/S or CofS	Chief of Staff
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief Naval Officer
D/CNO or D/CINC	Deputy
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
EUCOM	European Command
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HDASC	House Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
JAG	Judge Advocate General
Lieut J.G.	Lieutenant Junior Grade
NDU	National Defense University
NWC	National War College
ORSA	Operational Research and Systems Analysis
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PH	Purple Heart
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDASC	Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
SFAC	Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
SS	Silver Star
U/Sec Per & Read	Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness
USA	United States Army
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USCGA	United States Coast Guard Academy
USMA	United States Military Academy

List of Abbreviations (Continued)

USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve
USN	United States Navy
USNA	United States Naval Academy
USNR	United States Naval Reserve
V/CNO or V/C	Vice
XO	Executive Officer

Table 9
Presidential National Security Experience
1965-1995

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	National Security Experience
President Lyndon Johnson (19)	BA Southwest Texas State	1940-42 USN (Silver Star, Lieutenant Commander); 1937-49 Member, US House (served on Naval Affairs Comm, later HASC); 1949-61 US Senator (served on SASC 1949-60); 1961-63 Vice President
President Richard M. Nixon (18)	BA Whittier; JD Duke	1942-46 USN (Lieutenant Commander); 1947-50 Member, US House; 1951-53 US Senator; 1953-61 Vice President;
President James E. Carter (12)	BS USNA	1946-53 USN (Lieutenant); 1971-75 Governor of Georgia
President Ronald Reagan (6)	BS Eureka College	1942-45 US Army (Captain); 1967-75 Governor of California
President George Bush (19)	BA Yale	1942-45 USN (Lieut J.G., Distinguished Flying Cross); 1967-71 Member, United States House; 1971-73 United States Amb to UN; 1974-75 Chief, United States Liaison in China; 1976-77 Dir, CIA; 81-89 Vice President
President William J. Clinton (7)	AB Georgetown; Rhodes Scholar; JD Yale	1979-81, 1983-92 Gov of Arkansas

Table 10
The National Security Experience of
Key Members of Congress

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	Political-Military Experience
1965-1967		
HASC Chair L. Mendel Rivers (10)	BA Charleston Coll; LLB U of SC	1941-70, Member, US House (Chair, HASC beginning 1965-70)
HFAC Chair Thomas E. Morgan (15)	BS Waynesburg Coll; Doc of Med Wayne U.	1945-77, Member, US House (Chair, HFAC beginning 1957-72)
SASC Chair Richard Russell (25)	BL U of Georgia; LLD Mercer	1918 USNR; 1931-33 Gov of Georgia; 1933-71, US Senator; (chair, SASC 1950-69)
SFAC Chair J.W. Fullbright (15.25)	BA U of Arkansas; BA/MA Oxford; LLB GWU	1943-44 Member, US House; 1945-74, US Senator (chair, SFAC 1957-72)
1969-1971		
HASC Chair L. Mendel Rivers (14)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as HASC Chair
HFAC Chair Thomas E. Morgan (19)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as HFAC Chair
SASC Chair John Stennis (9.5)	BS Miss St. U; LLB U of VA	1947-89 US Senator (chair, SASC 1969-80)

Table 10 (Continued)

SFAC Chair J.W. Fullbright (19.25)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as SFAC Chair
<hr/>		
1977-1979		
HASC Chair C. Melvin Price (13.5)	none	1933-43 Congressional Aide; 1943-44 US Army 1945-88, Member US House; (chair, HASC 1975-84)
HFAC Chair Clement Zablocki (9)	BS Marquette;	1949-83, Member, US House; (chair HFAC 1977-83)
HDASC Chair George H. Mahon (23)	BA Simmons Coll; LLB U of Texas	1935-79, Member US House; (chair, HDASC/Approps 1964-79)
SASC Chair John Stennis (13.5)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as SASC Chair
SFAC Chair John Sparkman (16)	AB U of Alabama; LLB/AM U of Alabama	1916-18 USA, Colonel in Reserves; 1937-46 Member US House (Mil Affrs Comm); 1947-78 US Senator (chair, SFAC 1976-79)
SDASC Chair John McClellan (17)		1916-1918 USA (First Lieutenant); 1935-39 Member, US House; 1943-79, US Senator (chair, SDASC 1971-79)
<hr/>		
1981-1983		
HASC Chair C. Melvin Price (17.5)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as HASC Chair

Table 10 (Continued)

HFAC Chair Clement Zablocki (13)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as HFAC Chair
HDASC Chair Joseph Addabbo (9.5)	LLB St. Johns	1961-86, Member, US House (chair, HDASC 1979-85)
SASC Chair John Tower (11)	BA Southwestern U.; MA SMU	1943-46 USN; Chief Petty Officer, USNR; 1961-85 US Senator (chair, SASC 1981-84)
SFAC Chair Charles Percy (7.25)	BA U of Chicago	1943-45 USN (Lieutenant); 1967-85, US Senator (chair, SFAC 1980-85)
SDASC Chair Ted Stevens (11)	BA UCLA; JD Harvard	1943-46 USAAF; 1968-still serving, US Senator (chair, SDASC 1979-93)
<hr/>		
1989-1991		
HASC Chair Les Aspin (12.5)	BA Yale; MA Oxford; PhD MIT	1966-68 Army Service/ Pentagon, ORSA (Captain); 1971-93 Member US House, (Chair, HASC 1985-93)
HFAC Chair Dante Fascell (19.5)	JD U of Miami	1941-46 ARNG-Florida (vet African, Sicilian, Italian campaigns); 1955-93, Member US House, (chair, HFAC 1985-93)
HDASC Chair John Murtha (15)	BA U of Pittsburgh	1952-55 Marine Corps, enlisted, later commissioned officer (First Lieutenant); served in USMCR to Colonel, 1966-67 Vietnam vet (BSM for valor, 2 Purple Hearts); 1974-still serving, Member, US House (chair, HDASC 1986-90)

Table 10 (Continued)

SASC Chair Sam Nunn (11.5)	AB Emory; LLB Emory	1959-60 US Coast Guard, 1960-68 US Coast Guard Reserve; 1973-97 United States Senator;(chair,SASC 1987-97)
SFAC Chair Claiborne Pell (20)	AB Princeton; AM Columbia	1940-46 US Coast Guard, later United States Coast Guard Reserve, retired a Captain (O-6); 1945-52 Foreign Service Officer; 1961-97 United States Senator; (chair, SFAC 1985-97)
SDASC Chair Daniel Inouye (14)	AB U of Hawaii; JD GWU	1943-46 USA (Captain, Decorated Service); 1959-63 Member, United States House; 1963-still serving, United States Senator (chair, SDASC 93-still serving)
<hr/>		
1993-1995		
HASC Chair Ron Dellums (11.5)	AA Oakland City College; BA San Francisco State College; MSW U of California	2 years with USMC; 1971-still serving, Member, US House (chair, HASC 1993-95)
HFAC Chair Lee Hamilton (12)	BA DePauw; JD Indiana U.	1965-still serving, Member, US House (chair, HFAC 93-still serving)
HDASC Chair John Murtha (19)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as HDASC Chair
SASC Chair Sam Nunn (15.5)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as SASC Chair
SFAC Chair Claiborne Pell (24)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as SFAC Chair
SDASC Chair Daniel Inouye (18)	same as above	same as above + 4 more years as SDASC Chair

Table 11
The National Security Experience of
Top Presidential Advisors (Non-DOD)

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	Political-Military Experience
1965-1967		
Vice President H. Humphrey (11)	BA U of Minnesota; MA LSU	1949-65 United States Senator
NSA McGeorge Bundy (7.5)	AB Yale	1948-49 Political Analyst, CFR 1949-61 Assoc Prof of Govt, Harvard; 1961-69 NSA
Sec State Dean Rusk (22)	AB Davidson Coll (Phi Beta Kappa) BS/MA Oxford (Rhodes)	1934-40 Assoc Prof Govt, Mills College; 1940-46 USA; 1946 Asst Chief, Div Int'l Security Affrs, (State); 1946-47 Spec Asst to Sec of War; 1947-49 Dir, UN Affrs (State); 1949-50 Dep Under Sec of State; 1950-51 Asst Sec State (Far Eastern Affrs); 1952-60 Pres, Rockefeller Found; 1961-69 Sec State
Dir, Central Intelligence William Raborn (17)	BS USNA; NWC	1928-63 US Naval Officer; 1952-54 Office of Chief Naval Officer (CNO); 1955-63 Washington Related Naval Assignments including Deputy CNO; 1963-65 VP Aerojet-Gen Corp; 1965-66 Dir, CIA

Table 11 (Continued)

Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) J. Kitchen (15)	BS U of Oregon	1943-46 Administrator in Lend-Lease Program; 1948-51 Acting Chief Policy Reports, State Dept; 1952-53 Spec Asst to Sec State; 1956-61 Member, Senior Staff, Rand Corp; 1961-69 Asst Sec State Pol-Mil
1969-1971		
Vice President Spiro Agnew (8)	JD U of Baltimore	1943-45 USA (Captain); 1967-69 Gov of Maryland;
NSA Henry Kissinger (20)	AB Harvard; MA/PhD Harvard	1943-46 USA; 1954-69 Prof of Govt, Harvard; extensive exp with CFR and Rockefeller Found.; Extensive Govt Consulting, 1961-62 NSC; 1961-68 ACDA; 1965-69 State Dept; 1969-73 NSA
Sec State William Rogers (11)	BA Colgate; LLB Cornell	1942-46 USN (Lieutenant Commander); 1953-57 Dep Attorney General; 1957-61 Attorney General; 1969-73 Sec State
Dir, Central Intelligence Richard Helms (18)	BA Williams College	1942-46 Office of Strategic Services, US Navy 1947-73 with CIA; 1965-66 Dep Dir 1966-73 Dir CIA
Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) R. Spiers (16)	BA Dartmouth; MPA Princeton	1943-46 USNR (0-2) ; 1955-61 State Dept (extensive pol-mil exp: Disarmament, Nuc Test Ban, NATO); 1961-62 United States ACDA 1962-66 Dir Atl Pol-Mil Affrs; 1966-69 Counselor Pol-Mil Affrs, London Emb;

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Table 11 (Continued)

1969-73 Dir, Pol-Mil Affairs, State Dep

1977-1979		
Vice President W. Mondale (12)	BA U of Minnesota; JD U of Minnesota	1952-54 USA (Korea); 1965-77 US Senator;
NSA Z. Brzezinski (13)	BA McGill; MA/PhD Harvard	Over 30 years of exp in academia (Harvard, Columbia SAIS); 1966-68 Planning comm State Dept; 1973-76 Dir, Trilateral Commission
Sec State Cy Vance (15)	BA Yale; LLB Yale	1942-46 USNR (Lieutenant); 1957-60 Spec Counsel Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee SASC; 1961-62 General Counsel DOD; 1962-63 Sec Army; 1964-67 D/Asst Sec Def 1968-69 United States Negotiator, Paris Peace Talks; 1977-80 Sec State
Dir, Central Intelligence Adm Stansfield Turner (18)	BS Amherst; BS USNA; MA Oxford (Rhodes)	1946-79 US Navy; 1963-66 Office of Systems Anal; 1968-70 Aide to Sec Navy; 1971-72 Dir, Systems Anal Div US Navy; 1972-74 Pres. National War Coll; 75-77 Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe; 1977-81 Dir CIA
Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) Leslie Gelb (13.5)	AB Tufts; MA/PhD Harvard	Experience in Academia and with the Media in Defense Related Matters; 1966-67 Exec Asst to United States Senator J. Javits; 1967-69 Dep Dir, Policy Planning Staff DOS; 1969-73 Senior Fellow, Brookings; 1973-77 NY Times Washington

Table 11 (Continued)

		Correspondant; 1977-81 Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State)
1981-1983		
Vice President George Bush (11)	BA Yale	1942-45 USN (Lieut J.G., Distinguished Flying Cross); 1967-71 Member, United States House; 1971-73 United States Amb to UN; 1974-75 Chief, United States Liaison in China; 1976-77 Dir, CIA;
NSA William Clark (82) (7)	JD Loyola U.	1954-56 USA; 1966-69 Chief of Staff for Governor Reagan; 1981-82 Dep Sec State
Sec State (Gen-retired) Alexander Haig (18)	BS USMA; MA Georgetown;	1964 Mil Asst to Sec Army; 1964-65 Dep Spec Asst to Sec Def; 1969-70 Mil Asst to Pres for NSA; 1970-73 Dep Asst to Pres, NSA; 1973 Vice Chief of Staff, Army; 1973-74 Chief of Staff, White House; 1974-79 SACEUR; 1979-81 Pres, CEO, United Tech; 1981-82 Sec State
Sec State George Shultz (Jul 82) (13)	BA Princeton; PhD MIT	1942-45 USMC Reserve; Extensive experience in academia (MIT & U of Chicago) 1955-56 Senior Economist, CEA; 1969-70 Sec of Labor; 1970-72 Dir, OMB; 1972-74 Sec of Treasury; 1975-82 Pres, Bechtel Corp; 1982-89 Sec State

Table 11 (Continued)

Dir, Central Intelligence (13) William J. Casey	BS Fordham; JD St. John's	1941-46 OSS US Army; 47-48 Assoc Gen Counsel ECA Mission to France; 71-73 Chrmn, SEC; 73-74 U/Sec State economic affairs; 1974-75 Pres EX-IM Bank; 1976 For Intell Adv Board; 1980 Reagan Camp mngr
Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) R/ADM (15) J.T. Howe	BS USNA; MA, MALD, PhD Tufts U.	1969-73 Mil Asst to Nat'l Sec Advisor; 1975-76 Asst to Vice President for Nat'l Sec Affrs; 1980-81 Aide to CNO for Nat'l Sec Affairs/Dir Pol-Mil Affairs (State)
1989-1991 Vice President Dan Qualye (11)	BA DePauw; JD Indiana U.	6 years in Indiana Nat'l Guard; 1977-81 Member, United States House; 1981-89 US Senator (SASC)
NSA Brent Scowcroft (27)	BS USMA; MA/PhD Columbia NWC	1953-57 Asst Prof of Pol Sci, USMA; 1959-61 Asst Mil Attache Belgrade, Yugo; 1962-63 Assoc Prof of Pol Sci, USAFA; 1963-64 Prof and Head, Pol Sci Dept, USAFA; 1964-67 Member, AF Long Range Planning Staff; 1968-70 Staff Asst to Asst Sec Def for Int'l Security Affairs 1970-71 Spec Asst to Dir, Joint Staff; 1972-73 Mil Asst to Pres; 1973-75 Dep NSA; 1975-77 NSA; 1977-80 Pres Adv Comm Arms

Table 11 (Continued)

		Control; 1982-89 Vice Chairmen, Kissinger Associates; 1989-93 NSA
Sec State James Baker (12)	BA Princeton; LLB U of Texas	1952-54 USMC (First Lieutenant) 1957-81 Lawyer/Pol Strategist; 1981-85 Chief of Staff, White House; 1985-89 Sec Tres; 1989-92 Sec State
Dir, Central Intelligence William Webster (18)	AB Amherst; JD Washington U	Lawyer and Fed Judge US Circuit; 1978-87 Dir FBI; 1987-91 Dir CIA
Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) R. Clarke (18)	BA U of Penn; MS MIT	1973-77 Aide to Sec Def; 1979-85 Action Officer, Bur Pol-Mil Affairs; 1985-89 Dep Asst Sec State Intelligence Anal 1989-93 Dir, Pol-Mil Affairs
<hr/>		
1993-1995		
Vice President Al Gore (12)	AB Harvard	1969-71 USA (Vietnam exp, enlisted, reporter); 1977-85 Member, United States House (House Intelligence Comm); 1985-93 US Senator
NSA Anthony Lake (14)	AB Harvard; PhD Princeton	1963-65 State Dep Duty in Vietnam; 1969-70 Spec Asst to Pres NSA Affairs at State; 1977-81 Dep Policy Planning for Pres at State; 1981-93 Prof of Int'l Rel at Mount Holyoke; 1993-97 NSA

Table 11 (Continued)

Sec State Warren Christopher (11)	BS USC; LLB Stanford;	Extensive exp as Lawyer; 1943-46 USNR (Lieut J.G.); 1961-65 Consultant, Under Sec State 1967-69 Dep Attorney General; 1977-81 Dep Sec State; 1982-91 Vice Chairmen, CFR
Dir, Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey (18)	BA Stanford; MA Oxford (Rhodes); LLB Yale	Lawyer; 1968-70 US Army (with PA&E) 1970 NSC; 77-79 U/Sec Navy; 79-89 Ambassador/ rep to negotiation on conventional armed forces Europe;
Dir, Pol-Mil Affrs (State) T.E. McNamara (15)	BA Manhattan Coll; MA Notre Dame	1974-75 Arms Control Spec, ACDA; 1979-80 Spec Asst to Dir, Pol-Mil Affairs; 1983-86 Dep Asst Sec of State for Pol-Mil Affairs; 1986-88 Dir, Counter-Terrorism, Narcotics at NSC; 1988-91 United States Amb to Columbia; 1991-92 Spec Asst to Pres and Sr. Dir, NSC; 1992-93 Coord for Counter-Terrorism, 1993-95, Principal Dep Asst Sec and now Asst Sec of State, Pol-Mil Affairs

Table 12
Average National Security Experience:
The President & Key Members of Congress²²⁵

	1966	1970	1978	1982	1990	1994
President	19	18	12	6	19	7
Congress	16.31	15.44	15.33	11.54	15.42	16.67
Combined	17.66	16.72	13.67	8.77	17.21	11.83

Table 13
Average National Security Experience
Top Presidential Advisors (Non-DOD)²²⁶

	1966	1970	1978	1982	1990	1994
Average	14.5	14.6	14.3	12.3	17.2	14.0

²²⁵ This table is a snapshot look at professional preparation at the two-year mark of each of the six presidential administrations (LBJ's figures represent the 2nd year after his electoral victory). The 2nd year was chosen instead of the first to ensure that all civilian appointees were selected, confirmed, and working in their jobs before data was collected. To do otherwise might have biased the data towards the military.

²²⁶ These figures were derived by adding the scores of the Vice President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs and the Director of Central Intelligence, and then dividing by 5.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has documented the level of national security experience among the principals (president and the Congress) and non-DOD national security advisors to the President. The data, for the most part, supports assumptions that defense-related expertise among Members of Congress and the executive branch has declined since end of the draft and after the Cold War. The one major qualification deals with the Congress. Whereas overall Congressional national security experience has declined, it actually has increased among the chairs of key Congressional committees that deal with defense-related issues. By the early 1990s, most of these leaders had a considerable amount of national security experience and continuity in their positions. But in terms of the president, Clinton clearly has significantly less national security experience than his predecessors.

The table below provides a quick reference for the national security experience level and strategic consensus among the principals for the six time periods discussed in this study.²²⁷ A low rating on expertise and consensus may create the pre-conditions for agent ascendancy. That is exactly the situation depicted during the Clinton administration in the table below.

²²⁷ For polling data for both elites and the general public on matters of national strategy and foreign policy see, John E. Reilly, ed., American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995 (The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).

Table 14
The Executive and Congressional Branches
National Security Expertise and Strategic Consensus, 1965-1995

	National Security Expertise	Strategic Consensus ²²⁸
(1965-1967) LBJ	High	High
(1969-1971) Nixon	High	Low/Medium
(1977-1979) Carter	Medium	Medium
(1981-1983) Reagan	Low	High
(1989-1991) Bush	High	Low
(1993-1995) Clinton	Low	Low

During the Johnson administration the principals were firmly in control with high levels of expertise and a general consensus built around anti-communism and commitment to the Vietnam War. The Nixon administration was similar to Johnson's, except that the strategic consensus was eroded, to a degree, by the Vietnam War. Although anti-communism remained the dominant philosophy, domestic turmoil over the direction of the war in Southeast Asia and arms control policy towards the Soviet bloc weakened the strategic consensus. Principals remained firmly in control, however, with a very high degree of national security expertise.

The Carter administration witnessed a slight decline in defense expertise among the principals. This was because a new party took control of the White House during that time period. Although the strategic consensus was not as solid as before the Vietnam War, the principals were generally committed to competing with the Soviet Union. Carter altered this to a degree by reviving détente and pushing for SALT II ratification initially. He met resistance on his policy towards Korea, and

²²⁸ This is admittedly subjective. However, it is consistent with the findings of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Their report found a decline in foreign policy consensus among the elite after the collapse of communism. See John E. Reilly, ed., American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 1995 (The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995).

lost, but won on Panama in the debate over the future of the canal. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was an important moment during the Carter administration. In the aftermath Carter returned to the hard-line Cold War policies of the 1960s and the strategic consensus reemerged.

The Reagan administration brought another change in the White House and with it came the expected drop in defense expertise in the executive branch. Reagan rode the tide of anti-Soviet sentiment and took it to another level increasing his political stature. The principals remained united, at least throughout most of his first term, in a renewed support for Cold War policies.

When Vice President Bush took control of the White House he retained several key Reagan aides. He also brought in many very experienced advisors who complimented his own vast national security expertise. This high level of expertise turned out to be very important because the strategic consensus eroded with the end of the Cold War (despite the brief renewal during the Persian Gulf crisis).

The Clinton administration took over in 1993, and clashed with Congress over the direction of United States foreign policy.²²⁹ Clinton favored a more activist role, invoking an engagement and enlargement strategy. He was challenged, however, by a large number of Republicans and many conservative Democrats who questioned the Clinton strategy in an era when the urgency of domestic priorities warranted a reliance on narrowly defined vital interests-driven United States foreign policy.

The lack of a strategic consensus coincided with the arrival of the Aspin team to the Pentagon. This team was noticeably less prepared to direct national security policy, despite Aspin's extensive knowledge of defense-related issues. To a degree Aspin was hampered by an administration with a domestic focus. The president's

²²⁹ Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pps. 138-163.

initial disengaged attitude towards defense was by design as he promised “to focus like a laser beam on the economy.”²³⁰

The confluence of an inexperienced national security team at the White House and the Pentagon, with new leadership at the House Armed Services Committee, and the erosion of the Cold War strategic consensus created the pre-conditions for agent ascendancy during the transition period, 1993-1994. The next chapter will address what happened when this situation unfolded.

²³⁰ William J. Clinton, Mandate for Change.

Chapter 5
The Agents:
DOD Civilians, the Uniformed Military and
The Top Tiers of the Issue Network

This chapter documents the changing balance of military and political expertise among the agents--civilian and military--from the days of McNamara to the mid-point of the first Clinton administration. As discussed in chapter 2, the Department of Defense became especially powerful during and after World War II, expanding significantly with the creation of the Pentagon--which was itself a wartime project. Since that time the OSD and joint staffs have increased in size and scope of responsibilities.

The background of those who have occupied positions at the highest echelons of the issue network has changed considerably over the years, most noticeably in the military. Norm changes pertaining to the career value of a graduate degree and political-military and joint assignments have been particularly apparent. Whereas almost no one on the Joint Staff had a graduate degree in the 1960s, by the 1990s, virtually everyone serving there had advanced degrees, many of which were in the social sciences. Most joint officers also had expertise in the American political system. This trend was accelerated by Goldwater-Nichols which codified the career enhancing nature of joint assignments; that is, assignments with the other services.²³¹ This increased the military's ability to express united preferences in the decisionmaking processes, enhancing their ability to bargain and be influential with

²³¹ Congress mandated that officers selected for promotion to General had to have had 22 months of joint experience. An example of a joint assignment is an Army officer serving on the Atlantic Command staff, which is normally commanded by a Naval officer.

civilian authorities who often represent diverse and disjointed preferences. Moreover, since the 1980s officers joining the Joint Staff have been coming to the job with much more political-military experience, often with several assignments with the OSD staff and executive and congressional branches of government.

At the same time, personnel on the civilian side have declined in prior military experience. Whereas many on McNamara's team had prior military experience, including combat tours during World War II, civilian appointees in the 1990s came to the job with significantly less prior military experience. Even more general defense-related experience is down since the 1960s. The specific findings are discussed below, followed immediately by the tables with the quantitative and qualitative data sets.

Finding 1: Political-Military expertise in the Armed Forces at the top-tiers of the national security issue network has increased nearly 60% since the 1960s.

Both indicators (education and assignment history) witnessed significant increases over the thirty years encompassed in this study. First on education, since the 1960s, military officers have completed graduate schooling in significantly greater numbers. Note in the table below that the percentage of senior military officers with advanced degrees has virtually doubled over the six time periods covered in this study, from less than 50% in the 1960s to 89% in the 1990s. Holding an advanced degree is now virtually a requirement for advancement to senior field grade and Flag officer rank. This change has had, and will continue to have, an impact on civil-military relations as illustrated by examination of the biographies of senior military personnel serving in key political-military positions within the defined network found in the tables above.²³²

²³² Gibson and Snider, "Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations," p. 39.

Table 15
Officers With Advanced Degrees
Colonel through General, All Services²³³

Pay Grade/Rank	1971	1982	1994
O-6 Colonel	45.4	74.5	89.4
O-7 Brigadier General	62.1	80.7	88.5
O-8 Major General	43.0	79.3	86.9
O-9 Lieutenant General	30.6	68.4	86.5
O-10 General	12.5	73.5	88.9
Overall	45.8	74.7	89.2

Examination of the biographies reveals that in 1966 no member of the JCS (Levels I and II) held an advanced degree. In fact, over the entire network only the officer on the Joint staff responsible for operations (the J3), Rear Admiral Mustin, held an advanced degree, and his was in the physical sciences. McNamara's team, in contrast, was very well educated with all but one having advanced degrees, several of whom were PhDs or Rhodes scholars. But by 1982, the mid-point in this study, the number of graduate degrees held by the military had significantly increased. In addition, these degrees were increasingly in the social sciences and business management fields instead of the physical sciences. In fact, validated positions for graduate studies in the social sciences quadrupled for United States Army officers in the years following the military's power struggle with McNamara.²³⁴ By 1982, 50% of the JCS (Levels I and II) had an advanced degree up from 0% in 1965. Further, by 1982 all of the leaders of the Joint Staff (Level III) examined in this study had advanced degrees. The Air Force Chief of Staff General Lewis Allen held the

²³³Data provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy (FMP) at the Pentagon, August 1996.

²³⁴Sam Sarkesian, John A. Williams, and Fred B. Bryant. Soldiers, Society and National Security. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 18.

distinction of being the first serving member of the Joint Chiefs to have a PhD. A few years later Admiral Crowe would become the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to attain the Doctorate degree.

By the last time period, 1994, all military members serving in key positions in the network, with the exception of the CNO Admiral Kelso, had graduate degrees. Like the civilian side in the 1960s, by 1994 most of the senior military officers in the network had completed advanced degrees in political science, international relations, business administration and systems analysis; some were Rhodes scholars too (Lieutenant General Clark and Admiral Owens).²³⁵

Since the 1960s, the military has also made a more concerted effort to expose younger officers, with potential to serve at the highest level, to the political realm. Initially seen as a way of developing the kind of expertise necessary to deal with future McNamaras, this trend has been accelerated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act which requires at least one assignment in a joint billet (a position coded for cross-service assignment) for advancement to Flag rank.²³⁶

The mid-1960s situation was very different. The Joint Chiefs were filled by World War II heroes who had distinguished themselves under fire. The Army Chief of Staff General Harold Johnson fought valiantly in the Philippines and was a survivor of the Bataan Death March. Although the Chiefs were renowned combat leaders, McNamara and his team easily assumed control of policy deliberations, changing the language and process of decisionmaking in the Pentagon from “military judgment” to quantitative systems analysis. In the transition, the military witnessed a

²³⁵ Gibson and Snider, “Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations,” p. 41.

²³⁶ Flag rank is Brigadier General for the Army, Air Force and Marines and Rear Admiral for the Navy.

decline in relative influence as they reacted to the findings of Assistant Secretary Alain Enthoven and his crew at Systems Analysis.

But by 1982, the data illustrates significant changes. General officers with previous experience in political affairs and quantitative analysis were assuming positions of great responsibility. Flag officers Allen, Bigley and Dalton demonstrated the military's increasing emphasis on placing officers with knowledge of Washington politics into key political-military positions. By the 1980s, the military had the education and experience to use management systems brought to the Pentagon by McNamara. This helped with their dealings with Congress too.²³⁷

This trend continued throughout the 1980s and by the final time period, 1994, there was a reversal of the situation from the 1960s. In fact, by the beginning of the Clinton administration the data shows that the military held a relative advantage. By 1994 the data confirms that, compared to the 1960s, military officers were both much better educated and more experienced in political-military policy-making because of preparatory assignments within the military departments or as senior staff officers and policy advisors to civilian appointees within the Pentagon. General Colin Powell is perhaps the most noted of this new brand of senior military leadership, with ten years of Washington policy experience prior to being appointed as the Chairman, JCS. His predecessor, Admiral William Crowe, had even more. And there are other examples of this trend as well. Even General Shalikashvili, generally considered less of a political operator than Powell, spent three of his years as a senior officer as chief of the Army's politico-military division and later held several politically sensitive positions including Assistant to the Chairman, JCS, and Supreme Allied Commander Europe.²³⁸

²³⁷ Stubbing and Mendel, The Defense Game. passim.

²³⁸ Gibson and Snider, "Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations," p. 42.

From the data, no specific pattern of political-military experience emerges. The richness of experiences in the range of positions held included: systems analysts (a position which received a lot of emphasis as the military reacted to the McNamara experience), assistant professors of political science, strategic think-tank Fellows, White House Fellows, senior members of Military department staffs (including several with UN experience), senior military assistants to top civilian defense officials, and repetitive assignments in the joint community. With the recent emergence of a truly joint culture in the last decade, the “depth of the military team’s bench” will only increase in the future.²³⁹

Along with this education and experience has come the opportunity to create networks. Military officers have done this especially well since Vietnam. Although perhaps this has always been true to a degree, senior military officers are now able to exert extensive influence on receptive congressmen (themselves increasingly without military experience), executive branch personnel, members of the media and academia, and even the business world. This advantage has paid dividends during political battles on Capitol Hill, and if anything, the network continues to expand outward today: witness General McCaffrey's appointment as the National Drug Policy Coordinator.

Examination of the Army's Foreign Area Program, (in which military officers attend graduate school in international relations, comparative and regional studies and then serve in embassies and joint and combined headquarters around the globe), further illustrates the military's commitment to influencing the political-military realm. Note in the table below that, since the end of the Cold War, positions for Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) have been reduced at a much lower rate than the officer

²³⁹ Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, “Emergence of the Joint Military Officer.” Joint Force Quarterly, 13 (Autumn 1996): 53-57.

corps in the Army at-large. This was a conscious decision made by the Army to protect this program to facilitate institutional mission accomplishment in the post-Cold War era.

Table 16
Officer Reductions and the
Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program²⁴⁰

	1987	1996	% Reduction
FAOs	853	754	11.6%
Total Army Officers	82,044	58,511	28.7%

Finding 2: National Security expertise among top-level civilian appointees in the DOD has declined 20% since the 1960s.

The decline in civilian national security experience was not of the order of magnitude expected in the initial hypothesis. The data confirmed the relative advantage enjoyed by the McNamara team, which recorded a very high score of 11.72, compared to the 6.64 value for the military during the same time period. The McNamara team nearly doubled the military score. But the decline in civilian expertise was neither as steep nor as deep as initially expected. Laird's team (which included several key McNamara holdovers) also scored well (11.65). This made more sense after extensive research on the Nixon years which revealed both the capabilities

²⁴⁰These figures were provided to me by Major McDonald Heston, the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) proponent manager, in an interview conducted on 20 June 1996 at the Pentagon.

of Laird and the extent to which he has able to retain many of the Whiz Kids and their protégés.²⁴¹

Cheney's team scored 11.92--the highest recorded in the study. Since the military's highest score was also during the Bush years, I expected to find interview evidence of an effective national security policy process and firm civilian control. Those interviewed in the Bush administration confirmed this view.²⁴²

The lowest score recorded went to the Clinton administration (9.39), and this number even conceals, to a degree, the true weakness of this team because the score is significantly boosted by both Secretaries of Defense (Aspin and Perry). The Clinton administration initially was particularly weak at levels II and III. By 1995, however, this situation was changing, as original appointees gained in experience and as the Perry team took shape. Among those who added much needed depth to the Perry team were John P. White, the new Deputy Secretary, and Paul Kaminski, the new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In addition, the experienced Walter Slocombe replaced the lesser experienced Frank Wisner as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.²⁴³

²⁴¹ In fact, during the interviewing process, Laird himself passed along to me a copy of the May 1997 publication of World Traveler which had a article on him which said, "a poll of 38 political reporters voted Laird, by far, 'the most effective, likable, trustworthy, strong and forthcoming secretary of defense.'" However, I never was able to attain the names of the 38 political reporters or the methodology of the survey which lessened my degree of confidence with this claim. See, Jane Ammeson, "Healing the World," World Traveler (May 1997).

²⁴² My MPA thesis, completed at Cornell University in May 1995, provides support for this claim as well. In it I trace military effectiveness over a twenty year period (1971-1991). The highest scores were attained during the Bush administration. See Gibson, "The Evolution of Airland Battle Doctrine and the Renaissance of the US Army: From Vietnam to Desert Storm A Case Study of the US Army, 1971-1991." (Cornell MPA Thesis, May 1995).

²⁴³ For more on the Clinton appointees see, Ann L. Brownson, ed., Federal Staff Directory (Spring 1996).

As the tables show, the McNamara team had considerable World War II experience. McNamara himself had risen to Lieutenant Colonel with the Army Air Force in only four years, impressing Pentagon officials with his ability to conduct incisive and comprehensive quantitative analysis. Others in the World War II generation went on to serve in most of the administrations covered in this study until the 1990s when this group of Americans started to pass from the political scene. This generational change in public servants registered as the civilian score fell below 10 for the first time during the Clinton administration.

Although education levels remained high in the last time period, apart from the actual Secretaries of Defense (Aspin and Perry), civilian appointees mostly came to their key jobs without the quality and quantity of experience--training and exposure to defense politics--that their military counterparts had. Obviously this is due, in part, to the fact that the previous twelve years of Republican control of the White House did not provide many opportunities for Democrats aspiring to appointive positions within the executive branch.

Finding 3: Combined analysis of the educational and assignment history indicators demonstrates a shift in the balance of political-military expertise over the six time periods studied, in favor of the military.

This shift may partially explain the increase in civil-military tensions in the post-Cold War. The summary tables (20 and 21), in particular, reveal the relative change in experience among top-level civilian and military officials since the 1960s. Note especially the changes at levels II and III. While decisions are often made at level I, it is at levels II and III where interpersonal influence based on education, experience and wisdom especially matters. Here the relative advantage that McNamara's team had over the military is clearly evident--and this without even

taking into account the exceptional organizational and leadership skills of McNamara himself.

In the 1960s, apart from the marked educational advantage, civilians also held a significant edge in national security/political-military experience. In some cases this was an “overhang” from their service in government or in uniform during World War II or Korea. Military officers had Pentagon experience, but in more operational than political-military areas. This fact made them no match for McNamara and his team as they changed the structure, norms and rules within the Pentagon--which the creation of the Office of Systems Analysis (later changed to PA&E) with appointment of one of the “Whiz Kids,” Alain Enthoven, to lead it is illustrative.²⁴⁴

Strong leadership at levels II and III can have important consequences. One example is Reagan administration Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman. His vast knowledge of defense matters and reputation as a defense intellectual provided him the credibility to win battles within the Pentagon. His influence was responsible for the dramatic increase in the number of ships during the Reagan administration.²⁴⁵ More discussion of Lehman and other civilian secretaries is found in chapter six.

The experience indicator evidenced a very noticeable shift to the military’s advantage at Levels II and III by 1994. Although Aspin and Perry were both very knowledgeable on defense matters, when policy recommendations are being drafted by officials in levels II and III, the ability of a Secretary of Defense to influence an issue is diminished. This trend was exacerbated by Clinton’s slowness to fill top DOD civilian positions (taking as long as one year in some cases).²⁴⁶

²⁴⁴ Gibson and Snider, “Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations,” p. 41.

²⁴⁵ In fact, he wrote a book to promote his cause. See, John F. Lehman, Jr., Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy (New York: Scribner’s 1988).

²⁴⁶ Gibson and Snider, “Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations,” p. 45.

Although, by design, there is a competitive tone to this analysis, there are positive aspects concerning the combined civil-military score during the Bush administration. The individual scores of 11.92 (the civilian score) and 11.07 (the military score) combined for the highest composite value of 22.99. Discussion in chapter six, among other things, highlights the quality of national security policy in the Bush administration, which was arguably the best all six periods considered. This may suggest that especially high, and roughly equivalent, civilian and military scores not only enhance civilian control but also national security policies. The competency among both civilian and military officials during the Bush administration might be viewed as a model for future administrations. Healthy competition among the key DOD players (both civilian and military), like that between General Powell and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz over the design of Base Force (the first draft of a United States Post-Cold War Strategy), discussed in detail in the next chapter, was the result of a rough parity in professional preparation between these two actors. After being presented with the options, the elected leaders, (the President and Members of Congress), are responsible for decisions; if they are unhappy with the alternatives, they delay the decisions until satisfactory courses of actions (COAs) are prepared and presented. According to this normative framework, civilian control and national security are mutually enhanced because elected leaders remain firmly in charge because the two agents in the DOD (top-level civilian and military officials) are providing the best military and defense policy advice possible, competing as they are, for influence with the principals. Consistent with Madisonian logic, the virtue is in the system, not in the goodness of individuals (e.g. neither McNamara--the strong civilian defense intellectual, nor Powell--the politically powerful military figure).

Finding 4: The structural changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 affected both process and product and accelerated the trend of increased military expertise in the political-military realm.

From the perspective of “new institutionalism,” this is quite predictable. Apart from the often mentioned impact that strengthening the Chairman and the commanders-in-chiefs (CINCs) had on military unity, Goldwater-Nichols also led to the creation of the Vice Chairmen, JCS, the J7 (Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate) and the J8 (Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate). The addition of these positions and directorates, which occurred also within the unified commands, created new jobs for well educated and trained military officers capable of operating in the political-military sphere. This changed the composition of the issue network and reinforced the shift in the civil-military balance which was already underway. These processes may also be contributing to increased tensions in United States post-Cold War civil-military relations although the impact is somewhat concealed in the quantitative data provided above, which uses averages and not the sum of all the individual scores.²⁴⁷

Finding 5: Fluctuations in the civilian assignment history indicator among DOD appointees are, to a significant extent, a by-product of prolonged one party control of the White House.

When a new party takes control of the White House for the first time in 8 or more years, its key political appointees tend to have lesser experience than the

²⁴⁷ Gibson and Snider, “Explaining Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations,” p. 47.

outgoing civilian officials, for obvious reasons--their political partisanship generally excluded them from working in key politically appointed positions. The Clinton/Aspin team score is partially attributed to this. But there have been important exceptions to this trend. When the Nixon administration took over the new Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, kept on many key civilian officials from the McNamara team (Stanley Resor, Ivan Selin, Gardiner Tucker, and Robert Seamons, just to name a few of the top officials covered in this study, and this list does not even include the many mid-level officials in the Office of Systems Analysis who stayed). Thus, although the Nixon/Laird team should have dropped significantly in professional preparation, it did not partially as a result of a personnel policy that incorporated defense intellectuals from the outgoing administration. This hiring practice also contributed to the higher than expected scores for the Carter/Brown team as they retained some people from the Ford administration, and also brought back to the Pentagon many of the former Whiz Kids.

The Clinton administration was particularly handicapped by the lack of continuity among civilian appointees at the Pentagon. Aspin acknowledged this in his journal.²⁴⁸ During the period when political appointees were being screened, selected, confirmed and briefed on the status of their office, military officers stepped up to fill that void. Not surprisingly, when the civilian appointees were ready to take control, conflict ensued as power was taken away from people accustomed to exercising it. This dynamic is not confined to the civil-military relationship. This kind of interaction transcends all professional boundaries, being more of a reflection of human nature than national security expertise.

The converse is also true, that periods of continuity in party control of the White House (LBJ and Bush) foster enhanced levels of professional preparation.

²⁴⁸ Journal of Les Aspin, Princeton University.

Both of these administrations were helped by hiring practices that incorporated individuals with extensive knowledge in the defense arena.²⁴⁹

The analysis in this chapter was derived from the data presented in the tables below. As in chapter 4, these tables provide both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data reveal the different kinds of experiences that top-level officials have brought to their jobs for the past thirty years. The coding criteria used to calculate the individual quantitative scores and for the subsequent aggregate analysis initially found in chapter 3 is again provided to aid the reader. In addition, the list of abbreviations is also provided to aid in interpretation of the data.

²⁴⁹ Stephen Skowronek argues that “articulator” presidents have similar hiring practices. See Skowronek, “Presidential Leadership in Political Time,” in The Presidency and the Political System, Michael Nelson, ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995).

**Table From Chapter 3
Coding Rules For Education**

Type of Degree	Value For Highest Degree Earned		
	1	2	3
Academic Degrees			
MA/MS		X	
PhD			X
Professional Degrees			
MPA/MBA		X	
LLB		X	
JD			X
Professional Military Educational			
National War College (NWC)	X		

**Table From Chapter 3
Coding Rules For Assignment History**

Type Position	Value Per Year		
	.25	.5	1
DOD			X
NSC			X
DOS (significant Pol-Mil Affairs experience)			X
DOS (lesser Pol-Mil experience)		X	
Congress (significant Pol-Mil exp)			X
Congress (lesser Pol-Mil exp)	X		
Think Tank (Pol-Mil experience)		X (Max:4)	
Business Sector (Defense Related)		X (Max:4)	
Academia (Nat'l Security/Social Sciences)	X (Max:2)		
Media (Pol-Mil experience)	X (Max:2)		
Prior Military Service (Civilians Only)	X	X (Wartime)	X (Decorated in War)
Joint Service Credit			X

List of Abbreviations

ADC	Aide-de-Camp
Amb	Ambassador
ANSA/NSA	National Security Advisor to President
ARNG	Army National Guard
BSM	Bronze Star Medal
C/S or CofS	Chief of Staff
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMC	Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO	Chief Naval Officer
D/CNO or D/CINC	Deputy
DFC	Distinguished Flying Cross
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOS	Department of State
EUCOM	European Command
HASC	House Armed Services Committee
HDASC	House Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
HFAC	House Foreign Affairs Committee
JAG	Judge Advocate General
Lieut J.G.	Lieutenant Junior Grade
NDU	National Defense University
NWC	National War College
ORSA	Operational Research and Systems Analysis
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation
PH	Purple Heart
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SASC	Senate Armed Services Committee
SDASC	Senate Defense Appropriations Sub-Committee
SFAC	Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
SS	Silver Star
U/Sec Per & Read	Under Secretary of Personnel and Readiness
USA	United States Army
USAAF	United States Army Air Force
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFA	United States Air Force Academy
USAFR	United States Air Force Reserve
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USCGA	United States Coast Guard Academy
USMA	United States Military Academy
USMC	United States Marine Corps

USMCR
USN
USNA
USNR
V/CNO or V/C
XO

United States Marine Corps Reserve
United States Navy
United States Naval Academy
United States Naval Reserve
Vice
Executive Officer

Table 17
Level I: Sec Def & Chairman, JCS Interface

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	Political-Military Job Experience
1965-1967		
Sec Def Robert McNamara (13)	AB UC Berkeley, MBA Harvard Phi Beta Kappa	1943-46 WWII Service USAAF, Lieut Col (O-5) 1946-61 Ford Motor Co. later Co-director and President; 1961-68 Sec Def
C, JCS Gen Earle Wheeler (9)	BS USMA	1950 Asst to C,JCS; 1955-58 Army Dir Plans; 1960 Dir Joint Staff; 1963-65 Army Chief of Staff (C/S) 1962-63 CINC, European Command (EUCOM)
1969-1971		
Sec Def Melvin Laird (14)	BA Carleton College	1943-45 United States Navy (2 Purple Hearts) 1953-69 Member, United States House; House Defense Appropriations Committee; 1969-73 Sec Def
C, JCS Gen Earle Wheeler (12)	Same as Above	Same as Above + C, JCS 1966-69
C, JCS Adm Thomas Moorer (70) (9)	BS USNA	1945-46 Strategic Bombing Survey Atlantic Fleet; 1955-56 Aide, Asst Sec of Navy; 1957-59 Spec Asst to Chief of Naval Operations 1965-67 Cdr, NATO/United States Unified Atlantic Command; 1967-69 CNO; 1970-74 C,JCS
1977-1979		
Sec Def Harold Brown (16)	AB Columbia; AM/PhD Columbia	1950-61 Group Ldr, Later Dir, Radiation Lab at Lawrence Livermore; 1961-65 Dir Def Research & Eng; 1965-69 Sec AF;

Table 17 (Continued)

C, JCS Gen George S. Brown (14)	BS USMA; NWC	1957-59 Exec to AF CofS, later Mil Asst to Dep Sec Def; 1959-63 Mil Asst to Sec Def 1966-68 Asst to C, JCS 1973-74 AF CofS; 1974-78 C, JCS
C, JCS Gen David Jones ('78) (6)	NWC	1973-74 AF Dep C/S Ops; 1974-78 AF C/S 1978-82 C, JCS
1981-1983		
Sec Def Casper Weinberger (9)	AB Harvard, LLB Harvard	1941-45 WWII Service USA (Bronze Star); 1970-73 D/Dir, later Dir, OMB; 1973 Counselor to Pres;
C, JCS Gen David Jones (10)	Same as Above	Same as Above + 1978-82 C, JCS
C, JCS Gen John Vessey ('82) (8)	BA U of Maryland; MS GWU	1975-76 Army Planner 1977-79 CINC, Korea; 1979-82 V/CofS Army
1989-1991		
Sec Def Richard Cheney (10)	BA/MA U. of Wyoming;	1969-70 Dep to Couns to Pres; 1974-77 Asst to Pres; 1979-89 Member United States House; 1989-93 Sec Def
C, JCS Adm W. Crowe (19)	BS USNA; MA Stanford; PhD Princeton	1954-55 Asst to Naval Aide to President; 1974-75 Dep Dir Strategic Plans, Policy, Nuclear Systems and Nat'l Sec Affairs 1975-76 Dir East Asia & Pacific Region; 1977-78 Admin Asst to D/CNO; 1978-81 Member UN Military Staff; 1981-83 CINC, NATO Southern Europe; 1983-85 CINC, Pac and Ind Unified Command

Table 17 (Continued)

C, JCS Gen Colin Powell ('89) (11)	BS CUNY; MBA GWU	1985-89 C, JCS 1971-72 White House Fellow at OMB; 1978-79 Mil Asst to Dep Sec Def; 1979 Mil Asst to Sec Energy; 1983-86 Senior Mil Asst to Sec Def; 1986-89 D/ANSA later ANSA 1989-93 C, JCS
<hr/>		
1993-1995 Sec Def Les Aspin (16)	BA Yale; MA Oxford; PhD MIT	1966-68 Army, Pentagon, Systems Anal; 1971-93 Member United States House (Chairman, HASC 1985-93)
Sec Def William Perry ('94) (11)	BS Stanford; MS/PhD Penn St	1946-47 United States Army; 1950-55 Army Reserves, 2LT 1977-81 U/Sec Def Res/Eng; 1989-93 Center for Int'l Sec at Stanford 1993-94 Dep Sec Def
C, JCS Colin Powell (14)	Same as Above	Same as Above + 1990-93 C, JCS
C, JCS John Shalikashvili ('93) (12)	BS Bradley U; MS GWU	1971-73 J3 Ops Off UN Forces Korea 1981-84 Army Chief, Politico-Military Div; 1989-91 D/CINC United States Army Europe; 1991-92 Asst C, JCS; 1992-93 SACEUR; 1993-97 C, JCS

Table 18
Level II: Civilian Service Secretaries & Service Chiefs Interface

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	Political-Military Experience
1965-1967		
Sec Army Stanley Resor (8)	BA Yale; LLB Yale	1942-45 WWII USA (Silver Star, Bronze Star, PH); 1964-65 U/Sec Army
Sec Navy Paul Nitze (15)	AB Harvard; LLB Johns Hopkins	1944-46 Spec Counsel to War Dept; 1946-48 Dir, later V/Chair United States Strategic Bombing Survey; 1948-49 Dep Asst Sec State (Marshall Plan) 1950-53 Dir Policy DOS 1961-63 A/Sec Def Int'l Security Affs
Sec AF Harold Brown (12)	AB Columbia; AM/PhD Columbia	1950-61 Group Ldr, later Dir, Radiation Lab Lawrence Livermore; 1961-65 Dir Def Research & Eng; 1965-69 Sec AF
Army C/S Gen Harold Johnson (3)	BS USMA	1963-64 Army Dep C/S Ops Army C/S 1964-68
Navy CNO Adm D. McDonald (8)	BS USNA; NWC	1948-49 Aide, Asst Sec Nav 1949-50 Aide, U/Sec Nav 1955-57 Staff Asst for CNO 1963-67 CNO 9/1963-12/1967 Commandant of the Marine Corps
Marine Corps Comm Gen W. Greene (2)	BS USNA	
AF C/S Gen John McConnell (4)	BS Henderson St; BS USMA	1964-65 Vice CofS AF, 1962-64 Dep CINC EUCOM 1965-69 AF C/S

Table 18 (Continued)

1969-1971		
Sec Army Stanley Resor (12)	BA Yale; LLB Yale	1942-45 WWII USA (SS,BSM,PH); 1964-65 U/Sec Army; 1965-71 Sec Army
Sec Navy John Chaffee (9)	BA Yale U.; LLB Harvard	1942-45 USMC; 1951-52 USMCR 1963-69 Gov RI; 1969-73 Sec Navy
Sec AF Robert C. Seamans, Jr. (15)	BS Harvard; MS/PhD MIT	1941-45 Assoc Prof (Aero Eng) 1950-53 Chief Eng Project Meteor; 1953-60 Dir Flight Control/Chief Eng Missile Electronics; 1960-65 Assoc Dir NASA; 1965-68 Dep Admin NASA; 1969-73 Sec AF
Army C/S Gen Westmoreland (8)	BS USMA	1960-63 USMA Superintendent 1965-68 CINC, Vietnam 1968-72 Army C/S
Navy CNO Adm T. Moorer (9)	BS USNA	1945-46 Strategic Bombing Survey Atlantic Fleet; 1955-56 Aide, Asst Sec of Navy; 1957-59 Spec Asst to CNO; 1965-67 Cdr, NATO/US Unified Atlantic Command; 1967-70 CNO;
Navy CNO Adm E. Zumwalt (6)	BS USNA	1956-57 Spec Asst Asst Sec Nav Personnel; 1962-64 Aide, Asst Sec Def In't & Sec Affairs; 1966-68 Dir, Systems Anal for CNO; 1970-74 CNO

Table 18 (Continued)

Marine Corps Comm Gen Chapmen (3)	BS U of Florida	1967-68 Asst CMC; 1968-72 CMC
AF C/S Gen J. Ryan (5)	BS USMA	1964-67 CINC, Strategic Air Com 1968-69 V/CofS AF; 1969-73 AF C/S
<hr/>		
1977-1979		
Sec Army Clifford Alexander (6.75)	AB Harvard; LLB Yale	1958-59 United States Army; 1963-64 Member, NSC; 1964-67 Dep Spec Counsel to President; 1977-80 Sec Army
Sec Navy W. Graham Claytor (9.25)	BA U. of Va; JD Harvard	1941-46 USNR (0-4); 1977-79 Sec Navy
Sec AF John Stetson (2)	BS MIT	USN 1945-46; 1977-79 Sec AF
<hr/>		
Army C/S Gen Bernard Rogers (16)	BS USMA; MA Oxford	1945-46 Aide to Supe, USMA 1953-54 XO to CINC Far East 1956-59 XO to Army C/S; 1962-66 XO to C, JCS; 1967-69 Commandant, USMA 1971-72 Chief, Legislative Liaison for Sec Army; 1976-79 Army C/S
Navy CNO Adm Holloway III (5)	BS USNA	1973-74 Vice CNO; 1974-78 CNO
Navy CNO Adm Haywood (4)	BS USNA; MS GWU	1973-75 Navy Planner CNO 1978-82
Marine Corps Comm Gen L. Wilson (4)	BA Millsaps College	1967-68 Legislative Asst to CMC; 1975-79 CMC

Table 18 (Continued)

AF C/S Gen D. Jones (6)	NWC	1973-74 AF Dep C/S Ops; 1974-78 AF C/S
AF C/S Gen Lew Allen (17)	BS USMA; MS/PhD U. of Illinois	1961-65 OSD Space Tech; 1965-73 Asst to Sec AF; 1973 D/Dir CIA; 1973-77 Dir NSA 1978-82 AF C/S
<hr/>		
1981-1983 Sec Army John Marsh (12)	BA/LLB Washington & Lee	1944-51 USA; 1951-76 Va ARNG, Lieut Col; 1971-73 Member US House; 1973-74 A/Sec Def Leg Affairs; 1974 ANSA; 1974-77 Counsellor to Pres
Civ Sec Navy John Lehman (16)	BS (IR) St. Josephs; MA Oxford; PhD U. Penn	1966-68 USAF Res; 1969-74 Senior Staff Member NSC; 1974-75 Asst to ANSA; 1975-77 D/Dir ACDA; 1977-80 Chair, Def Advisory Comm RNC; 1980 Foreign Policy Advisor for Reagan
Sec AF Verne Orr (7)	BA Pomona; MBA Stanford	WWII Service USN, Commander; 1980 Comptroller, Reagan Campaign
<hr/>		
Army C/S Gen Ed Meyer (12)	BS USMA, NWC	1963-65 Asst to Army C/S; 1967-69 Asst J5 Armed Forces Joint College; 1970-71 Brookings Fellow 1975-78 Army Dep C/S Ops Army C/S 1978-82

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Table 18 (Continued)

Navy CNO Adm Thomas Haywood (8)	BS USNA; MS GWU	1973-75 Navy Planner CNO 1978-82
Navy CNO Adm James Watkins (7/82) Mil (5)	BS USNA; ME NPS	1979-82 V/CNO
Marine Corps Comm Gen R. Barrow (4)	BS U of Maryland; NWC	CMC 1979-83
AF C/S Gen Lew Allen (21)	BS USMA; MS/PhD U. of Illinois	1961-65 OSD Space Tech; 1965-73 Asst to Sec AF; 1973 D/Dir CIA; 1973-77 Dir NSA 1978-82 AF C/S
AF C/S Gen Charles Gabriel (7/82) (7)	BS USMA; MS GWU	1979-82 AF G3, 1977-79 D,CINC US Forces Korea
<hr/>		
1989-1991		
Sec Army Michael P.W. Stone (8)	BA Yale; LLB NYU	1982-84 Dir, United States Mission Cairo, Egypt; 1984-86 Dir, Caribbean Basin Initiative Affairs; 1986-88 AID; 1988-89 Asst Sec of Army Financial Management; 1989-93 Sec Army
Sec Navy H. Lawrence Garrett (14)	BS U of West Florida; JD UCSD	1961-81 USN (0-5 JAG) 1981 Asst Counsel White House; 1983-86 Associate Counsel to Pres 1986-87 Gen Counsel to Sec Def; 1987-89 Under Sec of Navy; 1989-93 Sec Nav

Table 18 (Continued)

Sec AF Donald B. Rice (14)	BS Notre Dame; MS/PhD Purdue	1965-67 United States Army; 67-69 Dir Cost Analysis, OSD; 1969-70 Dep Asst Sec Def Res Analysis; 1970-72 Asst Dir, OMB; 1972-89 Pres, CEO 1989-93 Sec AF
Army C/S General C. Vouno (8)	BS USMA; MS Shippensburg Coll	1971-73 Systems Analyst; Office of Vice C/S Army; 1976-77 XO to Army C/S; 1987-91 Army C/S
Navy CNO C. Trost (18)	BS USNA	1960-62 Olmsted Scholar; 1965-68 Mil Asst to Dep Sec Def; 1970-71 XO/Aide to U/Sec Navy; 1971-73 XO/Aide to Sec Navy; 1976-78 Chief, Navy Systems Analysis; 1981-85 Dir, Navy Program Planning; 1985-86 D/CINC US Atlantic Command 1986-90 CNO
Marine Corps Comm Gen Gray (3)		1987-91 CMC
AF C/S Gen Welch (10)	BA U of Maryland; MS GWU	1982-85 AF Programs & Resources 1985-86 Cdr, Strategic Air Command 1986-90 AF C/S

Table 18 (Continued)

AF C/S Gen Dugan (7)	BS USMA; MBA U of Col	1970-73 Instructor, US Air Force Academy; 1987-88 AF Programs & Resources; 1988-89 AF G3 Ops Off; '90 AF C/S (Fired by Sec Def Cheney)
AF C/S (Acting) Gen Loh (10)	BS USAFA; MS MIT	1972-77 Project Manager YF-16 & YF-17, Project Director F-16; 1985-87 AF R&D; 1990 V/Cof S AF
AF C/S Gen M. McPeak (7)	BA San Diego St.; MA GWU	1985-87 AF Programs & Res 1978-80 Asst C/S, Allied Forces Cent Europe 1990-94 AF C/S
<hr/>		
1993-1995 Sec Army Togo West (8)	BSEE Howard; JD Howard	1969-73 United States Army (JAG Corps) 1977-79 General Counsel Dep Navy 1979-80 Spec Asst Sec Def; 1980-81 Gen Counsel to Sec Def
Sec Navy John Dalton (5.5)	BS USNA; MBA U. of Penn	1964-69 USN, Lieutenant, USNR Lieut. Commander
Sec AF Sheila Widnall (8)	BS MIT; MS/PhD MIT	1964-93 Prof MIT (Aerodynamics Spec) 1975-80 Fluid Dynamics Res Lab
<hr/>		
Army C/S Gordon Sullivan (8)	BS Norwich; MA U of NH	1989-90 Dep C/S Operations UN Mil Stf 1990-91 V/Chief USA, 1985-86 Dep CS/ Allied Forces Central Europe;
Nav CNO Frank Kelso (12)	BS USNA	1960-62 Staff Asst, Atomic Energy Commission; 1979-83 Asst to CNO;

Table 18 (Continued)

		1986-87 Asst to CNO; 1990-94 CNO, 1988-90 CINC Atlantic Command
Nav CNO Mike Boorda (8)	BA U of Rhode Island	1978-81 Exec Asst, Prin D/Asst Sec Navy; 1984-86 Exec Asst to CNO 1991-93 CINC Allied Forces So Europe CNO 1994-96
Marine Corps Comm Gen C. Mundy (3)	BS Auburn	CMC 1991-95
AF C/S Gen M. McPeak (10)	BA San Diego St.; MA GWU	1985-87 AF Programs & Resources 1978-80 Asst C/S, Allied Forces Cent Europe 1990-94 AF C/S

Table 19
Level III: Under Secretary & Joint Staff Interface

Position/Name (Score)	Degrees/Universities	Political-Military Experience
1965-1967		
D/Sec Def Cyrus Vance (11)	BA Yale; LLB Yale	1942-46 USNR (Lieutenant 0-3); 57-60 Spec Counsel Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee SASC; 1961-62 General Counsel DOD; 1962-63 Sec Army; 1964-65 D/Asst Sec Def
U/Sec Policy John McNaughton (9) Civ	AB Depauw; LLB Harvard B Lit Oxford	1942-46 USNR; 1961-62 D/Asst Sec Def Int'l Sec Affairs; 1962-64 General Counsel DOD; 1964-65 Asst Sec Def Int'l Sec Affairs
U/Sec PA&E Alain Enthoven (12)	BA Stanford; B Phil/Pol Oxford; PhD MIT	1956-60 Nat'l Sec Analyst, Rand Corp 1960 Dir Def Research & Eng; 1961-65 D/Comptroller; 1965-69 Asst Sec Def for Systems Analysis
U/Sec Personnel & Readiness Tom Morris (10)	BA U. of Tenn	1941-45 USNR (Lieutenant Commander); D/Asst Sec Def Supply & Log; 1956-57 Asst D/Sec Def; 1959-61 Asst Dir Mngmnt/Org BOB; 1961-65 Asst Sec Def Installations & Log
Dir, Joint Staff LTG D. Burchinal (9)	BA Brown	1950 AF Program Analysis; 1958-66 Member, later Dir Joint Staff
J3 Operations R/Adm L. Mustin (7)	BS USNA; MS MIT	1951-54 Weapons/Systems Eval OSD; 1960-61 Office CNO; 1964-66 J3

Table 19 (Continued)

J5 Plans LTG B. Spivey (4)	BS USMA; NWC	1962-64 J5, EUCOM; 1965-66 J5
1969-1971		
D/Sec Def David Packard (8)	BA Stanford; MEE Stanford	1939-68 Co-Founder, Partner, Pres, later CEO, Hewlett-Packard; 1969-71 Dep Sec Def
U/Sec Policy G. Warren Nutter (9)	AB U of Chicago; AM/PhD U of Chicago	1952-53 Div Chief CIA; 1964 FP Advisor to Pres cand Goldwater; 1946-69 Professor of Economic and National Security Affairs U of Va; 1969-73 U/Sec Def Nat'l Sec Affairs
A/Sec PA&E Ivan Selin (10.5)	BE Yale; ME/PhD Yale	1960-65 Research Eng Rand Corp; 1965-67 Systems Analyst, DOD; 1967-69 Dep Asst Sec Def; 1969-70 Acting Asst Sec Def for Systems Analysis (which later became PA&E)
A/Sec PA&E Gardiner Tucker (7)	AB Columbia; PhD Columbia	1967-69 Dep Dir Research & Eng DOD; 1969-70 Prin Dep Dir Res & Eng; 1970-73 Asst Sec Def Systems Analysis
U/Sec Per & Readiness Roger Kelly (10)	BS Holy Cross; MBA Harvard	1942-46 USNR (O-3); 1946-69 Caterpillar Tractor Co; 1969-72 A/Sec Per & Read
Dir, Joint Staff V/Adm N. Johnson (11)	BS USNA; NWC	1953-55 Chief, Strategic Plans, O/CNO 1957-59 Chief, Joint & Int'l Plans, O/CNO; 1963 Dep Dir, Planning and Programming O/CNO; 1963-66 Chief, Strategic Plans and Policy, O/C, JCS; 1967-68 J5; 1968-71 Dir, Joint Stf

Table 19 (Continued)

J3 Gen John Vogt, Jr. (8)	BA Yale; MA Columbia	1951-54 Asst to Spec Asst, C, JCS; 1963-65 Dir Policy Planning Staff, OSD; 1969-70 J3
J5 Gen Ferdinand Unger (5)	BS USMA; NWC	1958-59 XO to SACEUR; 1962-64 J3; 1969-71 J5
1977-1979		
D/Sec Def Charles Duncan (5)	BS Rice	USAAF 1944-46; 1964-74 Executive with Coca-Cola, (including Pres 1971-74); 1977-79 Dep Sec Def
U/Sec Policy Stanley Resor (20)	BA Yale; LLB Yale	1942-45 WWII USA (SS,BSM,PH); 1964-65 U/Sec Army; 1965-71 Sec Army; 1971-73 U/Sec Army; 1973-78 Amb Negotiations Mutual & Balanced Force Reductions, Central Eur U/Sec Policy 1978-79;
A/Sec PA&E Russell Murray II (10)	BS MIT; MS MIT	1950-53 Guided Missile Test Eng, Grumman Aircraft; 1953-62 Asst Chief Operations Analysis, Grumman; 1973-77 Dir, Review Center for Naval Analysis; 1977-81 A/Sec Def Systems Anal
U/Sec Per & Read John P. White (10)	BS Cornell; MA/PhD Cornell	2 years USMC; 1968-77 Senior VP National Security Research, Rand Corp; 1977-79 Asst Sec Def Manpower, Resources & Logistics

Table 19 (Continued)

Dir, Joint Staff V/Adm Pat Hannifin (8)	BS USNA; MBA GWU	1967-68 Industrial Coll Armed Forces 1973-75 Vice Dir, Plans & Policy JCS; 1975-76 Chief Naval Planner; 1976-77 J5; 1977-78 Dir, Joint Staff
Dir, Joint Staff John Wickham (12)	BS USMA; MA Harvard	1956-60 Instructor, later Asst Prof of Social Sciences, USMA; 1964-66 Aide, Army C/S; 1968-69 Strategic Plans and Policy, O/ C, JCS; 1970-71 Staff Group Mem C, JCS; 1973 United States Rep, Four Party Joint Mil Commission, Vietnam; 1973-76 Mil Asst to Sec Def; 1978-79 Dir, Joint Staff
J3 LTG C.J. LeVan (7)	BGE U of Neb; MS GWU	1958-64 Member, Army General Staff; 1967 Aide, Sec Army; 1976-79 J3
J5 MG Arnold Braswell (12)	BS USMA; MBA GWU NWC	1955-58 Assisted in establishment of US Air Force Academy; 1969-72 Military Planner, DOD; 1974-77 Ops Officer, SHAPE, NATO; 1977-80 J5
1981-1983 D/Sec Def Frank Carlucci (13.5)	AB Princeton; MBA Harvard	1952-56 USNR; 1957-59 For Serv Off; 1974-77 Member, CFR; 1978-81 D/Dir CIA; 1971-72 A/Dir OMB, 1974-77 Dir, OMB

Table 19 (Continued)

U/Sec Policy Fred Ikle (7)	BA/MA/PhD U. of Chicago	1964-67 Harvard Ctr Int'l Affairs; 1973-77 Prof of Pol Sci MIT; 1981-82 Dir ACDA; Rand exp
U/Sec PA&E David Chu (13)	BA Yale; PhD Yale (Phi Beta Kappa)	1968-70 USA (BSM, Captain); 1970-78 Rand Corp; 1978-81 Asst Dir Nat'l Sec&Int'l Affairs, CBO
U/Sec Per & Read Larry Korb (11.5)	BA St. Johns; MA/PhD SUNY Albany	1962-66 USN; 1971-75 Asst Prof Govt USCGA; 1975-80 Dir, Def Pol Studies AEI; 1980-81 Counsel Sec Def
Dir, Joint Staff LTG James Dalton (10)	BS USMA; MS U. of Michigan	1970-72 Asst to C, JCS SALT Talks; 1976-78 AF Plans Officer; 1978-80 V/Dir Joint Staff; 1980-82 Comm Industrial College of Armed Forces
J3 LTG Phillip Gast (8)	BS U. Missouri; MS CGSC NWC	1970-71 Exec to V/CofS; 1977-79 Chief, Military Asst Advisory Group Iran 1980-82 Dir Ops, Joint Staff
J5 V/Adm T.J. Bigley (13)	BS USNA; MA (IR) American U. NWC	1965-67 ADC to CNO; 1970 Pol-Mil Div; 1970-72 Exec Officer to CNO; 1972-75 Pol-Mil Officer OSD East Asia; 1975-76 Cdr, Middle East Force
1989-1991 D/Sec Def Donald Atwood (9.5)	BSEE MIT; MSEE MIT	1943-46 US Army; Distinguished Career with GM (1961-89) including last assignment, President, GM Hughes Electronic Corp Div 1985-89; 89-93 Dep Sec Def

Table 19 (Continued)

U/Sec Policy Paul Wolfowitz (18)	BA Cornell U.; MA/PhD U of Chicago	1973-77 United States Arms Control & Disarmament (1974-75 Spec Asst to Dir, 1976 Spec Asst SALT, 1976-77 with DOD); 1977-80 Dep Asst Sec Def Regional Programs, PA&E; 1980-81 Visiting Assoc Prof SAIS; 1981-82 Dir, Policy Planning Staff DOS; 1982-86 Asst Sec of State East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 1986-89 United States Ambassador to Indonesia; 1989-93 U/Sec Policy
A/Sec PA&E David Chu (21)	BA Yale; PhD Yale (Phi Beta Kappa)	1968-70 USA (BSM, Captain); 1970-78 Rand Corp; 1978-81 Asst Dir Nat'l Sec&Int'l Affairs, CBO; 1981-93 A/Sec Def PA&E
U/Sec Per & Read Chris Jehn (8)	BA Beloit Coll; MA U of Chicago	1972-89 Center for Naval Analysis, various positions including, Dir Resource Analysis & VP Navy-Marine Corps Planning and Manpower Div; 1989-93 U/Sec Per & Readiness
Vice Chairmen Gen Robert Herres (11)	BS USNA; MSEE AF Inst of Tech; MPA GWU; Grad Industrial Coll of the Armed Forces	1982-84 J6; 1984-87 CINC Space Command; 1987-90 V/C, JCS

Table 19 (Continued)

<p>Dir, Joint Staff LTG Mike Carns (9)</p>	<p>BS USAFA; MBA Harvard;</p>	<p>1975-77 Spec Asst to SACEUR; 1982-84 Dir Ops, Central Command 1987-89 CofS Pacific Command; 1989-91 Dir, Joint Staff</p>
<p>J3 LTG Thomas Kelly (6)</p>	<p>BS Temple;</p>	<p>1979-82 Plans & Policy Allied Forces Southern Europe; 1986-87 Dir, Joint Special Operational Agency; 1988-91 J3 Ops Officer</p>
<p>J5 LTG George Butler (17)</p>	<p>BS USAFA; MS U of Paris</p>	<p>1966-68 Olmsted Scholar; 1969-71 Instructor of Pol Sci, USAFA; 1971-72 Spec Asst, Dir Office of Emergency Preparedness; 1972-73 Asst Prof of Pol Sci, USAFA 1973-74 Action officer, SALT; 1974-75 XO to Spec Asst for Strategic Initiatives; 1975-76 Exec Dir, AF Budget Issues Team; 1976-77 Chief Congressional and Joint Matters Div; 1979-81 Chief, Policy Analysis; 1986-87 AF Ops; 1987-88 Dep J5; 1988-90 J5</p>
<p>J7 Interoperability MG Malcolm Armstrong (6)</p>	<p>BS LSU; MBA Auburn NWC</p>	<p>1975-76 Industrial College of the Armed Forces; 1988-89 Vice Dir J7; 1989-91 Dir, Joint Staff</p>
<p>J8 Force Structure, Resources & Assessment MG John Robinson (4)</p>	<p>BA U of Maine; MBA U of Alabama</p>	<p>1988-89 Dep J8; 1989-91 J8</p>

Table 19 (Continued)

1993-1995		
D/Sec Def John Deutsch (8)	BA Amherst; BS MIT; PhD MIT:	1977-80 Dir Energy Research DOE; CNO Exec Panel; President's Comm Strategic Forces
U/Sec Pol Frank Wisner (3)	AB Princeton	1993 U/Sec State Int'l Sec Spec Asst to D/Amb V-Nam 1969-71
U/Sec Pol ('94) Walter Slocombe Civ (9)	AB Princeton; Oxford; LLB Harvard	1970-71 Program Analysis NSC; 1977-79 Prin Dep Asst Sec of Def Int'l Sec Affairs 1979-81 Prin D/Asst Sec Def ISA/SALT; 1993 D/Under Sec Def Pol
U/Sec PA&E W. Lynn (9)	BA Darmouth; MA Princeton; JD Cornell	1982-85 CSIS; 1993 OSD Asst Budget 1987-93 Cong Staff (Ted Kennedy); NDU Fellow
U/Sec Per& Read Edwin Dorn (7)	BA U of Texas; PhD Yale	D/Dir Research at Joint Ctr for Pol and Econ Studies; USA Germany exp Brookings Institute
Vice Chairmen Adm W. Owens (9)	BS USNA; BA/MA (Pol/Phil) Oxford; MBA GWU	1988 Dir USN Strategic Think Tank; 1988-90 Senior Mil Asst to Sec Def; 1992-94 D/CNO
Dir, Joint Staff V/Adm Macke (11)	BS USNA; MS (ORSA) NPS	1974-77 Chief, Legislative Affrs 1983-84 D/CNO; 86-88 Cdr, Naval Space Command; 1991-92 J6, Joint Staff 1992-94 Dir, Joint Staff
J3 LTG J. Sheehan (8)	BA Boston College; MS (Govt) GWU	OSD exp; Joint duty with Army exp. 1992-94 Dir Ops, Joint Staff

Table 19 (Continued)

**J5 LTG Wes Clark
(11)**

**BS USMA; MA (Pol/Phil) Oxford;
MMA CGSC**

**1971-74 Asst Prof of Pol Sci USMA;
1978-79 A/XO Saceur
1975-76 White House Fellow
1983 Chief, Plans Integration;
1983-84 Chief, Army Studies group
1994-96 J5**

**J7 MG Silvasey
(15)**

BS USMA; MS (ORSA) NPS

**1973-76 ORSA Analyst; 1980-81
Forces Analyst; 1981-83 Chief Army
Plans; 1985-86 D/Dir Concepts Analysis;
1989-91 Dir Concepts Analysis
1978-79 UNF/Kor; D/J5; 1991-93 UNF Kor
1993-96 J7**

**J8 MG R. Eberhard
(8)**

**BS (Pol Sci) USAFA;
MS (Pol Sci) Troy St.
NWC**

**1984-86 Exec to CofS; 1991-93 AF
DCS Program & Resources; 1993-94 J8**

Table 20
Average Pol-Mil Experience
Over Time Across the 3 Issue Network Levels

	1966			1970			1978		
	L1	L2	L3	L1	L2	L3	L1	L2	L3
Civilian	13	11.67	10.5	14	12	8.94	16	6	11.25
Military	9	4.25	6.67	12/9	5.88	8	14/6	9	9.75

	1982			1990			1994		
	L1	L2	L3	L1	L2	L3	L1	L2	L3
Civilian	9	11.67	11.25	10	12	14.13	16/11	7.17	7.5
Military	10/8	9.13	10.3	19/11	9.38	8.83	14/12	7.75	10.33

Notes: 1. The three issue network levels include: Level 1 (L1) The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS; Level 2 (L2) The Civilian Service Chiefs and the respective Service Chiefs of Staff; and Level 3 (L3) The key staff assistants for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS. 2. Scores were determined by averaging the numerical values for each individual at a given level. Therefore the scores at L1 are for the SecDef and Chairman, generally one score although in some cases two scores are presented during periods when the leaders were in transition. L2 scores reflect the average numerical values for the service civilian secretaries and service chiefs. L3 scores reflect the averages for the various key staff assistants.

Table 21
Average Pol-Mil Experience
in the Issue Network Across All Levels²⁵⁰

	1966	1970	1978	1982	1990	1994
Civilian	11.72	11.65	11.08	10.64	11.92	9.39
Military	6.64	8.13	9.58	9.48	11.07	10.36
Differential	76.5%	43.3%	15.7%	12.2%	7.7%	-10.3%

Notes: These values were derived by adding up the scores across the three levels found in Table 18 and dividing by three (e.g. the civilian score for 1966 is 11.72 because 13 [L1] + 11.67 [L2] + 10.5 [L3] = 35.17 / 3 = 11.72).

²⁵⁰ Averages were determined by equaling weighting Levels I, II, and III.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has traced the changing balance of military and civilian expertise at the top echelons of the Pentagon from the 1960s to the 1990s, demonstrating empirically that whereas once civilian officials had substantial military experience, and top military officials had little experience in the political realm, the tables have now turned. This shift comes at a time when national security expertise among Members of Congress and in the executive branch is at a Post-World War II low. The confluence of these two trends has clear implications for United States civil-military relations.

Combining analyses from chapters 4 and 5, the figures below provide a quick illustration of some of the key characteristics of the civil-military relationship over the six time periods studied. They describe the general conditions and relationship among the President, Congress, and the DOD (including top-level civilian and military officials).

**Principals United in Confronting Communism
and Fighting in Vietnam**




Figure 5: LBJ 65-67




Figure 6: Nixon 69-71




Figure 7: Carter 77-79




Figure 8: Reagan 81-83




Figure 9: Bush 89-91




Figure 10: Clinton 93-95

The Clinton transition period was particularly bumpy from the defense perspective. The Aspin team was slow to get on board and, even when it did, it had noticeably less experience compared to earlier defense teams and relative to the military at the time. At the same time, a new Chairman was taking the helm at House Armed Services and key staff positions in that committee also had to be filled as Aspin took with him many top aides from HASC. The new president was the first since FDR not to have military service, and the first since Coolidge to lack national security experience. His situation was exacerbated by criticism surrounding his activities during the Vietnam War and comments he made about the military as a young man. All of these things occurred when the military had one of its most effective political operators ever as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Powell, along with an especially influential Joint Staff with a level of political sophistication dramatically higher than during the McNamara days. It is thus not surprising that we saw civil-military conflict and policy heavily influenced by military preferences.

The next chapter presents decisionmaking analyses from 20 cases covering six time periods from 1965 to 1995. The interview responses from current and former members of the national security decisionmaking teams and passages from autobiographies and memoirs from many of those not available for interviews, will corroborate the empirical evidence presented in this chapter.

Chapter 6

Professional Preparation and Influence in the National Security Decisionmaking Process

This chapter presents findings on security policy dominance, analysis on the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables, and two illustrative case studies to demonstrate how an imbalance in professional preparation can effect national security decisionmaking. Dependent variable findings were based on interview responses,²⁵¹ government documents, passages from memoirs, and secondary sources. The findings are summarized in the Table 22 below, and then compared with Desch's findings over the same time period. Discussion is provided to explain the disagreement between these two sets of findings. Thereafter, tables are presented that demonstrate the relationship between changes in professional preparation and influence on policy outcomes (in terms of civilian and military preferences) from 1965 to 1995. These statistics are then analyzed before proceeding with the two illustrative case studies: Vietnam and Bosnia.

The Dependent Variable: Influence in the Decisionmaking Process

To determine influence in the decisionmaking process, 20 cases were examined from 1965-1995. These cases were chosen based on two major criteria. First, they involved instances of civil-military disagreement--when civilian and military preferences diverged.²⁵² Thus, some obvious cases do not appear in the data

²⁵¹ The author conducted in-depth interviews with nearly two dozen current and former key senior participants in the national security decisionmaking process. More detailed results of these interviews can be obtained by writing the author (email: jc5003@exmail.usma.edu.) A complete list of those interviewed is provided following the bibliography.

²⁵² This was a criterion for selection, but in a couple of cases extensive research revealed that preference consensus rather than conflict.

set, like Grenada and Panama. There were no major civil-military disagreements during these military interventions. Second, to maintain consistency with the data set for the explanatory variables, cases were drawn from only the first two years of presidential administrations (e.g. 1993-1995).

This variable was measured by examining determining civilian and military preferences and then examining the outcome for each issue examined. For example, one of the cases examined was the decision to deploy US ground forces to Lebanon in June 1982. The civilian preference (based on NSC consensus) was yes.²⁵³ The military preference (unanimous JCS opinion) was no.²⁵⁴ Since US troops were deployed to Lebanon, this outcome was coded "civilian." This example was chosen because of its clarity. Not all issues were as easily coded.

This method of measuring influence in the decisionmaking process is consistent with other works by political scientists, including civil-military relations specialist Michael Desch of Harvard University.²⁵⁵ While it captures influence to a marked degree, this method has drawbacks. First, it minimizes the degree to which preferences change throughout a decisionmaking process. Over an extended decision cycle preferences may change several times, making it hard to determine when the reading for the variable should be taken. Second, it can marginalize the degree of compromise inherent in any decisionmaking process. Rarely does a decision ever purely incorporate only one preference. Often there is a mix of preferences

²⁵³ Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger was the notable dissenter. Edwin Meese interview (July 30, 1997). See also, Casper Weinberger, Fighting For Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York, Warner Books, 1990), pps. 135-174.

²⁵⁴ Interviews with Edwin Meese (July 30, 1997) and General (retired) Bernard Rogers (June 19, 1997).

²⁵⁵ Michael C. Desch, Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment (forthcoming).

recognized in the final outcome. To address this point, a “consensus/compromise” category was added to the other two possible outcomes. However, because nearly every decision could be coded “consensus/compromise” on some level, every attempt was made to code the outcome either “civilian” or “military” influenced. Only those outcomes that could not be distinguished at all or were roughly equivalent in influence were coded “consensus/compromise.” This was a subjective call, but one buttressed by extensive decisionmaking analysis. Third, by identifying a singular civilian and military preference, it may minimize the degree of internal disagreement within civilian and military decisionmaking bodies. To address to this potential shortcoming, dissenting opinions were included. For example, although the unit of analysis for determining military preferences was the JCS, whenever one of the Chiefs disagreed with the consensus position of the JCS, that dissent was acknowledged in the table. The same was true for the NSC and OSD on the civilian side.

Despite its drawbacks, this method is still arguably the best available to measure decisionmaking influence. But with shortcomings acknowledged up front, the table below provides the results of dependent variable inquiry.

Table 22
Civil-Military Influence and the Decisionmaking Process
1965-1995

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
<i>Time Period 1 Johnson Administration</i>			
Pentagon Management ²⁵⁶ (<i>Issue</i>)		X (<i>outcome</i>)	
(<i>Preferences</i>) civilian: quantitative/systems analysis methods (e.g. PPBS and FYDP) military: subjective methods, so-called military judgment (e.g. commander's input)			
Strategic Doctrine ²⁵⁷		X	

²⁵⁶ SecDef McNamara and his chief lieutenants in the OSD dramatically changed decisionmaking criteria in the DOD, moving it away from subjective judgment based on field experience (where the military held the marked advantage) to more quantifiable standards where mathematical and statistical methods gave Rand-trained defense intellectuals the decisive advantage. This coding decision was determined after extensive interviews with Dr. Alain Enthoven (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis); General (retired) Edward "Shy" Meyer, (former Army Chief of Staff); Admiral (retired) Stansfield Turner (former military staff officer for Dr. Enthoven, and CIA Director); Harold Brown (former McNamara aide and Secretary of Defense); General (retired) Bernard Rogers (former military aide to C, JCS and Army Chief of Staff); and examination of many primary and secondary sources. A sampling of these sources include: Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), chs 2-3; For other articles written by Dr. Enthoven see "Analysis, Judgment, and Computers," Business Horizons, (August 1969); "Arms and Men: The Military Balance in Europe," Interplay, (May 1969); and "What Forces for NATO? And From Whom?" (with K. Wayne Smith), Foreign Affairs, (October 1969); Charles J. Hitch, Decisionmaking for Defense (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); R.A. Stubbing and R.A. Mendel, The Defense Game (New York: Harper & Row, 1986); William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); William J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Washington, DC: Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989). Hereafter referred to as the JCS History.

²⁵⁷ Changing the US strategic doctrine was a Kennedy campaign promise. The new strategy was designed to deter the Soviets and inject flexibility into US foreign policy. In the words of Dr. Enthoven, the strategic change give the US policy options beyond "holocaust or humiliation." This coding decision was determined after extensive interviews with Dr. Alain Enthoven (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis); General (retired) Edward "Shy" Meyer, (former Army Chief of

Table 22 (Continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
Strategic Doctrine (cont)		X	
civilian: change US strategic doctrine from massive retaliation to mutual assured destruction military: retain massive retaliation (military preferences were not united however, AF Gen Curtis LeMay most strident on retaining current doctrine)			
Air War in Vietnam ²⁵⁸		X	
civilian: graduated military pressure; targets chosen with a high degree of political sensitivity military: overwhelming air power application; total war mentality			
Ground War in Vietnam ²⁵⁹		X	

Staff); Admiral (retired) Stansfield Turner (former military staff officer for Dr. Enthoven, and CIA Director); Harold Brown (former McNamara aide and Secretary of Defense); General (retired) Bernard Rogers (former military aide to C, JCS and Army Chief of Staff); and examination of many primary and secondary sources. A sampling of these sources include: Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough?: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969, chs 2-3; For other articles written by Dr. Enthoven see "Analysis, Judgment, and Computers," Business Horizons, (August 1969); "Arms and Men: The Military Balance in Europe," Interplay, (May 1969); and "What Forces for NATO? And From Whom?" (with K. Wayne Smith), Foreign Affairs, (October 1969); Charles J. Hitch, Decisionmaking for Defense; R.A. Stubbing and R.A. Mendel, The Defense Game; William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann ed., Military Policy and National Security; William J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole, JCS History.

²⁵⁸ According to former McNamara Aide Harold Brown the President personally made many of these decisions at his weekly "Tuesday Lunches." The coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Harold Brown, General (retire) Bernard Rogers, General (retired) William C. Westmoreland (from American Legion Magazine), and examination of primary and secondary sources. A sampling of these sources include: Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked; H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History; David Halberstein, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972); Neil Sheehan, ed., The Pentagon Papers (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Webb and Cole, JCS History; Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York: Penguin Books, 1990).

²⁵⁹ This decisionmaking process is discussed in detail later in the chapter. The coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Harold Brown, General (retired) Bernard Rogers, General (retired) William C. Westmoreland (from American Legion Magazine), Stanley Resor (former Secretary of the Army), and examination of primary and secondary sources. A sampling of these sources include: Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked; H.R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty;

Table 22 (Continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
Ground War In Vietnam (cont)	X		
civilian: graduated military pressure; strike and pause, talks, strike again, if necessary			
military: overwhelming ground attack to defeat communist forces; total war mentality			

New Standards Men (1966)²⁶⁰	X		
civilian: lower aptitude scores to allow lower IQ youths to join the armed forces			
military: opposed to using the armed forces as an instrument of social policy			

Time Period 2 Nixon Administration

Vietnamization²⁶¹	X		
civilian: turnover ground combat responsibilities to South Vietnamese Army; and quickly			
military: lukewarm on idea; withdraw slowly after assuring efficacy of South Vietnamese Army			

Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History*; David Halberstein, *The Best and the Brightest*; Neil Sheehan, ed., *The Pentagon Papers*; Webb and Cole, *JCS History*; Dean Rusk, *As I Saw It*; Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*.

²⁶⁰ Although not a new idea, President Johnson followed through on a program first proposed by President Truman to give military training to Americans intellectually disadvantaged. This was a citizenship building program designed to increase the participants' competitiveness once they returned into society. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Stanley Resor (former Secretary of the Army) and Dr. Alain Enthoven (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis) and from examination of Webb and Cole, *JCS History*; David Dawson, "The Impact of Project 100,000 on the Marine Corps," Occasional Paper. History and Museums Division, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC, 1995.

²⁶¹ SecDef Laird was the driving force behind Vietnamization. He lined up the White House and Administration, and then worked to co-opt the military into this plan for gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. This coding decision was determined after examination of the in-depth interviews conducted by Doug Selin with Melvin Laird (former Secretary of Defense), Morton Halperin (former OSD official) Robert Komer (former OSD official), Daniel Henkin (former OSD official), Anthony Lake (former NSC official), Roger Morris (former OSD official), Phillip Odeen (former NSC official), Ivan Selin (former OSD official); and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources include: Karnow, *Vietnam*; Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Little, Brown and Company, 1979); Seymour Hesch, *The Prince of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (Summit Books, 1983); Webb and Cole, *JCS History*; Anthony Lake, *The Vietnam Legacy*; Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978); and Tad Szulc, *The Illusions of Peace* (New York: Viking Press, 1978).

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
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Détente and SALT I ²⁶²		X	
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civilian: arms control regime; no linkage to Southeast Asia

military: more cautious; force asymmetric concessions from the USSR

Time Period 3 Carter Administration

Readiness and the Hollow Army ²⁶³			X
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²⁶² These negotiations were tightly controlled by the White House, particularly by the National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger. President Nixon, unlike President Carter in 1979, did not bring a member from the JCS with him when he went to Moscow in May 1972 to conclude the SALT I agreement. This coding decision was determined after an in-depth interview with Stanley Resor (former Secretary of the Army and SALT specialist) and from primary and secondary sources including: Webb and Cole, JCS History; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Kissinger, The White House Years; and Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon.

²⁶³ A difficult one to categorize. Conventional wisdom blames the Carter administration for allowing military readiness to decline. Reagan made this a major campaign issue in 1980. However, interview responses from two of Carter's Army Chiefs of Staff (Generals Rogers and Meyer) disagreed with this perception. They both put the blame for deteriorating readiness with the civilian secretary Clifford Alexander, who was aggressively pursuing other agenda items. The military (led by Army Chief of Staff General Shy Meyer) portrayed to Congress a deteriorating readiness posture caused by underfunding and neglect from the civilian leadership. However, after the SecDef (Harold Brown) and the President got involved, military leadership subsided in its criticism of civilian priorities and leadership. Coded "consensus/compromise" because while the military got what it wanted (more funding and civilian attention to readiness issues), top-level civilian leadership was seen as responsive and possessing a different preference/agenda than the Secretary of the Army. This decision to code this outcome "compromise" was made after in-depth interviews with Harold Brown (former SecDef), General (retired) Bernard Rogers (former Army Chief of Staff) General (retired) Shy Meyer (former Army Chief of Staff), Stanley Resor (former Secretary of the Army and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of which included: Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); Warren Christopher, American Hostages in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1983); Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1983); and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
Readiness and the Hollow Army (cont) civilian: not united; pursue priorities to advance race, gender and the enlisted man (Sec Army Alexander); military: priority on readiness, other issues important too, but secondary			X
Ground forces in Korea ²⁶⁴ civilian: withdraw US ground forces from Korea military: keep US ground troops in Korea		X	
Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission ²⁶⁵	X		

²⁶⁴ Although the outcome is coded “military” (since US troops ultimately stayed in Korea), this issue is remembered for the insubordination of MG Jack Singlaub who publicly criticized President Carter for his intention to withdraw from Korea. Singlaub was eventually retired after a second public incident where he criticized the Carter administration. Although military officers generally agreed with Singlaub’s policy preference, very few top-level officers (and none of those I interviewed) supported his tactic of publicly challenging the President (his only ally during this incident was General Jack Vessey who professionally paid for this when President Carter passed him over for the Chairmen’s job the next year. Vessey was subsequently named to the post, however, by President Reagan in 1982). This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with former Army Chiefs Generals Rogers and Meyer, SecDef Brown, Under SecDef (Policy) Resor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, and from primary and secondary sources. Some of these sources included: Jack Singlaub, Hazardous Duty (New York: Summit Books, 1991); “Transcript of the President’s News Conference on Foreign Policy,” New York Times, March 10, 1977, p. 26; Carter, Keeping Faith; “The Singlaub Affair,” Washington Post, May 24, 1977, p. A-18; “Hill Unit Votes to Require Carter to Leave Troops in Korea,” Washington Post, April 27, 1978, B-1.

²⁶⁵ This issue is still very divisive in the literature with conflicting viewpoints on the degree to which President Carter micromanaged the Rescue Operation. The findings of the Holloway Commission pointed to the obsession with secrecy as the cause of compartmentalization which was blamed for the disjointed coordination among the various groups executing the mission. President Carter’s concern (some claimed excessive) for low casualties may also have contributed to faulty planning. But research points to conflicting viewpoints. Colonel (retired) Charles Beckwith, the ground commander, denied a Carter heavy-handedness in the planning and coordination phase. More research is necessary to resolve this issue. This case was coded “civilian” because the plan was ultimately developed in accordance with the guidance of President Carter and was determined after in-depth interviews with Admiral (retired) Stansfield Turner (former Director of the CIA) and General (retired) Shy Meyer and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of these sources included: Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President; Warren Christopher,

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
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Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission (cont)	X		
civilian: priorities on low casualties, secrecy			
military: less restrictions; more tactical autonomy			

Time Period 4 Reagan Administration

The Defense Build-Up²⁶⁶			X
civilian: SDI research & development			
military: not united in preferences; AF=yes; rest of JCS dubious of SDI R&D			

American Hostages in Iran; Harold Brown, Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981; and Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy; Charles Beckwith and Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983); Paul B. Ryan, The Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission: Why it failed (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1985); Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991) Webb and Cole, JCS History.

²⁶⁶ The JCS was surprised by President Reagan's level of commitment to such an exploratory and politically sensitive initiative. However, White House aides found allies in several senior Air Force generals creating the perception of military support despite JCS opposition. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with General Meyer, Dr. David Chu (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Evaluation & Analysis [PA&E]), Edwin Meese, and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources include: Dan Wirls, Build-Up: The Politics of Defense During the Reagan Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992) US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Strategic Defense and Anti-Satellite Weapons 98th Cong., 2d sess., 25 April 1984; Clark, Asa A., IV, et al., eds. The Defense Reform Debate: Issues and Analysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Drell, Sidney, et al. eds. The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1985); Hartung, William D., et al. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Costs, Contracts, and Consequences (New York: Council on Economic Priorities, 1985); and Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
Arms Control Policy ²⁶⁷		X	
civilian: Pursue START; trade Pershings for SS20s			
military: not united in preferences; SACEUR Gen Bernard Rogers publicly opposed Admin's positions on START and the Pershings/SS20s issue			
Lebanon ²⁶⁸		X	
civilian: Deploy troops to Lebanon to withdraw PLO and stabilize situation (SecDef Weinberger notable dissenter in the NSC)			
military: Opposed to deploying US troops			

²⁶⁷This was a presidential initiative received moderate support from the JCS. Public opposition from the military did come from the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, (the ground commander directly responsible for implementing the proposed treaty), General Bernard Rogers. The initiative went forward over his objections. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with General Rogers, General Meyer, Dr. David Chu (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Evaluation & Analysis [PA&E]), and Edwin Meese, and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources include: Dan Wirls, Build-Up: The Politics of Defense During the Reagan Era; Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1985); and William P. Snyder and James Brown, Defense Policy in the Reagan Administration (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988).

²⁶⁸ President Reagan ignored JCS concern with vague mission objectives and sent US troops into Lebanon in June 1982. The initial operation was actually successful as US forces assisted in the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. But in September 1982, after the troops had been withdrawn for two weeks, Reagan ordered them back ashore to keep the warring factions apart and to leverage the Syrians and Israelis in the peace process. This second initiative went awry as US troops became the victims of terrorist attacks, including the one that killed 241 Marines in October 1983. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Ed Meese, General Rogers, and General Meyer and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993); Casper Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990); Edward C. Meyer, R. Manning Ancell and Jane Mahaffey, Who Will Lead?: Senior Leadership in the US Army (Westport: Praeger, 1995); Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); and Mark Perry, Four Stars (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989).

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
<i>Time Period 5 Bush Administration</i>			
Post-Cold War Strategy²⁶⁹			X
civilian: Regional approaches (Wolfowitz)			
military: global approach (Crowe); Base Force (Powell)			
Gulf War Strategy²⁷⁰			X

²⁶⁹ Shortly after the Bush administration took over a conflict ensued between Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr. Paul D. Wolfowitz and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral William Crowe over the direction of post-Cold War US strategic policy. Whereas Wolfowitz favored regional approaches (emphasizing bilateral relationships with key nation-states in regions throughout the world), the Chairman wanted to maintain a global strategy. This conflict subsided when General Powell took over as Chairman. However, Powell added another dimension to the debate and was instrumental in writing the Base Force plan for the Bush administration. This plan was a compromise between Wolfowitz's regional approach and Powell's force structure plan (a 25% cut over 5 years, but essentially a straight line reduction instead of major restructuring). This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Dr. David Chu and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and from primary and secondary sources. A Sampling of those sources included: William J. Crowe, The Line of Fire (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993); Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense; Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995); Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations," Working Paper # 1. Harvard Project on Post-Cold War US Civil-Military Relations, (December 1995).

²⁷⁰ The accounts from top-level national security meetings prior to the Gulf War reveal that President Bush and some of his White House aides were more forceful proponents of military action against Iraq than the Chairman, JCS General Powell. However, the administration respected the technical expertise of the military and settled for compromises in timing and strategy during Desert Shield/Storm. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Dr. David Chu and Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense; Colin Powell, My American Journey; James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995); H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations."

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
Gulf War Strategy (cont)			X
civilian: Aggressive approach; for bombing and ground combat sooner rather than later			
military: General Powell was more cautious preferring more time to allow sanctions to work; JCS lined up behind Powell; Air Force Chief of Staff General Dugan notable dissenter favoring aggressive bombing campaign			
<i>Use of Force Decisions</i>			
--Bosnia (1991-1992)²⁷¹			X
civilian: Opposed to use of force to stop the fighting and genocide (Wolfowitz notable dissenter)			
military: Opposed to use of force to stop the fighting and genocide			
--Haiti (1991-1992)²⁷²			X

²⁷¹ The cause of this policy outcome is really over-determined, and is discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. The popular literature attributes much of the decision to the opposition to use force presented by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell. However, Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, who was present at White House policy meetings regarding the former Yugoslavia, believed that Powell was used by the Bush team as the "front man" on Bosnia as civilian and military preferences were in agreement on this issue. Most civilian leaders (with the exception of Wolfowitz) thought the US should not intervene militarily in Bosnia. General Powell concurred. The media was led to believe that Powell was the cause, but Wolfowitz believed that even if General Powell was in favor of military action it was not likely that it would have occurred. This coding decision was determined after an in-depth interview with Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: Powell, My American Journey; James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995); Elizabeth Drew, On The Edge (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations;" Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, October 8, 1992.

²⁷² The decisionmaking process in Haiti was similar to Bosnia, at least during the Bush administration. Once again, civilian and military preferences coincided. Neither wanted military action. The notable exception was SecState Baker, who wanted to use any means necessary to restore Aristide to power in 1991, shortly after the coup. Despite the clout he held with President Bush, Baker's course of action never gained serious momentum due to NSC and JCS opposition. This coding decision was determined after an in-depth interview with Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: Powell, My American Journey; James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy; Elizabeth Drew, On The Edge; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
--Haiti (cont)			X
civilian: Opposed to use of force to restore Aristide to power; (SecState Baker notable dissenter)			
military: Opposed to use of force to restore Aristide to power			

Time Period 6 Clinton Administration

Gays in the military ²⁷³		X	
civilian: end the ban prohibiting homosexuals from revealing their sexual orientation while serving in the military			
military: maintain the ban			

Bottom-Up Review ²⁷⁴			X
civilian: "win-hold-win"; budgetary reductions to support Clinton domestic spending plan			
military: "win-win"; maintain the status quo on defense spending at Base Force levels			

Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations;" Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, October 8, 1992.

²⁷³ This was one of President Clinton's campaign promises. However, shortly after taking office he became embroiled in a public controversy with the military over ending the gay ban. To diffuse the political fallout, he asked his SecDef Les Aspin to study it for six months. The military dominated these discussions and in the words of Aspin, "held all the cards on this issue." In the end, "Don't ask, don't tell," was hailed as a compromise, but not much, if anything, had changed. Gays were still discharged once their sexual orientation was revealed. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, My American Journey; Lawrence Korb, "The Military and Social Change," The Harvard Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, Working Paper # 5 (August 1996).

²⁷⁴ This issue was a partial victory for both sides. Whereas Powell was successful in stopping Aspin's desire to change the "win-win" war-driven scenario to "win-hold-win," Aspin was successful in getting Powell to agree to significant defense budget cuts, thus moving the strategic discussion beyond Base Force assumptions about military spending. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, My American Journey; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations;" and Lawrence J. Korb, "Defense Budgets and the Clinton Defense Program," in Stephan J. Cimbala, ed., Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1996).

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
<i>Use of Force Decisions</i>			
--Bosnia ²⁷⁵		X (93-94)	X (95)
civilian: more aggressive military measures to stop the fighting and end genocide			
military: opposed to military measures			
--Haiti ²⁷⁶		X(9/94)	X (93-94)

²⁷⁵ Unlike during the Bush administration, when preferences on Bosnia coincided, there were major disagreements between the civilian and military leadership over the direction of US policy towards the former Yugoslavia during the first two years of the Clinton administration. As with the gay ban, changing US policy towards Bosnia, was another campaign promise. Yet despite this, policy did not change for over two years. Military arguments prevailed over civilian ones and is the subject of extended discussion later in this chapter. This coding decision was determined after interviews with General Wesley Clark (former planner on the Joint Staff [J5], Walter Slocombe (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, My American Journey; Elizabeth Drew, On The Edge; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations;" Colin Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, October 8, 1992, p. A8.

²⁷⁶ As with Bosnia, the preferences of Clinton administration differed from those of the JCS over Haiti, and initially military preferences prevailed. The crisis came to a head in September 1994, and former President Carter was dispatched to Haiti along with Senator Sam Nunn and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General (retired) Colin Powell. In an riveting display of high politics, the three men negotiated with General Cedras, the Haitian strongman. After learning that the 82nd Airborne Division had already left Pope Air Force Base enroute to Haiti, the general stepped down. Clinton, for the first time since taking over as commander-in-chief had not only won a major diplomatic victory, but did so in the face of military resistance. Thus, for the first two years of his administration this case is coded a military influenced outcome. But ultimately it is coded a "civilian" outcome as Aristide is restored to power in September 1994. This decision was reached after in-depth interviews with Walter Slocombe (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, My American Journey; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations."

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
--Haiti (cont)		X(9/94)	X (93-94)
civilian: more aggressive military measures to restore Aristide to power			
military: opposed to any military action			
--Somalia²⁷⁷			X
civilian: not united in preferences (State Dept attempting to negotiate with Aidid; UN rep civilian rep in Somalia (Adm ret Jonathan Howe) coordinating to capture him; White House out of the loop)			
military: ground commanders actively hunting Aidid			

²⁷⁷ This outcome is coded “consensus/compromise” based on a strict definition of civilian involvement. The actors involved with the hunting Aidid decision were: State Department representative Admiral (retired) Jonathan Howe, UN representative Madeline Albright, US ground commanders in Somalia, and to a modest degree JCS Chairman General Colin Powell, and to a lesser degree, SecDef Aspin. The political decision (from the US perspective) to blame Aidid for the June 1993 raid that killed Pakistani forces in Mogadishu was made by Howe and Albright, but the decision to actively hunt Aidid was made on the ground by US commanders. Aspin was really concerned about deploying Army Rangers to Somalia and said so in his journal. He considered them “loose cannons.” According to Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA), President Clinton was genuinely surprised to hear about the deadly firefight that ended up with over 1,000 Somalis and 18 US Army Rangers dead. In fact, at the same time of the firefight the State Department was attempting to contact Aidid to fly to Ethiopia for secret peace talks. This case is coded “consensus/compromise” because of the civilian control and direction coming from Howe and Albright, but the right kind of control (from Aspin, Christopher, Congress and the President) was conspicuously absent. Military commanders, trained to take the initiative in the absence of orders, constructed a plan and executed it aggressively. In the aftermath of the firefight, President Clinton changed the direction of US foreign policy announcing a pullout effective the following March (1994). The outcome was determined by in-depth interviews with Admiral (retired) Jonathan Howe (State Department representative-in-charge in Somalia), Walter Slocombe (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, *My American Journey*; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, “Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations.”

Table 22 (continued)

Event	Civilian	Military	Compromise
--Rwanda²⁷⁸			X
civilian: dispatch military forces for humanitarian relief			
military: not united in preferences (C,JCS Gen Shalikashvili supported/crafted a military support package to provide humanitarian relief)			
Strategic Missile Defense²⁷⁹			X
civilian: not united in preferences; GOP Congress favored reviving SDI funding; Democratic administration opposed it;			
military: opposed to increased spending for SDI; JCS dubious of the military value of SDI and wanted to preserve funding for their programs instead			

These findings are very similar to those of Michael Desch's. There are only two discernible differences between the two. First, Desch codes the Gulf War

²⁷⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili, surprised many by his relatively early (compared to his predecessor General Powell) willingness to go along with the proposed humanitarian relief operation. This coding decision was determined after in-depth interviews with Walter Slocombe (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: Powell, My American Journey; Elizabeth Drew, On The Edge; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations."

²⁷⁹ The GOP, as part of the Contract For America, attempted to bring back increased spending for SDI. The administration opposed this spending hike and so did the JCS. General Shalikashvili's testimony on Capitol Hill, explaining the drawbacks of such spending increases, all but killed the initiative which was already losing steam within the Republican party. As with the gays in the military debate, military influence was enhanced during this issue partially as a result of divided government. This outcome was determined by in-depth interviews with Walter Slocombe (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA and Chair, HASC), Dr. William Perry (former Dep and SecDef), and from primary and secondary sources. A sampling of those sources included: the journal entries and personal papers of Les Aspin, found at Princeton University; Powell, My American Journey; Comments by Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, found in, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations."

strategy as a civilian-influenced decision because President Bush wanted offensive action and General preferred to wait for sanctions. But my interviews suggested that the extent of Powell's reluctance has been overdrawn.²⁸⁰ Powell was not as bellicose as some of Bush's aides, but neither did he vigorously object to moving forward. Military commanders and the Chairman took special measures to ensure that the maneuver plan and logistics were ready to go on time. The decision to go forward with combat operations was influenced by this planning zeal in a process that was balanced between civilian and military advisors.

The other area where these findings differ from Desch relates to the Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) and the first Clinton budget. Whereas Desch codes for three separate actions (FY 1994 budget, "win-hold-win" versus "win-win", and changes in roles and missions), this study groups them together under the rubric of BUR. Desch codes the first "civilian" and the later two "military." This study codes the three together as "consensus/compromise," making the two studies very similar in this issue area too. Another difference between these two studies, not related to specific outcome coding discrepancies, is that Desch has more cases. His table, edited here to include only 1965-1995 cases, is presented below.

²⁸⁰ Paul Wolfowitz, who was present at the meetings between the President and General Powell, particularly made this point.

**Table 4 (Full Version in Ch. 2)
Desch Findings on Increased Military
Political Influence: 1965-1995²⁸¹**

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted	
		Civilian	Military
1960-68	PPBS (McNamara=yes; military=no)	X	
1965-68	Vietnam ground war strategy (civilian=limited; military=full mobilization)	X	
1965-67	Vietnam air war strategy (LBJ=gradual; JCS=all-out)	X	
1960s-70s	Limited Nuclear options (civilian=yes; AF=no)	X	
1973-76	Detente (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
1972	SALT I (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
1973	Integration of women (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
5/77	Withdrawal of United States forces from Korea (Carter=yes; military=no)		X
5/77	“Revolt of the Navy” (Carter vs. carrier; Navy=pro)	X	
6/77	Cancellation of B-1 (Carter=yes; AF=no)	X	
1978	SALT II (Carter=yes; JCS=no)	X	
1981	“Zero Option” for United States Soviet Nuclear Arms Control (civilian=yes; military=no)	X	
2/82	Protracted Nuclear War (Reagan=yes; military=no)		X
1982	Lebanon intervention (Reagan/Shultz=yes; Weinberger/JCS=no)	X	

²⁸¹ Michael C. Desch, “Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing US Civil-Military Relations” (Tenth Draft), Conference Paper presented at the APSA September 1995. This data set is also found in Michael C. Desch, Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civilian Control of the Military in a Changing Security Environment (forthcoming).

Table 4 (Continued)

Date	Issue	Preferences Adopted Civilian or Military
mid-1980s	Invasion of Central America (Reagan=yes; military=no)	?
1983-1986	JCS/DOD Reform (Goldwater-Nichols) (civilians=yes; services=no)	?
1986	SOLIC (civilian=yes; military=no)	X
Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1994		
1990	Gulf War Strategy (Bush=offensive; Powell=sanctions)	X
1993	FY 1994 Defense budget (Clinton/Aspin vs. Powell)	X
1992	Use of Force in Bosnia (civilians=yes; Powell=no)	X
1992-94	"Gays in the military" (Clinton=yes; JCS/Nunn=no)	X
1993-94	Military Strategy "Win-Hold-Win" (Clinton/Aspin) vs. "Win-Win" (JCS)	X
1993-94	Change in Roles and Missions (Clinton/Nunn=yes; JCS=no)	X
1994	Use of Force in Haiti (Clinton/Talbot=invade; Perry/JCS=no)	X
1994	No restrictions on women in combat (Clinton/West=yes; JCS=no)	X

It is clear from both of these studies that military influence in the national security decisionmaking process has increased since the mid-1960s. The first table below, drawn from the findings in Table 22, provides statistical analysis of whose influence (civilian or military) was most prevalent in national security decisionmaking

during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Note the dramatic drop in civilian dominance over these two time periods. However, also note that military influenced outcomes, while higher in the post-Cold War era, still only represent 21% of the cases examined. The extent to which the military has dominated their civilian counterparts has been overstated by Kohn et al., although an increase in military influence cannot be denied. "Consensus/ compromise" is the most prevalent coded outcome in the post-Cold War era, encompassing nearly two-thirds of the cases.

Table 24
Influence on Policy Outcomes

	Cold War	Post-Cold War
Civilian	77%	7%
Compromise	16%	62%
Military	7%	21%

The second table provides a look at the relationship between explanatory and dependent variables. A clear pattern between significant professional preparation advantages (10% or greater) and influence in decision outcomes is evident. During the Johnson administration, when civilians held a 76.5% advantage relative to their military counterparts inside the Pentagon, 100% of the outcomes were civilian influenced. The same was true during the Nixon administration when civilians held a 43% advantage in professional preparation. The Carter administration is the outlier with a 15.7% advantage in professional preparation, but no clear pattern of civilian (nor military for that matter) influence. Civilians held only a 12.2% advantage during the Reagan administration but enjoyed significant influence, which may be explained

by budgetary factors. Military spending was spiking to very high peacetime levels.²⁸² The Bush administration had near parity in professional preparation (a 7.7% advantage for civilians) and outcomes matched this reading, with all four cases coded “consensus/compromise.” During the Clinton administration the military held the relative advantage for the first time (10.3%). The outcomes reflected this as the military enjoyed a noticeable edge in influence during the first two years of the Clinton administration.

Based on the data in Table 25 below, revised hypotheses may be offered. First, significant advantages in professional preparation (10% or greater) can lead to increased influence in the national security decisionmaking process. A less than 10% advantage in professional preparation (or rough parity) produces more consensus and compromise in the policymaking process. Significant dips in military spending may negate civilian relative advantages in professional preparation (as in the Carter case). Conversely, civilian relative advantages in professional preparation may be enhanced when military spending is significantly increased (as in the Reagan case).

²⁸² Office of the Comptroller of the Department of Defense, National Defense Budget Estimates, 1997.

Table 25
The Relationship Between Professional Preparation
and Influence in the Decisionmaking Process

	1966	1970	1978	1982	1990	1994
Prof Prep (Relative Advantage) ²⁸³	76.5%	43.3%	15.7%	12.2%	7.7%	-10.3%
Compromise & Military-Influenced Outcomes	0%	0%	67%	33%	100%	89%
Civilian-Influenced Outcomes	100%	100%	33%	67%	0%	11%
Compromise Outcomes	0%	0%	33%	33%	100%	56%
Military-Influenced Outcomes	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	33%

***Professional Preparation, Clusters and
Issue Networks, and the National Security Decisionmaking Process***

The national security decisionmaking apparatus includes three institutional clusters:²⁸⁴ the White House decisionmaking cluster; the Congressional decisionmaking cluster; and the Pentagon decisionmaking cluster. All three play an important role in budget politics, but the Congressional cluster is often left out decisions concerning the use of force.²⁸⁵ The specific high-ranking players in these three policy clusters are listed below.

²⁸³ Postive values indicate a civilian advantage and negative values indicate a military advantage (e.g. -10.3% in 1994).

²⁸⁴ Kingdon also uses the term policy “clusters” to explain the subsets within issue networks. See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, ch.1.

²⁸⁵ This is (and has been) a major source of contention with Members of Congress. It was stressed during interviews with Congressman Ronald Dellums (D-CA), and Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN).

White House Cluster

President
 Vice President
 National Security Advisor
 Secretary of State
 Director of Central Intelligence

Congressional Cluster

Chairs of the following committees/subcommittees

House Armed Services
 Senate Armed Services
 House Foreign Affairs
 Senate Foreign Affairs
 House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
 Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee

Pentagon Cluster (Top Tiers of the Issue Network)

**Top Tiers of the DOD
 National Security Issue Network**

	Civilian	Military
Level I:	Secretary of Defense	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Level II:	Civilian Secretaries	Uniformed Service Chiefs
Level III:	Deputy Secretary of Defense Under Secretaries for Policy, Personnel and Readiness, and Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis & Evaluation (PA&E)	Key Members of the Joint Staff: The Director, the J3 (operations) and J5 (plans) ,and, since Goldwater- Nichols, the Vice Chairman, JCS, J7 (interoperability) and J8 (Resources and Assessment)

These three clusters have played varying roles in the national security decisionmaking process over the past thirty years. Professional preparation was partially responsible for this waxing and waning across institutional boundaries over time. The two case studies below illustrate how a relative professional preparation

advantage can affect the decisionmaking process, ultimately altering outcomes as well.

Two Cases Studies: Vietnam and Bosnia

Professional preparation can provide a partial explanation for the different US policy outcomes towards Vietnam (1965) and Bosnia (1991-1995). Whereas civilians once held a decisive advantage in the 1960s, the tables were turned by 1993, allowing the services to be very influential in establishing the decision criteria for evaluating policy alternatives pertaining to the use of force. Unbalanced levels of professional preparation affect the terms of debate. When two parties are roughly equal in intellectual capacity and experience, arguments are often resolved on the merits of the case. However, when one side or another holds a decisive advantage in relative professional preparation, decision criteria can be skewed to aid the side with the relative advantage.

Decisions regarding the use of force, on one level, are made by weighing national interest (and potential gains) against national costs, but closer examination reveals that the specific evaluation criteria for these decisions have changed over the 30 year period covered in this study. High levels of professional preparation at different periods have enabled each side to dominate the debate concerning what decision criteria should be employed at different times. The reversal in professional preparation from 1965-1995 has contributed to a significant change in the evaluation criteria used to decide whether or not US forces should be employed in combat. These two case studies, Vietnam and Bosnia, will illustrate this point.

Vietnam

Civilians (principals and agents across the three policy clusters) scored very high in professional preparation during time period 1 (1965-1967). From the top on down, there was a high degree of national security expertise. President Johnson (who scored 19 and tied with Bush for the highest level of national security experience among Presidents) was very experienced in national security affairs. He was one of the many in Congress who left their seats to fight in World War II. He joined the Navy, saw action, and was decorated with the Silver Star. After the war he spent several years on the House Military Affairs Committee (precursor to Armed Services) and then, after gaining election to the US Senate in 1949, served on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC). He increased his experience by service as Vice President at a time of intense superpower confrontation. Although he did not hold advanced degrees, he was an adept and persuasive politician--a former legislator renowned for his ability to close a deal.²⁸⁶

His White House cluster of national security advisors (National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and CIA Director William Raborn) were mostly Kennedy holdovers, except for Vice President Hubert Humphrey--a hardline anti-communist despite his liberal credentials (not uncommon for the 1950s and 1960s).²⁸⁷ Rusk and Raborn were very experienced (they scored 22 and 17 respectively), and Bundy was very intellectually capable even if not

²⁸⁶ For more on President Johnson see, Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: Knopf, 1982); Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise of Power (New York: New American Library, 1966); Eric F. Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Knopf, 1969); and Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976).

²⁸⁷ William W. Keller, The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 6.

particularly experienced in the policy arena. President Johnson also retained most of the Kennedy Pentagon team.²⁸⁸ This coterie of defense intellectuals were exceptionally bright, well educated Ivy League graduates, skilled in quantitative analysis, systems analysis and argumentation--they dominated their military counterparts. Led by McNamara, a Harvard-educated businessman of Ford Motor Company fame, the Pentagon was revolutionized by two groups, which sometimes overlapped: one, a distinguished group of very experienced public servants from the World War II generation (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International and Secretary Affairs John McNaughton, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Tom Morris); and the other, a younger group of brilliant scholars skilled in quantitative methods and statistical analysis, who came into the Administration from the Rand Corporation or the Defense Industrial Base (DOD Comptroller Charles Hitch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis Alain Enthoven, and Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown).²⁸⁹

Compared to their military contemporaries, the McNamara team was significantly more professionally prepared to influence the decisionmaking process. In fact, the civilian composite score was 76.5% greater than the military composite score for professional preparation at Levels I-III. General Wheeler's team was long on combat and command experience but short on political-military experience. This was not viewed as a shortcoming from their perspective. To the contrary, repetitive

²⁸⁸ For more discussion on top-level Kennedy/Johnson appointees see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).

²⁸⁹ For more on the political appointees of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations see, David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).

assignments in the field were considered the hallmark of a military professional's career. As Huntington prescribed, military officers of that era eschewed politics and focused instead on combat skills and aspired to command positions in the field.²⁹⁰ Assignments with the Pentagon and Executive Branch, if at all, were viewed as necessary "broadening" experiences that had to be endured before moving back to the field to command troops. Those who were particularly lucky avoided Washington, DC service all together. Therefore, to military officers of the 1960s, low scores in political-military experience would not have been an insult, but a badge of honor. Indeed Generals H.K. Johnson, John McConnell, Wallace Greene were all highly decorated combat veterans--"foxhole" type generals, proud of their field time and relished the fact that they had little "inside the beltway" knowledge or experience.

As proud as they were of their military records, they were little match for the sophisticated and politically savvy Whiz Kids when it came to establishing decision criteria for policy alternatives. The McNamara team, emboldened by the institutional knowledge that accompanies continuity (most had been on-board since the early spring of 1961), supplanted quantitative methods and systems analysis for military judgment, and the criteria employed to support decisions tilted away from the military at the Pentagon. This development was key in the decisionmaking process regarding the widening of the war in Vietnam. Tables 26 and 27 below display very well this marked advantage in professional preparation that civilians enjoyed relative to their military counterparts at the time that President Johnson was considering widening the war effort in Vietnam.

²⁹⁰ Huntington, Soldier and the State, pps. 83-85.

Table 26
Time Period 1: Johnson Administration
1965-1966

	Professional Preparation	Rank (Out of 6)
Cluster 1: White House	16.75	1
President:	19	1
Advisors	14.5	3
Cluster 2: Congress	16.31	2
Cluster 3: DOD: Civilian	11.72	2
L1 SecDef:	13	3
L2 Civilian Secretaries	11.67	3
L3 Key members of the OSD staff	10.5	3
DOD: Military	6.64	6
L1: Chairman, JCS	9	5
L2: Service Chiefs	4.25	6
L3: Key Members of the Joint Staff	6.67	6

Table 27
Pentagon Cluster (DOD Interface)
Professional Preparation By Level (Johnson Administration)

	L1	L2	L3
Civilian	13	11.67	10.5
Military	9	4.25	6.67

Key moments in the Decisionmaking Process

There were three decisive periods during the extended decision cycle (early 1964 to summer 1965) that culminated in LBJ's decision to send US ground combat troops to Vietnam in July 1965. The first period was the course of action development phase, which took place during most of 1964 and on into the first two months of 1965. The second critical period has been characterized by Gelb and Betts as the "last clear chance" phase when, policymakers still had the opportunity to turn away from escalation despite an implementation plan to do just that.²⁹¹ The last critical phase was the public affairs campaign to convince the Congress and American people why the war needed to be "Americanized," and the more difficult challenge pertaining to how to dupe the same audiences that US objectives could be secured without Americans being significantly affected in the process. But before discussing the decisionmaking process that culminated in the escalation of the Vietnam War, it is first necessary to discuss some of the important events that led up to this pivotal moment. The chronology below was taken from Stanley Karnow's Vietnam: A History.²⁹²

Key Events in 1965 Preceding President Johnson's Decision to Americanize the War

4 February

--Johnson's national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, arrives in Saigon as Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin arrives in Hanoi.

7 February

--Vietcong stage attacks against American installations--a clear escalation on the part of the communists.

²⁹¹ Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, pps. 124-128.

²⁹² Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: The Viking Press, 1983). For the entire chronology see pps. 672-688.

Mid-February

--Johnson retaliates by authorizing Flaming Dart, American air raids against North Vietnam.

24 February

--Operation Rolling Thunder, sustained American bombing of North Vietnam, begins.

8 March

--Two marine battalions land to defend Danang airfield--the first American combat troops in Vietnam.

7 April

--*Johnson, at Johns Hopkins University, offers Ho Chi Minh participation in a Southeast Asian development plan in exchange for peace.*

8 April

--*North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong rejects Johnson's proposal, says settlement must be based on Vietcong program.*

26 June

--American command in Saigon reports that Vietcong have put five South Vietnamese combat regiments and nine battalions out of action in recent months. A clear indication of the escalation in ground conflict in the region.

28 July

--**Johnson announces on television his decision to send 44 additional American combat battalions to South Vietnam**

Important Post Script

--Johnson suspends bombing of North Vietnam on December 25 in an attempt to induce the Communists to negotiate. Resumes bombing January 31, 1966. This cycle continues for the next several years.

The Course of Action (COA) development phase

After the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson inherited the Kennedy administration's policy towards Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Kennedy, focused on containing communism and, emboldened by his newly created Special Forces units designed to fight and influence low-intensity conflict in the Third World, increased support for South Vietnam, stepping up the number of advisors from 700 to 15,000. At the same time, he significantly increased the level of military spending for

that country. After Kennedy's assassination, President Johnson took the reins, concerned with appearing weak in the face of the communist challenge, Kennedy's insecurities after the Bay of Pigs fiasco having watched first-hand as the Vice President. Johnson was determined *not to lose* Vietnam and although the specifics of his strategies and tactics changed over the years, this central policy goal remained constant. He did not want to appear weak internationally or domestically. Due to stand election for the first time himself in 1964, Johnson was determined not to get outflanked by the right wing of the Republican Party led by the conservative and hawkish Republican, Arizona senator, Barry Goldwater.²⁹³

At the same time, the communists in South Vietnam were expanding their combat activity against the South Vietnamese armed forces with considerable success. Even after the presidential election in 1964, the Johnson administration remained obsessed with not being embarrassed or appearing impotent in the face of the communist challenge in South Vietnam. President Johnson believed that his domestic political momentum would be affected by his ability to confront the communist challenges of the Cold War. In 1965, he was vigorously lobbying Congress to pass his Great Society program, so he cautiously guarded his professional reputation to ensure political momentum, a decisive factor in legislative success. Johnson knew this firsthand being a former Senate Majority Leader. The key to legislative success was to focus on priorities and not to overburden the Congress with unrelated initiatives or unpopular measures. All of these considerations affected his decisionmaking in Vietnam.²⁹⁴

Johnson's top aides in the White House (cluster 1) and at the Pentagon (cluster 3) understood his domestic priorities and policy intent towards Vietnam. The

²⁹³ Karnow, Vietnam, p. 320.

²⁹⁴ McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, pps. 179-180.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (a position which later became the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) John McNaughton, a World War II veteran, defense intellectual, and famed McNamara Whiz Kid, articulated the Pentagon's understanding of Johnson policy aims.

- "A. To protect US reputation as a counter-subversion guarantor.
- B. To avoid domino effect in Southeast Asia.
- C. To keep South Vietnamese territory from Red hands.
- D. To emerge from crisis without considerable taint from methods."²⁹⁵

In essence, the central US aims in Vietnam were to contain communism and to protect US prestige and credibility. However, all of this was to be done without harming Johnson's coveted Great Society program. Therefore, any action in Vietnam could not disturb the domestic political calculus. Within these policy objectives and parameters, courses of action were developed.²⁹⁶

The planning process was tightly controlled by the White House and DOD civilian clusters. Attended by SecDef McNamara, and SecState Rusk, it was directed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA McNaughton and NSA Bundy. The military played a very minimal role in this process. The JCS did send Rear Admiral Lloyd Mustin (the J3) to these meetings, but he was not prepared to effectively influence the outcome. Although his professional preparation score of 7 was one of the highest on the Joint Staff at the time, he was outmatched by all of the civilian participants. McNamara's team enjoyed high levels of professional preparation--

²⁹⁵ John McNaughton, "Actions for South Vietnam," 6 November 1964, in Gavel, The Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, pps. 598-599.

²⁹⁶ McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 184.

Vance (11), McNaughton (9), Enthoven (12), Bundy (7.5), McNamara (13), and Rusk (22).

The Three COAs developed by McNaughton and Bundy

The initial three courses of actions developed for President Johnson are listed and briefly described and analyzed below.

COA A) Maintain the Status Quo. Continue to support South Vietnam with advisors and military aid. In the words of McNaughton, “continue on present lines.”

However, this course of action was soon ruled out. The marked increase in communist activity and the success of the Vietcong was embarrassing the US and LBJ, and harming American international prestige. Continued communist strength or worse, communist victory, would bring further discredit upon the US and the President, and 1964 was no time to look weak in the face of a presidential challenge from the hawkish Senator Goldwater. But even after the election, this course of action, and the weakness it revealed in US resolve, threatened to undermine Johnson’s reputation as a strong leader--a reputation he was counting on to bring success for the Great Society programs.

COA B) Graduated military pressures (plus). This option continued “present policies plus (added) a systematic program of military pressures against the North, meshing at some point with negotiation but with pressure actions to be continued until we achieve our central present objectives.”²⁹⁷ This was the military build-up option, a strategy of attrition designed to make the North Vietnamese and Vietcong realize that

²⁹⁷ Project Outline, 3 November 1964, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, Box 8, book 2, Department of State Materials (1964), item #5a. Found in McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, p.181.

they could not win. It was gradual because the US only wanted to commit those forces necessary to achieving the intended goal, and not one troop more. Quantitative analysis done by the Dr. Alain Enthoven and his assistants with the Office of Systems Analysis at the Pentagon provided statistics on force ratios to assist planners on troop deployments levels. These figures challenged military judgment deemed too bellicose and politically clumsy for an administration bent on domestic policy priority (and one that patently underestimated the possibility Soviet and Chinese entry into the conflict).

COA C) Graduated military pressures. This option entailed a continuation of “present policies plus additional forceful measures and military moves, followed by negotiations in which we seek to maintain a believable threat of still further military pressures but would not actually carry out such pressure to any marked degree during negotiations.”²⁹⁸ This option was very similar to COA B except that there was more emphasis on bombing, followed by negotiations, and more bombings if necessary, but fewer (if any) American ground troops.

The Chairman, of the Joint Chiefs General Earle “Bus” Wheeler became very angry when briefed on the three COAs under consideration. He immediately drafted a fourth, which he called “hard knock” (to really make a psychological impact on the communist leadership) entailing 1) expanded bombing; 2) mining of Haiphong Harbor; and, 3) extensive and overwhelming use of ground forces.²⁹⁹ General

²⁹⁸ Project Outline, 3 November 1964, Papers of Paul C. Warnke, Box 8, book 2, Department of State Materials (1964), item #5a. Found in McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, p.181.

²⁹⁹ Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Courses of Action in Southeast Asia, 23 November 1964, US Department of State,

Wheeler and the Chiefs preferred a strategy that produced victory instead of one designed to cause the other side to quit.

But ultimately the JCS was not a factor in the decisionmaking process for several reasons, some political and related to their disadvantaged position in professional preparation relative to their civilian counterparts, and others a consequence of the institutional structure of the JCS, which was designed to enforce military unity prior to providing advice to the President.

The speed of the conversations and the evaluation criteria used to support decisions favored civilian view points. Consistent with the more sweeping changes in Pentagon management that were underway throughout the DOD, quantitative methods were employed to analyze communist strength and to assess what it would take to convince the enemy in Southeast Asia to abandon its threat to South Vietnam. Led by Enthoven, the systems analysis specialists devised models and measures for success and Secretary of Defense McNamara embraced these evaluation criteria over the objections of the JCS. In his discussions with the Secretary of Defense, Enthoven argued that it would be “suicidal” for the US not to use quantitative methods to support decisionmaking in Southeast Asia.³⁰⁰

The military was not prepared for these quantitative discussions, as the Whiz Kids deliberated in the Rand lexicon foreign to officers of that time period. To be sure, the military later reacted to this void, sending officers off to civilian institutions to get graduate degrees in systems analysis, but this was of little help in 1964 and 1965 when the key decisions on Vietnam were being made. McNamara, himself very comfortable with this methodological approach despite not working at Rand,

Foreign Relations of the United States: Vietnam, 1964, (Washington, DC; Government Printing Office), pps. 932-935. Found in McMaster, Dereliction of Duty.

³⁰⁰ Alain Enthoven, Oral History Transcript, 27 December 1968, LBJ Library, tape 1, p. 25. Found in McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 91.

gradually began to ignore the JCS during the planning process.³⁰¹ In 1963, McNamara was meeting with the JCS weekly, but by 1964 this frequency had dramatically decreased. Thereafter, he seldom met with the JCS and when he did it was mostly for cosmetic purposes, to give the impression that there was a civilian-military relationship. Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson, equated these perfunctory meetings to a "mating dance of the turkeys...[where they] went through certain set procedures [but] solved no problems."³⁰²

The Joint Staff, a potential repository of intellectual strength for the JCS, was not prepared to challenge McNamara's lieutenants intellectually either. As it was, they had sent up the only individual with a graduate degree (Rear Admiral Lloyd Mustin) to attend the planning meetings with the Whiz Kids. But Mustin was outnumbered and outgunned. Civilians were generally united in preferences and methods while Mustin was disadvantaged because he could not speak for all of the Chiefs. The committee moved very fast, foreclosing advice from the JCS. The Chiefs (before Goldwater-Nichols) were required to vote as a whole on military matters, and if they disagreed, then the dissension was passed along as such. The problem was that this required the circulation of memorandum and by the time the Chiefs had a position, the committee was well past the issue the Chiefs were considering. Thus, structural impediments were also limiting military input during the course of action development phase. Before the Chairman (General Wheeler) even had a chance to respond to the work of the committee, the President had already been briefed on the three courses of action, which basically entailed affirmation of the

³⁰¹ McNamara himself had earned a reputation as a quantitative methods specialist during his World War II experience as a Lieutenant Colonel with the Air Force at the Pentagon.

³⁰² H.K. Johnson, Oral History Transcript, 1972, vol. 2, sec. 11, pps. 3-4.

status quo and gradual and incremental military responses to the growing Communist insurgency in Vietnam, none of which the JCS favored.³⁰³

To placate the JCS, NSA Bundy sent forward the JCS proposal which stood out as the most bellicose COA considered. The initial B and C options which were similar were subsequently conflated into one. This left three COAs.

COA A: The Status Quo. Advisors and military assistance.

COA B: The JCS plan of annihilation for battlefield victory in Vietnam.

COA C: Graduated and measured military pressures (limited bombing and troop deployments) to convince the communist of the futility of further military action in South Vietnam. The “progressive squeeze and talk” option.³⁰⁴

The decisionmaking process was stacked to scream out COA C. George Ball (the Under Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs) described it as the “Goldilocks approach.” COA A was “too soft” COA B was “too hard,” and COA C “was just right.”³⁰⁵ Doing nothing was unacceptable, but doing too much could create other problems. Mining Haiphong Harbor might accidentally cause a Soviet or Chinese ship to be sunk, expanding the war beyond Vietnam. In this way, the struggle between civilian and military COAs was similar to the earlier one between Truman and MacArthur over the scope of the Korean War. This further added legitimacy to the civilian argument as Truman turned out to be right in that case. The Chinese had

³⁰³ McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 181.

³⁰⁴ John McNaughton, Draft Analysis of Option C, 8 November 1964, Papers of Paul C. Warneke, Box 8, book 2, Department of State Materials (1964), item # 19a. Found in McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 181.

³⁰⁵ George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982), p. 388.

threatened to join the war in Korea and then did so. Johnson was determined not to repeat that mistake. COA B was too risky. It could provoke the Chinese or possibly the Soviets. This left COA C, graduated military pressures followed by a period for talks. It seemed logical and the best way to influence the situation in Vietnam while upholding American prestige. After a series of communist successes in ground combat actions in June and July 1965, Johnson directed McNamara to develop an implementation plan for COA C.³⁰⁶

Last Clear Chance

Although the President had basically made up his mind, his experience in the Senate led him to hold a series of high-level meetings, ostensibly to discuss the proposed courses of action, but really to get everyone on the record as in favor of the decision which was already made.³⁰⁷ He had done this on countless occasions in the Senate. These meetings mattered even if they were pro forma and substantively changed nothing. The perception of solidarity for a course of action was important in Washington, DC. All members of the issue network needed to understand the course of action, and since the meeting was held in a place representing symbolic power (either in the Senate Majority Leader's office/conference room or in 1965 at the White House), and attended by high-powered advisors who supported the plan, Johnson counted on peer pressure (if not group think) to persuade those not in favor to publicly to profess their support anyway. The pressure to conform to the President's policy preference was high, and that was exactly what he wanted. In this context, these meetings took place from 21-27 July 1965.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁶ Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, p. 123.

³⁰⁷ Interview with Stanley Resor, former Secretary of the Army during the Johnson administration.

³⁰⁸ McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, p. 313.

But even amidst this hidden agenda, real policy discussion emerged. It occurred primarily between two members of the Department of State, the Secretary Dean Rusk and the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs George Ball. Ball argued strenuously that the US should cut its losses and withdraw from Southeast Asia immediately. He was not convinced that graduated military pressures would work and did not think major escalation was worth it terms of lives and financial burden. He implored his comrades, “this is our last clear chance to make this decision.”³⁰⁹

His boss, Dean Rusk fervently disagreed. He considered the Southeast Asia situation an important test of American resolve. The world was watching. Vietnam was an American responsibility and at the very least, America had to *try* to assist the South. Even if it ultimately failed, it was important that the US react to the communist threat. Any failure would have to be for isolated reasons (e.g., the South Vietnamese Army was corrupt and lazy and not up to the challenge of a committed guerrilla force), and not because the US stood by and did nothing. Even if an action failed, deterrence would still be assured because would-be aggressors would see that the US was responding to the challenge.³¹⁰

McNaughton (Assist Secretary of Defense for International and Security Affairs) and Bundy (the National Security Advisor to the President) agreed with Rusk. Bundy even put the odds of American success at 25% with the graduated military pressures COA, but failure was preferable to doing nothing. He argued, “even if it fails, the policy will be worth it.”³¹¹ As the communist ground success in

³⁰⁹ George Ball as quoted in Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, p. 22.

³¹⁰ Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, p. 23.

³¹¹ McGeorge Bundy, “A Policy of Sustained Reprisal,” 7 February 1965, in Gavel, The Pentagon Papers, vol. 3, pps. 687-691.

South Vietnam mounted, US inaction was seen as embarrassing. Something had to be done.

President Johnson also was moving to bring Congress on-board with the escalation. However, he wanted to do so without jeopardizing his domestic agenda. He had no plans to ask for additional appropriations to fight the Vietnam War for fear that this would hurt the chances of Great Society initiatives being considered by Congress in July 1965. Any additional appropriations would have to wait until after Great Society initiatives cleared Capitol Hill. In addition, Congress would not be asked to pass a measure to call up the reserves or National Guard. President Johnson argued that such a measure might, in itself, provoke a Chinese reaction. At the same time, any reserve call-up would be sure to ignite a major debate and controversy in Congress something that had to be avoided while Congress was considering Great Society programs. Therefore, the coordination meetings that took place from 21-27 July with his key advisors also discussed how Congress was to be briefed on the escalation plan.³¹²

President Johnson ultimately ignored his last clear chance to disengage from a strategy designed to *not lose Vietnam*--at least not in 1965. While all of this was going on, the JCS willingly acquiesced to the strong-arm tactics of President Johnson and SecDef McNamara, despite their individual and collective misgivings regarding the proposed plan for graduated and measured escalation. Their silence even persisted when Members of Congress questioned them directly about the President's plan.

Congressional Questioning about the Escalation Plan

This is where the Congressional cluster re-entered the decisionmaking process. Last significantly involved in August 1964 when, at the behest of President

³¹² McMaster, *Derelection of Duty*, p. 313.

Johnson, it overwhelmingly passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Congress heard rumblings that the administration was planning on widening the war and it wanted explanations.³¹³ One of those Congressmen concerned about the direction of US policy towards Southeast Asia was the *new* Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Mendel Rivers.³¹⁴ He held a meeting with the Joint Chiefs (minus the Chairman General Wheeler, who was with McNamara in Vietnam, coordinating the escalation plan with key personnel in Southeast Asia) in his office with other members of the House Armed Services Committee present. The Members wanted an estimate of costs, in both dollars and estimated casualties, and the JCS viewpoint whether or not reserve mobilization was necessary. The Chiefs upheld the administration's position that the communists could be defeated without additional appropriations or reserve call-ups, despite their private beliefs to the contrary. In essence the war could be fought without getting the American people involved in it. This was exactly the message President Johnson wanted the JCS to convey to Congress--no distractions that could derail the Great Society initiatives. Congress pushed the Chiefs on troop levels, how much would be necessary? Army Chief of Staff, General H.K. Johnson, after dodging the question for several minutes before being pinned down, responded with 250,000, despite the fact that he had privately thought that twice as many would be needed. The other Chiefs were similarly evasive to Congressional queries about troop strength needed to accomplish administration

³¹³ Of the 535 Congressional Members of both Chambers, only Senators Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening voted against the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. One of the key members of the Congressional cluster of the national security issue network, Senator William Fullbright, was instrumental in bullying this Resolution through the Senate. For more on this see, Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam, p. 103.

³¹⁴ Mendel Rivers eventually went on to gain considerable experience as Chair of HASC, but in 1965 he was still relatively inexperienced (his professional preparation score of 10 was lower than almost all of President Johnson's top civilian aides) in that capacity, having just taken as the Chair in January.

goals. Some of the Members, sensing the equivocation, lashed out at the Chiefs. Representative F. Edward Herbert (D-LA) warned the Chiefs that their reputation would suffer if they did not tell Congress the whole truth. The Chair, Congressman Rivers, reminded the Chiefs that they were “creatures of the Congress and therefore have a duty to them as well as to the Executive Branch.” General Johnson disagreed, explaining that his loyalty was principally with the President, his Commander-in-Chief.³¹⁵ Congressman William Bates (R-MA) proclaimed that the National Security Act was “the worst one that Congress ever passed.”³¹⁶

Rivers and the rest of the committee were frustrated with the meeting, but ultimately could do nothing. President Johnson did not plan to ask for additional funding so purse issues (traditionally a Congressional check on the President) could not be exercised. Moreover, although not convinced by the Chiefs, they could not point to anything in particular as reason to block the escalation. Interestingly, two hours after the meeting ended General Wallace called Congressman Rivers’ legal counsel, John Blandford and confided that the Chiefs had not given the entire picture to the assembled Members. He told Blandford that the US was on the verge of a “major war” that would require at least 500,000 men and would take up to 5 years to complete.³¹⁷

What happened to that information after the telephone conversation between Greene and Blandford is unknown. But it is clear that Congress neither played a role,

³¹⁵ General Johnson was right in a narrow interpretation of the National Security Act of 1947. This Act establishes the JCS as the principal military advisors to the president, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

³¹⁶ This entire passage is an account of that meeting from General Wallace Greene, Memorandum For Record, Subject: First Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Policy Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 15 July 1965, Greene Papers, and is taken from McMaster, Dereliction of Duty, pps. 310-311.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

nor was completely aware of the reasoning behind what President Johnson was about to do in Vietnam. The war was about to be “Americanized” in a deliberate attempt to show the world that the US would stand by its allies in need. But the course of action was chosen carefully to demonstrate resolve with full knowledge that a lasting solution had yet to be developed. That was sufficient, however; Vietnam would not be lost in 1965. By 1966 things would clear up and a lasting solution would become evident, especially since the Whiz Kids believed that quantitative indicators could be counted on to facilitate the decisionmaking process. The JCS opposed the adopted course of action but did nothing publicly to discredit or stop it. Congress and the American people heard nothing from them as the JCS justified their behavior by citing presidential (vice civilian) control of the military.³¹⁸ The JCS had been outmaneuvered by a team of civilian advisors adroit at analysis and persuasion. Slow in crafting policy alternatives and then ill-equipped to convince the President otherwise, they were complicit in the decisions made in July 1965. General Westmoreland, in an interview in June 1997 commented about the decisionmaking process towards Vietnam.

...Looking back, there were many times I silently disagreed with decisions handed down, and I was extremely frustrated by many. In particular, I felt, as I pointed out in my book, that however desirable the American system of civilian control over the military, it was a mistake for appointive civilians lacking military experience, knowledge of military history, and knowledge of communist machinations to wield such great influence. Overall control of the military is one thing; the shackling of professional military men by civilians who lack military understanding is another. So I would say while there were many things I would have liked to have seen done differently, most were directly attributable to decisions being made, or heavily influenced, by civilian advisors who knew little or nothing about how to fight and win a war.

Certainly the failure to follow my recommendations to cut off the flow of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail was one of the biggest frustrations. I would have liked to see us able to go into Laos and Cambodia to get that job done more

³¹⁸ McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty*, pps. 330-331.

effectively with ground troops, but the politicians didn't want us to for a number of reasons they deemed sufficient. And there were many other things. The strict observance of the Demilitarized Zone, even though the enemy attacked from there. The failure to arm the South Vietnamese Army with M-16s early on. Not being permitted to go after the enemy when he retreated across the DMZ. But I also had trouble with the fact there were too many government agencies—the CIA, State Department, United States Agency for International Development and the like – each with its own agenda.³¹⁹

Westmoreland's responses support claims of extensive civilian dominance in the decisionmaking process in Vietnam. But he is wrong about the McNamara team. They were very experienced in national security matters. They were very professionally prepared for those positions at the Pentagon. Of course, they were inexperienced in fighting low-intensity conflicts (LICs), but so were the military. The military lacked the political experience to compete with the McNamara team and as such provided no countervailing force for President Johnson and the Congress. Inside the DOD, civilian preferences prevailed.

Bosnia

The data on civil-military professional preparation changed dramatically between 1966 and 1994. Whereas at the Pentagon held a 76.5% advantage during the McNamara tenure, the military reversed this trend by 1994, enjoying over a 10% advantage (see Table 28). Significant shifts in professional preparation can alter the national security decisionmaking process. The Aspin team was not in the same position to dominate their military counterparts as McNamara had done in the 1960s. The military had not only learned the McNamara budgeting and quantitative analysis methods, it had mastered them. Moreover, the senior leadership was trained in

³¹⁹ Interview with retired General William C. Westmoreland, American Legion (June 1997): 55-56.

American politics and bureaucratic maneuvering. General Powell and the Joint Staff (which registered the highest values for political-military experience at Level III for the entire study) knew very well how to influence the Washington political scene.³²⁰

The relative balance of national security and political-military experience had shifted towards the military at the Pentagon. Simultaneously, critical players from the elected civilian leadership were new at their positions (President Clinton and HASC Chair Ronald Dellums). This provided an opening for agents at the Pentagon. The military capitalized on this opportunity during 1993 and 1994, enjoying significant influence in the decisionmaking process of some prominent issues (gays in the military, and use of force decisions in Bosnia and Haiti).

The civilian leadership, predictably given the change in political parties controlling the White House, lacked continuity at the Pentagon. But the Clinton administration did not retain any top-level civilians at Defense as Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Carter had done. Incoming Clinton political appointees did not possess the same level of national security expertise as the outgoing group. For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation (the descendant of Enthoven's Office of Systems Analysis) Dr. David Chu (a 12 year veteran of the job) was replaced with Dr. William Lynn, who despite some congressional staff experience (with Edmund Kennedy D-MA), and a year of study at the National Defense University, could not immediately influence Pentagon politics in the way that Chu could. Twelve years of continuity brings with it significant bureaucratic advantage.³²¹

³²⁰ Military professional preparation scores at Level III (the Joint Staff) in 1994, were 55% higher than in 1966.

³²¹ Interview with Dr. David Chu.

The same was true with the Under Secretary of Policy position. Outgoing Paul Wolfowitz (who scored 18) was replaced by Frank Wisner (who scored 3). When dealing with matters of longterm strategic planning, the relative balance of professional preparation shifted significantly towards the military during this transition, and it showed in the results of policy debates--especially in decisionmaking relating to post-Cold War strategy.³²² Interfacing with Wisner and later with his successor Walter Slocombe was chief military strategist and planner, Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, a Rhodes Scholar and former White House Fellow with extensive political-military experience. General Clark (who scored 11) was versed in the political process (having taught it for 3 years at West Point) and national security strategy. He wielded enormous influence during his tenure with the Joint Staff.³²³

Further review of the backgrounds of those serving on the Joint Staff at the outset of the Clinton administration illustrates the changes in military political-military experience since Vietnam. Admiral William Owens, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff (and another Rhodes Scholar), was also very influential during his time in Washington, DC. In addition to his former schooling, Admiral Owens had executive branch experience, having served as Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's chief military assistant for two years. The chief operator (J3) on the Joint Staff, General Jack Sheehan was an example of the new breed of Marine Corps officers.

³²² A stark example of such manifestation was the role played by the military in the intense infighting between State and Defense Departments during the long development of the Clinton administration's national security document asserting the criteria for US participation in UN peacekeeping operations. For more on Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 see United States Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations." State Department Publication 10161 (Washington DC: United States Department of State, May 1994), 4-5.

³²³ General Clark is now the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe and the commander-in-charge of the operation in Bosnia.

Historically the Marine Corps had chosen its senior leadership from officers who have spent their entire career in the field. Washington, DC time used to be considered a career-ender in the Marine Corps. General Sheehan was an accomplished soldier and commander, but he also had several broadening assignments. He earned a MA in political science from George Washington University. He also spent a two year joint assignment with the Army, and worked in the office of the Secretary of Defense as well. The promotion of General Sheehan to four-stars represented a significant change in the norms and values of the Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps has traditionally done well on Capitol Hill, this was in large part due to the affinity among active duty Marines and former Marines serving in Congress. General Sheehan is indicative of a new approach, that of specifically grooming senior leaders to influence the Washington political scene.³²⁴

Although professional preparation for the service chiefs was actually down from the previous time periods (and 5th of the 6 time periods examined), they still held a *relative advantage* with their civilian counterparts. President Clinton apparently had a personnel strategy similar to President Carter--use the civilian secretary positions as political pay-offs to groups supportive of your election bid.³²⁵ Both Togo West (the second African-American Secretary of the Army) and Sheila Widnall (the first female Secretary of the Air Force) had narrow spheres of expertise, law and aerodynamics respectively, and not as much broad experience in national security policymaking. The Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton, had some active duty time with the Navy, but not nearly the breath of national security experience that his

³²⁴ George C. Wilson, "Sheehan would break mold as new Joint Chiefs chairman," Army Times, January 13, 1997, p. 48.

³²⁵ The Washington Post ran several stories in the Spring of 1993 claiming that the Clinton personnel selection strategy was principally driven by Ethnicity, Gender, Geography (e.g. California) or EGG considerations.

predecessors (e.g., Paul Nitze, John Lehman, and Lawrence Garrett) had. Thus, Level II provided an advantage for the military, despite the downturn in raw scores among the service chiefs.

Even though Les Aspin scored highly in professional preparation, his team did not enjoy the same level of influence that previous OSD teams did. Although possibly attributable to the interpersonal skills of Aspin, this study points to the relative advantage in professional preparation of the military at levels II and III as significant reasons for changes in policy outcomes (e.g., gay ban policy, post-Cold War strategy, land mine decisions, etc.).³²⁶ The issue area where professional preparation has made a particularly stark impact in the post-Cold War era has been on the use of force. Military arguments pertaining to which *decision criteria* to use prevailed time and again throughout the early 1990s, foreclosing policy options that might have ended genocide in Bosnia and restored Aristide to power in Haiti earlier.³²⁷

Although the specifics of each of these cases are important (and the Bosnia case will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter), military preferences were adopted in both instances because they won the preliminary struggle regarding decision criteria: under what circumstances should the US deploy forces? The Vietnam case study discussed earlier exemplified the decisionmaking criteria of the

³²⁶ President Clinton was recently criticized for flip-flopping on the land-mine issue. In 1994 he personally lobbied the UN to ban all use of landmines, but in 1997, in an effort to curry favor with the JCS, he reversed his stance insisting on an exemption for US mines along the Korean DMZ, an exemption not included in the final UN document, which ultimately caused the US to oppose the international land-mine treaty. For more see Philip Shenon, "White House Remains Firm against Land-Mine ban," New York Times, October 11, 1997, p. A.1.

³²⁷ Although her work in this area is not yet published, the author wishes to thank Cori Dauber, a discourse analysis specialist and assistant professor in the Speech Department at UNC Chapel Hill for the insight into argumentation and discourse analysis regarding use of force decision criteria.

1960s. President Johnson and his team of civilian advisors in the White House and Defense, established national credibility as the primary decisionmaking criterion. Potentially unsuccessful courses of action were plausible (even acceptable) if they advanced US national credibility in the short term. Long-term policy could be corrected, but short-term policy that led to a decrease in US credibility was not tolerable. Therefore, selecting a course of action that called for graduated military pressures to stave off defeat in South Vietnam in 1965 made sense within that context. Civilian dominance of the decisionmaking process enabled this to happen. President Johnson (very professionally prepared in the national security realm) and his team of advisors (who held significant advantages in relative professional preparation) changed decisionmaking criteria from “military judgment” to quantitative methods discounting the military voice. Moreover, national strategy was focused at the “grand level” with containment and confrontation of monolithic communism center to this concern. Military concerns with the efficacy of use of force, although important, were secondary to larger issues of superpower confrontation. A stalemate in Vietnam was acceptable under these conditions, even optimal to US withdrawal which would have signified American weakness in the face of communist challenge. Weakness could have led to more confrontation (e.g. the lessons of Munich) thus in the long-run a stalemate in Vietnam was preferable to the civilian leadership despite the objections from the JCS, which preferred “all or nothing” courses of action instead.

But times have changed since the 1960s, and the Vietnam experience itself had something to do with discrediting this thinking. The end of the Cold War was obviously a factor too. But even if this is true, new civilian criteria could easily have filled this void, but it did not. By 1993 the military had supplanted civilian criteria for use of force with a set of standards of their own. Labeled the Powell Doctrine (after

the Joint Chiefs Chairman who publicly pronounced them),³²⁸ these criteria effectively prevented the kind of decisions reached during the Johnson administration, especially the one that escalated the US portion of the Vietnam War.

General Powell's professional preparation and political activity as Chairman has been the subject of much debate.³²⁹ He was a skilled and masterful bureaucrat, capable of significant influence inside the military, the White House and Capitol Hill, and beyond. Earlier in his career he was instrumental in helping Weinberger write his now famous speech for the National Press Club in 1984, which outlined six criteria for the use of force. In his Foreign Affairs piece, Powell modified the Weinberger Doctrine allowing for use of force to secure national objective beyond those deemed "vital" but only in those circumstances that political objectives were clear and overwhelming force was used (e.g., the bombing of Libya).³³⁰ Summarized, the Powell doctrine asks the following questions before an affirmative decision regarding US military force:

Powell's Questions for Use of Force Policy Debates

- 1) Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?
- 2) Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?
- 3) Will military force achieve the objective?

³²⁸ Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs 71:5 (Winter 1992/1993): 32-45.

³²⁹ See, for example, Bob Woodward, Bernard Trainor, Richard Armitage, and Michael Gordon, "Colin Powell as JCS Chairman: A Panel Discussion on American Civil-Military Relations," Working Paper # 1. Harvard Project on Post-Cold War US Civil-Military Relations, (December 1995).

³³⁰ Colin Powell, "US Forces: Challenges Ahead," p. 45.

- 4) At what cost?
- 5) Have the gains and risks been analyzed?
- 6) How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it has been altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?

These decision criteria vary significantly from those used during the 1960s. Of chief import for US civil-military relations, according to these schema only the military can determine: a) whether or not military forces can achieve the objective; and b) how much force is necessary. Both of these criteria may ultimately foreclose policy alternatives nuanced to accomplish limited (but still important) national goals. The Bush administration had no quarrel with the Powell doctrine. However, it was clear that President Clinton's campaign promises fell outside the parameters established in the Powell doctrine.³³¹ Even before gays in the military, the civil-military relationship between the commander-in-chief and the Joint Chiefs Chairman was headed for conflict. The significant advantage (and significant increase since the 1960s) of the military in professional preparation enabled them to change the decision criteria employed during use of force debates. The tables below provide the specific data (numerical and comparative) for those key players during the first two years of the Clinton administration.

³³¹ John Apple, "Campaign Sifts to a New Turf" New York Times, July 28, 1992. p. A.1.

Table 28
Professional Preparation Data
Time Period: 1993-1994

	Professional Preparation	Rank (Out of 6)
Cluster 1: White House	10.5	5
President	7	6
Advisors	14	5
Cluster 2: Congress	16.67	1
Cluster 3: DOD Civilian	9.39	6
L1 SecDef	16/11 ³³²	1/4
L2 Civilian Secretaries	7.17	5
L3 Key members of the OSD staff	7.5	6
DOD: Military	10.36	2
L1: Chairman, JCS	14/12 ³³³	2/3
L2: Service Chiefs	7.75	5
L3: Key Members of the Joint Staff	10.33	1

Table 29
Pentagon Cluster (DOD Interface)
Professional Preparation: 1993-1994

	L1	L2	L3
Civilian	16/11	7.17	7.5
Military	14/12	7.75	10.33

³³² The split scores reflect the numerical values for Secretary of Defense Aspin (16), and Secretary of Defense Perry (11).

³³³ The split scores reflect the numerical values for General Powell (14) and General Shalikashvili (12).

Key moments in the decisionmaking process

There were three critical phases in the decisionmaking process that ultimately resulted in the deployment of over 20,000 US troops in a peacekeeping capacity in Bosnia in December 1995. The initial phase took place shortly after civil war broke out in Yugoslavia in June 1991 and continued throughout the remainder of the Bush administration. The second phase was the initial initiative by the Clinton administration to build a consensus in NATO to lift the arms embargo (viewed as favoring the Serbs and preventing a fair fight) and to strike advancing Serbs with air power. This plan, called “lift and strike,” never gained serious momentum in NATO and died out by May 1993. Subsequently the Clinton administration adopted a policy of containment of the fighting and that policy essentially remained unchanged until the third phase in the summer of 1995, when NATO began aggressive military action against the Serbs for violating safe-havens and exclusion zones. Before an in-depth discussion of the decisionmaking process is offered, a brief chronology is provided to add context to the analysis.³³⁴

Chronology of the key events in the Former Yugoslavia

June 1991

--Yugoslavia starts to fall apart and plunges into civil war in June 1991.

May 1992

--War spills over to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992.

Spring 1992-1995

--NATO considers action, UN passes resolutions attempting to contain the fighting (arms embargo, restriction of air activity).

³³⁴ Drawn from NATO fact sheets. “NATO’s Role in the Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement,” March 1997; and, NATO’s Role in Peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia,” March 1997, [Http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs11.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs11.htm).

Summer/Fall 1992

--Genocide and war atrocities in the former Yugoslavia becomes a presidential campaign issue in the US; Candidate Clinton calls for more US military pressure to end the fighting and to stop the genocide; President Bush disagrees and exploits the issue to claim Clinton is neophyte in international affairs.

January-May 1993

--Incoming Clinton administration works to implement the campaign promise of more US involvement in Bosnia and supports the Vance-Owen peace initiative; meets resistance from the JCS and some Members of Congress; proposes "lift and strike" (lift the arms embargo and strike the Serbs to get them to the peace table); backs off activist policy when it becomes clear NATO does not support; adopts "containment" policy instead.

May 1994

--(May 1994) President Clinton signs PDD 25, a NSC memorandum that establishes parameters for the deployment of US forces in peacekeeping and other OOTW; this policy is a major political victory for the military and those subscribers to the Powell doctrine as it encompasses most of those tenets vice the more activist vision initially articulated by the civilian leadership at the outset of the Clinton administration.

1994-1995

--Increased media coverage of the fighting and genocide in former Yugoslavia.

June 1995

--UN peacekeepers endangered, the captured and used as "human shields" to prevent further NATO bombing of Serbian positions.

September 1995

--Serbs capture the UN declared "safe haven" of Srebrenica and commit massive atrocities.

October 1995

--Clinton administration changes policy and becomes more active; takes the lead in directing air strikes against the Serbs; air strikes work as Serbs cease offensive action and retreat beyond exclusion zones.

December 1995

--increased diplomatic activity supplemented with more threats of NATO military action leads to comprehensive peace settlement at Dayton, December 1995 paving way for the NATO implementation force(IFOR) and the deployment of over 20,000 US ground troops.

The Bush administration: No intervention in Bosnia

Soon after the Persian Gulf War was over and before all of those troops had been brought home, Yugoslavia erupted into civil war. As President Bush assembled his national security team it became apparent that the consensus wanted to avoid an active role in the Balkans.³³⁵ Secretary of State James Baker, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell, and the President, embracing the Powell doctrine regarding decision criteria for the use of force, believed there was little that the US could do to affect the outcome on the ground in the former Yugoslavia. The voices of Scowcroft and Eagleburger were particularly influential since both had served in Yugoslavia in the past (Scowcroft as a military attaché and Eagleburger as Ambassador).³³⁶

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney was more activist, and inclined to consider bombing, but even he was cautious about committing ground troops. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Paul Wolfowitz (performing the role that McNaughton had done during the McNamara years), was one of the few voices in the administration's inner-circle of national security advisors who favored more aggressive American action in Yugoslavia. But all the indicators used to support decision analysis (Powell criteria of mission clarity, etc.) pointed to US inaction. After all the terrain was much different from the barren desert in the Gulf.³³⁷ Longstanding hatreds were cited (although not necessarily historically supported) as

³³⁵ Interview with Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy during the Bush administration.

³³⁶ James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 635.

³³⁷ Wolfowitz interview.

another reason why the United States should not intervene. Further, political and military objectives seemed elusive.³³⁸

Secretary of State Baker discussed this debate in his memoirs. In June 1992, “Scowcroft had become as disheartened by the situation in Sarajevo as I was, but we both knew the President didn’t want to, and shouldn’t, get involved in an open-ended military commitment in the former Yugoslavia. We both knew as well that the Pentagon was deeply opposed to any military involvement in Bosnia, for reasons we both appreciated.”³³⁹

But if direct military intervention was not going to be pursued, some argued for at the very least, lifting the arms embargo and arming the Bosnian Muslims to make it a fair fight.³⁴⁰ By going along with the UN arms embargo, the United States was complicit in the genocide taking place in the former Yugoslavia at the hands of the Serbs. This COA never gained momentum partially because of concerns of its acceptance in Europe, which seemed opposed to the idea.³⁴¹

Was this decision taken by the Bush administration a “military influenced” outcome? That was the subject of the front page news story in the New York Times on September 28, 1992.³⁴² Reporter Michael Gordon accused Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Powell, of blocking a US response to the continued genocide occurring in the Balkans at the hands of the Serbs. Summarizing the highlights of a news conference held by the general, Gordon wrote the following:

³³⁸ Powell, “Why Generals Get Nervous.” New York Times, October 8, 1992.

³³⁹ Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, p. 648.

³⁴⁰ This was Wolfowitz’s position.

³⁴¹ Wolfowitz interview.

³⁴² Michael R. Gordon, “Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia,” New York Times, September 28, 1992, p. A.1.

...General Powell assailed the proponents of limited military intervention to protect the Bosnians. The general questioned the immediate need to establish an air-exclusion zone over Bosnia like those the United States has imposed over parts of Iraq, where the Pentagon sees less risk...General Powell also angrily rejected suggestions by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain and others that the West undertake limited air strikes to deter the Serbs from shelling Sarajevo and continuing their attacks. General Powell said: 'As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not [note the parallel the general is drawing between the proposed policy and that which was pursued in Vietnam in 1965-- parenthetical comment mine]. As soon as they tell me surgical, I head for the bunker.'³⁴³

However, top-level Pentagon official Paul Wolfowitz saw this policy outcome differently. He believed that Powell was credited with too much influence in the media for this policy decision.³⁴⁴ Wolfowitz's argument was that while General Powell was very influential, the actual cause of this decision was over-determined. "Even if Powell had supported a military option in Bosnia, it was not likely that Bush would have adopted it. There were too many other advisors against that option and the President was already predisposed to do nothing in the first place."³⁴⁵ After Baker left State to take over the responsibilities of Bush's re-election in the first week of September 1992, Eagleburger took over as the new Secretary, further decreasing any chance that the administration would commit military resources to the Balkans.³⁴⁶ Still, as the Gordon article indicates, it is an open question because Powell was so emphatic in his opposition to using force.

³⁴³ Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, September 28, 1992. p. A1.

³⁴⁴ Wolfowitz was present at top-level meetings on Bosnia at the White House and is an authority on this subject.

³⁴⁵ Wolfowitz interview.

³⁴⁶ Eagleburger did not believe that the US could positively affect the situation on the ground in Bosnia. See Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, pps. 640-641.

In his book, Balkans specialist David Owen partially attributes the Bush policy to the opposition from General Powell and the JCS.³⁴⁷ Pentagon refusal to re-evaluate the Powell Doctrine (the six questions presented earlier) resulted in a negative answer to the use of force question every time. The decision criteria employed by the Bush administration mandated no military action. Since no clear political goal was established, the force option was foreclosed. Moreover, and perhaps more important, even if a political objective was established, it was not clear that military action could accomplish it. During the decisionmaking process, the Pentagon circulated the fact that Hitler had sent 38 Infantry Divisions to pacify the Balkans during World War II without success, certainly the US military could do no better, especially since it had only 12 divisions currently on active duty! Moreover, the Joint Staff was quick to point out the differences between the terrain in Bosnia compared to the Persian Gulf. So-called “surgical strikes” were not possible under these circumstances. Therefore, since the Powell criteria were not met, nor likely to be so in the near future, Bush administration policy towards Bosnia did not change.³⁴⁸

The Clinton Administration

One of President Clinton’s campaign promises was to do more in Bosnia to relieve the suffering and to stop the genocide. As he stumped on the campaign trail Clinton said, “President Bush’s policy toward former Yugoslavia mirrors his

³⁴⁷ David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), pps. 56 & 129-130.

³⁴⁸ The military’s position was bolstered in 1993 by the publication of Kaplan’s, Balkan Ghosts, a story of long-held hatreds between the warring factions in the region and the futile nature of any intervention to resolve the differences. Kaplan’s thesis subsequently came under vigorous attack by those who believe that the people’s of the former Yugoslavia can live together within the proper state (and have, for centuries).

indifference to the massacre at Tiananmen Square and his coddling of Saddam Hussein...Once again, the administration is turning its back on violations of basic human rights and our own democratic values.”³⁴⁹ Just before he assumed office in January 1993 he ominously proclaimed, “the legitimacy of ethnic cleansing cannot stand.”³⁵⁰ However, after taking over, the Clinton administration was indecisive about how to proceed in Bosnia. Political advisors (particularly Vice President Gore) and some members of his diplomatic team (namely Madeleine Albright) tended to favor aggressive military action, arguing that Clinton had promised that during the campaign. The State Department and the NSC (especially the NSA advisor Anthony Lake) were inclined to support the President but were weary of the details and implications of active US involvement. In this decisionmaking process the military strenuously argued against the use of force. Powell noted in his book:

...My own views on Bosnia had not shifted much from the previous administration. In response to constant calls by the new team to “do something” to punish the Bosnian Serbs from the air for shelling Sarajevo, I laid out the same military options that I had presented to President Bush. Our choices ranged from limited air strikes around Sarajevo to heavy bombing of the Serbs throughout the theater. I emphasized that none of these actions was guaranteed to change Serb behavior.³⁵¹

Powell was emboldened by decisionmaking criteria that considered whether or not military force could accomplish the political objective. According to these rules, the military (the technical expert) was responsible for assessing this criteria. Since Powell raised serious doubts, the administration was in a precarious position. Should

³⁴⁹ President Clinton as quoted in Elizabeth Drew, On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency (New York: Touchstone, 1995), p. 138.

³⁵⁰ Clinton as quoted in Drew, On the Edge, p. 139.

³⁵¹ Powell, My American Journey, p. 561.

the President override the decision criteria with subjective criteria of his own? As Owen points out, "...Clinton was in no position to override Powell's advice after the debacle over removing the ban on homosexuals serving in the army (sic)."³⁵² In one high-level meeting, UN representative Madeline Albright challenged Powell, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" To which Powell replies in his book by saying, "I thought I would have an aneurysm!"³⁵³

That question, however, was precisely the point of the editorial written by Michael Gordon, albeit earlier in the process.³⁵⁴ Gordon equated Powell to McClellan--the Civil War general reluctant to fight at the outset of the war, much to the dismay of President Lincoln. This infuriated Powell and was the catalyst of his own op-ed, "Why Generals Get Nervous," where he excoriated civilians who did not embrace his decision criteria on matters pertaining to use of force.³⁵⁵

The Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, as much as he disagreed philosophically with the Powell Doctrine, actually supported military analysis on Bosnia.³⁵⁶ Aspin's reluctance to challenge the JCS over Bosnia is illustrative of the military political victory regarding decision criteria. Months earlier he had delivered an address promising a change in use of force decision criteria.³⁵⁷ In this speech he delineated

³⁵² Owen, Balkan Odyssey, p. 130.

³⁵³ Powell, My American Journey, p. 561.

³⁵⁴ Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No On Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, September 28, 1992, p. A1.

³⁵⁵ Powell, "Why Generals get Nervous," New York Times, October 8, 1992, p. A 8.

³⁵⁶ Aspin's Journal at Princeton, entry dated August 7, 1993.

³⁵⁷ Les Aspin, "The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World." Address given at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC., September 21, 1992. Found in Richard N. Haass,

two schools of thought--the Powell School (“all or nothing”) and the Thatcher School (“limited objectives”). He explained that while the Powell school had spent a lot of time honing their ideas, they ultimately were not sufficient for the post-Cold World environment. They did not allow the US to *shape* the security environment in instances that did not (or could not) allow for overwhelming military force. “This school says if you aren’t willing to put pedal to the floor, don’t start the engine.” The limited objectives school, which Aspin included himself in, wanted more. He cited Bosnia as the prime example. “This school (limited objectives) also wants to do something to stop the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. If we do not, they say, others may follow these horrific practices. And there is no scarcity of candidates.”³⁵⁸

Aspin’s points are two. First, there should be a moral component to US foreign policy. The US should intervene (militarily if necessary) to stop the genocide. Second, the US should be able to shape the international environment, and that cannot be done using the Powell criteria on use of force. Yet despite this eloquence, and Clinton’s campaign promises, the US did not intervene, nor show leadership, in the Bosnia situation for over two years.

However, the military was not the only cause for the Clinton administration’s inaction. Despite his aggressive rhetoric, the president never fully committed to a military course of action. Throughout April 1993, Clinton told reporters that he was sickened by the genocide and ethnic cleansing and that he was going to stop it. Yet, top-level policy meetings continued throughout that month without a decision. Congress was consulted and the Democratic leadership--Representatives Richard Gephardt (D-MO), and Tom Foley (D-WA)--agreeing with the military, was loathe to

Intervention (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), pps. 183-190.

³⁵⁸ Aspin, “The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World,” in Haass, Intervention, p. 187.

intervene despite a moral repugnance for what was happening in Bosnia. Moreover, once the President gave the go ahead for “lift and strike” Secretary of State Warren Christopher was unable to convince the Europeans to agree to the plan. As all of this was occurring President Clinton was reading Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, and his resolve for the course of action weakened, much to the dismay of advocates within the administration. By mid-May it was apparent that “lift and strike” was not going to be implemented and Clinton gave the approval for a policy switch to “containment”-- preventing the war from spilling over to other parts of the former Yugoslavia.³⁵⁹

President Clinton did not follow through on his campaign promise to take more aggressive action to stop the Serbs and the military (more precisely, the decision criteria advanced by the JCS which dominated policy discussions) was a major factor in stopping the President’s policy aims. General Powell’s keen political ability and the persuasive analysis completed by the Joint Staff, both by-products of enhanced military professional preparation to influence the decisionmaking process, significantly contributed to this policy outcome. But as the foregoing discussion in the previous paragraph illustrates, the military was not the sole factor for the policy’s demise.

Post Script on Bosnia

When US policy did finally change in 1995, it was only after Powell left office and General Shalikashvili modified the Powell Doctrine. General Shalikashvili embraced the shaping concept to a greater degree than Powell, which allowed for more and varied military options to be considered in the decisionmaking process. The policy change towards Bosnia must be viewed in this context--it was not the triumph of civilian over military standards. Rather, the initial decision to increase the bombing

³⁵⁹ This analysis is based on Drew, On the Edge, pps. 138-157.

was a courageous one taken by the President over the objections of the military in response to increased ground successes of the Serbs in 1995. This was magnified after the fall of the UN designated safe-haven of Srebrenica, which caught NATO off-guard.³⁶⁰ At this point the President stepped in and ordered more air strikes, which to the surprise of many (including the US military), worked. The Serbs were responding and it was clear that there was an opening for possible peace talks. The Clinton administration aggressively pursued this opportunity. President Clinton appointed renowned diplomacy expert Richard Holbrooke in charge of the US delegation and Secretary of State Warren Christopher stayed actively engaged in the peace process too.³⁶¹

In December 1995, spurred on by the US at peace talks in Dayton, Ohio the warring parties finally reached an agreement. Although President Clinton is widely credited for aggressively pursuing this peace accord (and deservedly so), the significant breakthrough, from the US perspective, was accomplished by the Joint Staff in the "Military Annex" to the Accords. This Annex significantly reduced the possibility of mission creep (blamed for the debacle in Somalia two years before), and established clear and attainable goals for the UN peacekeepers, a force that was to be led by US soldiers. A robust military annex was a pre-condition for support of the peace process from the JCS and from many Members of Congress leery of an over-extended and ill-defined multilateral operation, especially after Somalia. In the end, the US military got all six major provisions they were seeking at Dayton. Those six provisions are listed below.³⁶²

³⁶⁰ Interview with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe.

³⁶¹ Interview with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Walter Slocombe.

³⁶² Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Confident, But Some Serbs Will Fight: Military Now Says Bosnia Peace Plan Will Work," New York Times, 27 November 1995, p. A1.

1) *clear goals*: peace enforcement; the UN force was not responsible for arresting war criminals nor safeguarding civilians in Bosnia; the mission was merely one of peace enforcement--preventing the warring factions from conducting combat operations against one another.

2) *deployment of a powerful force*: 20,000 US troops were initially deployed.

3) *NATO command and control*: essentially ensuring US command since the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR) was an American.

4) *Robust rules of engagement*: the force would not be "hand-tied"; it could defend itself and "defend" was broadly defined to include limited offensive operations designed to protect the force.

5) *a one-year time limit*: although the JCS would have preferred an exit strategy based on mission results it settled for an exit strategy based on time--at least there was one.

6) *finally, the expressed cooperation of the rival factions*. The UN force was there only because *all* warring factions had invited them there.

The significant players from the US side at Dayton were Richard Holbrooke, Warren Christopher, and Lieutenant General Wesley Clark, a key member of the Joint Staff whose professional preparation was described earlier. Of these three, Clark was the principal author of the military annex.³⁶³ Because the JCS had criticized earlier plans which failed to sufficiently empower the peacekeeping force and safeguard against mission creep, Clark's role was considered key by the administration. The Joint Chiefs wanted assurances that United States ground forces would not serve as policemen, nor go after war criminals. Given the political clout of the JCS, the

See also, US Department of State, The Dayton Peace Accords, Web Site:
<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu>.

³⁶³ Interviews with General Wesley Clark and Dr. William Perry, former Secretary of Defense.

civilian authorities sought to address these items in the Dayton Accords to secure the support of the Joint Chiefs.³⁶⁴

In his interview, former Secretary of Defense William Perry discussed the specific question of authorship of the military annex,

...General (Wes) Clark was the principal author of the military annex to the Dayton Peace Accords. He was the principal agent who went between the warring factions to get concessions. He did a good job, however, in keeping the Pentagon informed of developments. He constantly updated the JCS, the Under Secretary for Policy Walt Slocombe and me, and obviously he keep Holbrooke apprised of any developments. But Clark wrote it.³⁶⁵

Significantly, Perry did not discuss the role that Walter Slocombe played in the process until asked, and then minimized his contribution. Although this may seem unimportant, it is central to the argument that the military has increased in influence at the interface of civil-military decisionmaking. Slocombe and Clark held functionally equivalent jobs. Clark, as the J5, was the chief military planner and strategist. Slocombe performed roughly the same role for the civilian side. On being questioned about Slocombe's role, Perry said that "Clark had kept him informed constantly throughout the process."³⁶⁶ The mere fact that Clark kept Slocombe informed implies that General Clark was the critical player in this process and supports the claim that military officers are exercising more influence in the post-Cold War era.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ Perry interview.

³⁶⁵ Perry interview.

³⁶⁶ Perry interview.

³⁶⁷ To be fair, General Clark assured me during our conversation that Slocombe had played an important role during Dayton process too. But this is an expected response from an active-duty officer when questioned about the contributions of his civilian counter-part. Perry's testimony seems more objective and indicates the significance of General Clark at Dayton.

Chapter Summary

This chapter has presented the findings for influence in the decisionmaking process, analyzed the correlation between the explanatory and dependent variables and illustrated how imbalances in professional preparation between top-level civilian and military officials can affect decisionmaking criteria and influence the national security decisionmaking process. The tables presented earlier clearly show that military political influence is on the rise in the post-Cold War era and that there is a positive association between professional preparation and the ability to influence the decisionmaking process. Whereas in the 1960s civilians clearly held the advantage, the tables were reversed in the 1990s, allowing the military to establish decision criteria favorable to argument resolution on their terms (e.g., that clear and attainable goals were paramount in use of force discussions and that morale, discipline, and warfighting capability were most important when weighing social change in the military). These findings have significant consequences for US civil-military relations and national security policy which are the subjects of the last chapter.

Chapter 7

Conclusion, Policy Recommendations & Future Trends

US civil-military relations have changed significantly in the past ten years. Examination of the norms, structure, and rules of civil and military institutions since the 1960s reveals a new decisionmaking regime comprised of altered nodes (e.g. an elevated Chairman over the Joint Chiefs since Goldwater-Nichols reforms) buttressed by cultural changes, particularly in the military. These changes to the decisionmaking process have enabled the military to win critical arguments about decision criteria employed during policy debates. However, in the past two to three years, as the Clinton administration has grown in national security experience, the decisionmaking process has moved back towards more “consensus/compromise” policy outcomes. Thus, the situation that recently caused concern among scholars and practitioners is already working itself out. Long-term developments, however, remain a cause for concern.

Over the past three decades the gradual decline (and then sudden noticeable drop in 1993) in civilian national security professional preparation occurred at the same time that the military was steadily increasing in military political-military expertise. These changes in the balance of relative professional preparation have affected national security decisionmaking, as the case studies in chapter 6 illustrate. Decisions made during the Clinton transition regarding the use of force in Bosnia and Haiti, and other decisions pertaining to how strategy is designed and how the armed forces are organized and equipped (the Bottom-Up Review, policy decisions regarding homosexuals, and the publication of *Joint Vision 2010*), were affected by the reversal in the balance of professional preparation in favor of the military.³⁶⁸ The

³⁶⁸ The document *Joint Vision 2010* is a long-term vision of warfare and the United States role in it. It was developed in 1995-6 by the military joint staff under General

Goldwater-Nichols Act contributed to this trend by creating several more key political-military positions for the Services and fostering their drive for enhanced professional educational levels and joint experience.³⁶⁹

This thesis was designed, in large measure, to respond to recent arguments in both the popular and scholarly literature claiming that the United States military has been acting inappropriately and exerting too much influence in the political process.³⁷⁰ Two aspects missing from this debate were historical context and documentation of what many assumed to be true--that military political influence was on the rise. The quantitative and qualitative data reported here have substantiated that claim. This thesis has offered a partial explanation for that development. The major findings are summarized below.

1. The aggregate data for all Members of Congress demonstrate a 30% decline in military experience since the 1960s; for presidents there has been 60% decline.
2. Although the aggregate data indicate a general decline in Congressional national security experience, this was not true of individuals serving in key Committee Chairmanships.

Shalikashvili, and reflects the innovative thinking done in earlier years by the civilian defense intellectuals.

³⁶⁹ Thomas L. McNaugher and Roger L. Sperry, "Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense," Who Makes Public Policy? The Struggle for Control between Congress and the Executive, Robert S. Gilmour and Alexis A. Halley, eds., (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1994), pps. 219-258.

³⁷⁰ Kohn, "Out of Control." For other prominent works with similar arguments, see: Richard Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, No. 5; Charles Dunlap, "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the United States Military," Wake Forest Law Review, 29:2; Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal;" and Michael Desch, "Losing Control? The End of the Cold War and Changing United States Civil-Military Relations," paper presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1995.

3. National security experience in the executive branch declines when a new party assumes control of the White House.
4. Political-military expertise among high-level military officers in the top-tiers of the issue network has increased nearly 60% since the 1960s.³⁷¹
5. National security expertise among top-level civilian appointees in the DOD has declined 20% since the 1960s.
6. Combined analysis of the educational and assignment history indicators demonstrates a shift in the balance of political-military expertise in the DOD over the six time periods studied, in favor of the military.
7. The structural changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have affected both process and outcome and have accelerated the trend of increased military expertise in the political-military realm.
8. Fluctuations in the assignment history indicator among DOD civilians are, to a significant extent, a by-product of prolonged one-party control of the White House.
9. The decisionmaking analysis in chapter 6 pointed to an increase in military influence over the six time periods examined, particularly in post-Cold War era. There was an apparent relationship between professional preparation and influence in the decisionmaking process.
10. There was an apparent relationship between the balance of professional preparation among DOD civilians and top-level military officers at the Pentagon and civil-military tension. Whenever one side enjoyed a significant advantage (10% or greater) over the other in professional preparation, conflict increased. As that disparity was erased, tensions dissipated. The exception to this finding was the Reagan administration when tensions were low despite a significant civilian advantage in professional preparation. Increasing military budgets and partisan affinity may be plausible explanations for this occurrence.

³⁷¹ The terms political-military and national security expertise are very similar in their effect on the national security decisionmaking process. They do differ slightly, however, as political-military expertise (measured by education and political-military and joint assignment history) is needed for military officers to influence the decisionmaking process, whereas national security expertise (as measured by education and national security-related assignment history) is needed for civilians to influence the decisionmaking process.

These findings suggest that tensions will wax and wane as expertise indicators fluctuate, with tensions at their lowest when parity exists in the civil-military relationship at the Pentagon.³⁷² Several hypotheses related to the US civil-military relationship may be offered.

Hyp 1: Principals (the nation's elected leaders) remain firmly in control of the direction of national security policy unless there is a significant decline in defense-related expertise among the Congressional and Presidential policy clusters and that trend coincides with an erosion of political and strategic consensus.

Hyp 2: Civilians in the DOD will dominate the uniformed military when they possess a greater degree of defense-related expertise than the military has political expertise.

Hyp 3: When either civilian or military officials possess a significant relative advantage in professional preparation (greater than 10%) decision criteria employed during policy debates may be changed to favor the side with the significant relative advantage. This change in decision criteria will result in skewed preference to outcome ratios (i.e. policy dominance by the side with the significant advantage in professional preparation).

The empirical data for this study ends in 1994--the second year of the Clinton administration, and since that time, civil-military relations have evolved in a manner consistent with hypotheses offered in this thesis. However, it was not clear that this would happen at first. When Secretary of Defense Aspin resigned after the Somali disaster, things initially appeared to go from bad to worse when his first designated replacement, retired Navy Admiral Bobbie Ray Inman, suddenly and for bizarre reasons, asked the president to withdraw his name. Inman's nomination was an obvious attempt by the President to improve his relationship with the military. But

³⁷² Tensions are at their lowest when that parity occurs across all three levels of the Pentagon cluster interface (Level I: SecDef and Chairman; Level II: Civilian Secretaries and Service Chiefs; and Level III: among the key staff assistants on the OSD and Joint Staffs).

the demise of the Inman nomination was actually a blessing in disguise for Clinton. Inman was not the right person to help Clinton turn things around with the military. He had already signaled to everyone what the attitude of the Inman team would be when he insulted the president in his introductory press conference, describing the anguish and soul-searching he went through prior to accepting the president's request--he said that at first he was not sure he could serve Clinton because of his (Clinton's) background. Inman, a career Navy man and former Deputy CIA director, was known throughout Washington, DC for his go-it-alone, standoffish style. He would have done nothing to improve the civil-military relationship. In fact, he probably would have worsened it. The quiet professional, Dr. William Perry was a far better choice for the job. His promotion at the Pentagon proved to be something of a turning point in civil-military relations. Perry provided excellent leadership and brought to the Pentagon several experienced individuals (John P. White being the most prominent) to help him make the transition. In addition, the initial set of appointees at the Pentagon grew considerably in experience after 1993, also helping bring balance to the decisionmaking dynamic that was skewed towards the military at the outset of the administration.

Transition periods (the first 12-18 months of a new administration) are especially vulnerable to stormy civil-military relations, *and* (although not discussed much in the civil-military literature) poor national security decisions.³⁷³ But administrations that retained high level civilian advisors in the White House and/or Pentagon policymaking clusters during this period tended to have smoother transitions (Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Carter). President Clinton choose not to

³⁷³ Richard Neustadt discusses the tenuous nature of presidential transition periods. He calls administration errors during this period "pigs," after one of the biggest mistakes made during a presidential transition--the Bay of Pigs fiasco. For more see, Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership From Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Free Press, 1990), pps. 230-268;

and this exacerbated his administration's weaknesses in professional preparation during the first year.

President Clinton surprised many by appointing a Republican to the Secretary's position at the outset of his second term. This decision may foster more bipartisanship in national security decisionmaking--something that has been missing since the end of the Cold War. More bipartisanship among the elected leaders in Washington, DC may strengthen civilian control reducing the military's ability to "divide and rule."

Policy Recommendations³⁷⁴

The findings of this dissertation provide the basis for a set of policy recommendations. First, civilian control should not be pursued by "dumbing-down" the military to reduce the threat of policy subversion. The intellectual improvements in the military since Vietnam are not, by themselves, the cause of the altered decisionmaking dynamic and the heightened civil-military tensions witnessed at the outset of the Clinton administration. These were the result of changes to *both* sides of the civil-military relationship and this country would be better served (both in terms of civilian control and national security decisionmaking) by policy changes aimed at improving civilian national security expertise rather than decreasing military political sophistication. By doing this the country gets a well trained force and its elected leaders have available politically sensitive military advice. That was exactly what President Kennedy demanded of the JCS in the wake of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.³⁷⁵ Now that we have it, it would make no sense to let it erode.

³⁷⁴ Some of these policy recommendations also appear in Gibson and Snider, *Explaining Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations.*"

³⁷⁵ National Security Advisor Memorandum, (NSAM) 55, President to Chairman, Joint Chiefs, 28 Jun 1961, discussed in Webb and Cole, *JCS History*, p. 16.

Thus, the DOD Secretary should encourage the military to continue to educate some of their most promising officers at the very best universities, making contact in the process with the upcoming faculties of security studies--an experience of mutual benefit when these same faculty are subsequently tapped to be civilian appointees in the Department of Defense. This recommendation needs to be defended because Congress has considered cutting this program for budgetary reasons in recent years.

More importantly, however, the Secretary should take action to address the longer-term systemic problem, the increasing weakness, relative to the military, of the civilian appointees in the DOD. He, along with Congress, should set about to reverse the declining numbers of young intellectuals available to be tapped for service in defense. A national security seminar program could be reinstated at top-tier universities for faculty in security studies. Years ago a similar program by Frank Treager at New York University strongly influenced Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Burt, Ronald Lehman, Joe Kruzel and Allen Goodman--an able group of recent defense appointees serving both parties. Congress could also restore funding for professional internships within the DOD for promising faculty in security studies, programs terminated during Clinton's first term. The private sector could also be encouraged to fund such internships, as the Council on Foreign Relations has done for years. The Senior Executive Service might be better designed and managed to provide institutional support for a renaissance of civilian defense intellectuals.

For more solutions closer to home and already within his purview, the Secretary of Defense need look no further than across the river to the National Defense University. Reversing the ratio of civilian and military students (currently three military to one civilian), and making it the premier departmental institute for strategic studies, as once envisioned by Admiral Crowe and many members of Congress, would go a long way toward addressing the problem of vanishing civilian expertise in military affairs.

Continuing with the education theme, Congress should pass a new National Defense Education Act to provide funding for national security studies at leading universities across the US. This would increase civilian knowledge in defense affairs while facilitating alternative viewpoints to those being taught at the National Defense University.

The president should also reach out to America's next generation of scholars and inspire them to pursue careers in national security public service. It has been nearly 40 years since a president has done this and the time has come for this message again.³⁷⁶ The President should take steps to foster the professional development of a new generation of civilian defense intellectuals needed for future decisionmaking and effective civil-military relations. This is an opportunity that should not pass. Concerns about a return to civilian dominance by a modern-day McNamara contingent are lessened by the current degree of military political sophistication. Assuming that does not change, the addition of civilian defense intellectuals would actually enhance defense decisionmaking, providing a countervailing force to a politically strong military.

The presidential transition period is a time when presidents are particularly prone to making poor national security decisions. Given the association between continuity, professional preparation, and influence, future presidents might want to consider retaining highly skilled civilian defense intellectuals during their first year, regardless of party affiliation. The experiences of Stanley Resor and others who served in both Democratic and Republican administrations demonstrates the usefulness of this personnel strategy as a way of bridging the gap between two different administrations.

³⁷⁶ David Segal, "What's Wrong with the Gore Report," The Washington Monthly, November 1993, pps. 18-23.

Finally, the normative framework of US civil-military relations needs reexamination. The current way of conceiving civilian control, that every civilian-military interface in the DOD should be dominated by the former, has adversely affected both national security and civilian control in the past. The Constitution does not require such lower-level dominance. Although it stipulates that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief (Article II), and that the Congress shall be responsible for appropriating the money and establishing the regulations of the armed forces (Article I), nowhere does it state that civilian appointees in the Pentagon will command their military counterparts.

From analysis of the case studies it appears that the nation's elected leaders, both Congress and the President, are best served when these two agents (the civilian and military officials in the DOD) are of roughly equal experience, expertise and power, and compete for influence in the decisionmaking process. When this happens, (and the Bush administration provides a good example), these countervailing forces help to produce sound national security policies, while elected officials remain firmly in control. This is probably closer to the Founders intention, and over two hundred years experience has shown us its wisdom. Madisonian pluralistic and competitive concepts are just as applicable to United States civil-military relationships in the DOD as they are for the other major institutions in this country.

Future Trends

There are two contemporary developments, which if they persist into the future, will require monitoring from civilian officials as they will likely enhance military political power. These trends have the potential to adversely affect United States civil-military relations if civilian national security expertise at the Pentagon fails to keep pace with increased military political sophistication. The two

developments are: 1) the proliferation of OOTW and their affect on military culture;³⁷⁷ and, 2) changes in military personnel management systems.³⁷⁸ Both of these developments promise to enhance military professional preparation in the future.

Operations Other Than War (OOTW)

These operations can be broadly classified into "peace operations" (support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement) and "domestic support operations" (disaster and domestic emergency operations, environmental missions, support for law enforcement operations which include counter-drug missions and community assistance).³⁷⁹ Many of these missions are not actually new. Pre-dating World War II, the US military helped settle the West and was the administrative and logistical backbone for President Franklin Roosevelt's Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). The occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II were two of the largest and most complex OOTW ever conducted by the United States military. In addition, the United States participated in several peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations between World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, including the Sinai mission (1982 to the present), Lebanon (1958 and 1982), and the Dominican Republic (1965). Over the years the military has also "enforced laws, quelled domestic insurrections, combated terrorism, participated in public works and environmental

³⁷⁷ See, for example, John Hillen, "The Military Ethos," The World & I, (July 1997): 34-39.

³⁷⁸ Jim Tice, "Four-stars to approve OPMS XXI mid-July," Army Times, June 30, 1997, p. 6.

³⁷⁹ These definitions were drawn from Department of the Army Field Manuals, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Va: Training and Doctrine Command, 1994) and FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations (Fort Monroe, Va: Training and Doctrine Command, 1993).

projects and assisted in recovery operations following disasters."³⁸⁰ However, as FM 100-23 Peace Operations points out, "what is new is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations."³⁸¹ In total the military has conducted over 30 OOTW in the last seven years (see Table 30 below).³⁸²

³⁸⁰FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, 1993, p. 1-1.

³⁸¹FM 100-23 Peace Operations, 1993, p. v.

³⁸²Strategic Assessment 1995: United States Security Challenges in Transition, edited by Hans Binnendijk, (Wash, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), pps. 14-15.

Table 30
Operations Other Than War (OOTW)
Since 1991³⁸³

Date	Name	What\Where
March 91	Provide Comfort	Protect Iraqi Kurds
May-Jun 91	Sea Angel	Relief in Bangladesh
Jun 91	Fiery Vigil	Relief in Philippines
Sep-Oct 91	Quick Lift	Assist NEO* in Zaire
Oct 91-Jul 93	GTMO	Process Haitians in Cuba
Feb 92	Provide Hope	Airlift supplies to CIS
May 92	Unnamed	NEO in Sierra Leone
Jul 92-Pres	Provide Promise	Airlift to Bosnia
Aug-Dec 92	Provide Transition	Airlift to Angola
Dec 92-May 93	Restore Hope	Relief in Somalia
May 93-Mar 94	Continue Hope	Peacekeeping Somalia
Aug 92-Pres	Southern Watch	Enforce "No-Fly" Iraq
Apr 93-Pres	Deny Flight	Enforce "No-Fly" Bosnia
Jun-Dec 92	Maritime Monitor	Check Cargo fmr Yugo.
Dec 92-Jun 93	Maritime Guard	Enforce embargo Yugo.
Jun 93-Pres	Sharp Guard	Enforce embargo Yugo.
Jul 93-Pres	Able Sentry	Peacekeeping: Macedonia
Oct 93-Sep 94	Support Democracy	Enforce embargo Haiti
May 94-Pres	Sea Signal	Interdict Haitian refugees
Jul 94-Pres	Support Hope	Relief in Rwanda
Aug 94	Able Vigil	Interdict Cuban refugees
Aug 94	Safe Haven	Refugees to Panama
Sep 94	Distant Haven	Refugees to Surinam
Sep 94	Restore Democracy	Restoration of Aristide
Sep 94	Uphold Democracy	Restore Dem. govt. Haiti
Oct 94	Vigilant Warrior	Defense of Kuwait
Dec 95	Joint Endeavor (IFOR)	Peacekeeping: Bosnia

Source: Strategic Assessment 1995: United States Security Challenges in Transition.

*Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation

Soldiers normally trained to close with and destroy the enemy are now increasingly serving as diplomats, negotiators, community leaders (pseudo-mayors), pseudo-policemen, and economic developers. This trend has caused the country to

³⁸³This list does not even include the many domestic support operations like hurricane relief operations in Florida and Hawaii in 1992, firefighting support operations in just about every year, civil disturbance operations in LA after the riots of 1992, flood relief support operations along the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers in 1993 and the numerous counter-drug operations conducted both in the United States and abroad.

look at the military differently, but more important, it has caused the military to change the way it trains, educates, organizes, and looks at itself.³⁸⁴

The function of planning, coordinating, and executing OOTW has enhanced the political skills of military officers. Examination of OOTW doctrine displays the significance of this development. Since the adoption of Airland Battle doctrine by the Army in 1982, doctrine has taken on an increasingly important role in shaping military culture.³⁸⁵ A close look at the recently published OOTW Field Manuals reveals the change in command guidance which may ultimately change military culture. The following passages are an illustrative list demonstrating the changing nature of what is expected of soldiers.

FM 100-23 Peace Operations discusses the requirement for soldiers to be sensitive to civil-military issues and to perform roles traditionally done by statesmen and diplomats. "Because peace operations often involve small-unit activities, to avoid friction, all levels must understand the military-civilian relationship."³⁸⁶ "Commanders should always seek to de-escalate and not inflame an incident or crisis whenever possible. Alternatives to force should be fully explored before armed action is taken. They include *mediation* and *negotiation*, which may be used to reconcile opponents, both to one another and the peace operation."³⁸⁷ "...Army forces might attempt to defuse conditions that could otherwise lead to a resumption of fighting by

³⁸⁴ James Dewar, Carl Builder, Richard Darilek, William Hix, Thomas McNaugher, Judith Larson, with Debra August, Selika Ducksworth, and Brian Nichiporuk, "Army Culture and Planning in a Time of Great Change," (The Rand Corporation, September 1996).

³⁸⁵ See, for example, John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command Historical Monograph Series, 1984).

³⁸⁶ FM 100-23 Peace Operations, p. 16.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 17.

recognizing the inherent dangers and by resolving grievances before they ignite into open combat."³⁸⁸

In other sections of this manual the distinction between civil and military appears to be erased and civilian control dangerously close to being called into question. "...The mandate should express the political objective and international support for the operation and define the desired end state. Military commanders with unclear mandates should take the initiative to redefine, refine, or restate the mandate for consideration by higher authority."³⁸⁹ How often in the fast-paced, chaotic peacekeeping environment are soldiers redefining political objectives in the absence of civilian control? Although other examples from FM 100-23 could be given, this discussion now moves to the domestic component of OOTW.

In its doctrinal manual for domestic support operations the military appears to be embarking on its own national identity-building project. Consider the following passage from FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations.

...Additionally, domestic support operations provide excellent opportunities for soldiers to interface with the civilian community and demonstrate traditional Army values such as teamwork, success-oriented attitude, and patriotism. These demonstrations provide positive examples of values that can benefit the community and also promote a favorable view of the Army to the civilian population.³⁹⁰

This passage is somewhat confusing and raises questions about the supremacy of civilian values, not only inside the military, but in society at-large.³⁹¹

³⁸⁸Ibid. p. 19.

³⁸⁹FM 100-23 Peace Operations, p. 15.

³⁹⁰FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, pps. 1-4.

³⁹¹ For a recent discussion of this debate see, Thomas Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the US Military and US Society" Atlantic Monthly (July 1997).

As with the peace operations manual, FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations also flirts with military interference into the civilian decisionmaking sphere.

...Army commanders will frequently coordinate with civilian emergency managers, both professional and volunteer. They are often referred to as the 'coordinators of emergency services' or similar titles and, in smaller jurisdictions, may be the fire chief, police chief, or other official. [In these circumstances] *the Army will--establish achievable objectives, establish clear termination standards and tailor forces to the mission.*³⁹²

The effect that Vietnam had on the current generation of military leadership is evident in this passage. Concerns over clear objectives and termination criteria are allayed by allowing ground commanders to make these decisions in the absence of clear civilian guidance. All of this makes sense from an institutional perspective forged in a disastrous and emotional experience (Vietnam), but the larger question of civilian control looms large from this passage.

Beyond discourse analysis of Field Manuals, ground experience in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia attests to the political skills needed to accomplish these sensitive operations. After Aristide was restored to power, the operation in Haiti was complicated by the additional task given to the military to assist that country in planting the seeds for a healthy democracy. The hunting of Aidid that resulted in a deadly firefight during a humanitarian operation in Somalia demonstrated what can happen when top-level civilian leadership does not stay abreast of the situation on the ground. In Bosnia, soldiers were so involved in political and diplomatic tasks that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shalikashvili pleaded with his civilian bosses to appoint a single high-level civilian official to coordinate military and civilian

³⁹²FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, pps. 1-6.

efforts during OOTW. "We don't have a system that puts someone in charge of the overall operation that can coordinate the efforts," General Shalikashvili stated.³⁹³

As mentioned earlier these types of missions are not new, but never before have they come in such quantities and complexities in such a short period of time--a time when despite downsizing the military appears to be the popular candidate for solving so many national problems. In 1995, for example, Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich suggested that the military should be deployed along the Mexican border to prevent illegal aliens from entering this country.³⁹⁴ Of course, the recent proliferation of domestic missions can be partially explained by the absence of a national police force in this country which many other nations rely on for execution of internal policing.³⁹⁵

The military, and particularly the Army and Marine Corps, have altered career patterns and training plans to accommodate the proliferation of these non-combat missions. The Marine Corps was quicker than the Army to embrace these new missions and strategically this has worked to their advantage. In the 1990s, as the Congress debated how the armed forces should be restructured in the post-Cold War era, the Marines promoted themselves as the Nation's premiere OOTW force. They astutely recognized that there would be more action in this realm than in traditional missions in the new security environment. The Marine Corps sought to justify its existence and to protect against budget cuts by promoting itself as service of choice for OOTW. While this was happening, the Army was arguing with the administration, Congress, and anyone who would listen, *against* troop deployments

³⁹³ General John Shalikashvili as quoted in Philip Shenon, "No GI Role See in Arrests of Bosnian War Suspects," New York Times, August 29, 1997, p. A6.

³⁹⁴ Army Times, February 20, 1995. p. 8.

³⁹⁵ For this analysis I am indebted to Benedict Anderson of Cornell University.

for OOTW. Significantly influenced by their Vietnam experiences, the Army's senior leaders were slow to see what the Marines were seeing so clearly--that OOTW will increase in the next couple of decades and outnumber traditional deployments.

However, when it became apparent that the Army stood to lose badly in the post-Cold War budget battle, the senior leadership grudgingly began to embrace these missions, too. This initially caused tension within the Army and two camps emerged; one that wanted to orient the force towards conducting OOTW and another that wanted to convince the national leadership otherwise, or at the very least, pass off these non-combat missions to the Marine Corps. The fight was short-lived; the former camp won.

Evidence of the change in the Army's attitude towards OOTW can be seen in the weekly editions of the Army Times, which over the past two years has presented the changing message of the senior leadership on these non-combat missions; they are now stressing the unique training opportunities presented, allowing the Army to showcase its soldiers.³⁹⁶ More systemic and concrete evidence can be found in the changes to the personnel management system which will take place in October 1997. As with Goldwater-Nichols, these changes will affect behavior and culture by altering the rules for promotions and assignments.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁶See, for example, Patrick Pexton, "Future seizes operations other than war: Vision 2010 embraces humanitarian, peacekeeping missions," Army Times, November 25, 1996, p. 8. For official Army publications that make this point see, General William Hartzog, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va: TRADOC, 1 August 1994).

³⁹⁷General Dennis Reimer and Major General David H. Ohle, What is OPMS XXI? An Officer's Guide to the Personnel Management System for the 21st Century (Office of the Army Chief of Staff, 1997).

Changes in Promotion and Officer Management Systems

This second development is strongly related to the first. Indeed, the first is primarily the cause of the second. The changes in Army personnel management are designed to update promotion and assignment patterns to reflect the changing nature of warfare and the proliferation of OOTW. Since OOTW require *political* and *diplomatic* skills, the personnel system is being revised to promote them, literally.

Previously, the only way to the top was through the command track. In order to make general officer, one had to command soldiers at every level from platoon to brigade in order to be considered for flag officer (general's) rank. This skewed the Army towards "foxhole" type officers. Of course this was by design, as it reinforced the warrior ethos. Norms began to change after Vietnam when the services realized that political-military experience was necessary to compete with the McNamara team. This trend was accelerated by Goldwater-Nichols, which mandated joint experiences facilitating united military preferences and made jobs in Washington, DC career enhancing, but today's generals are still a mix of "political-military" and "foxhole." Even General Powell, for example, commanded at every level (platoon through brigade) as an infantry officer, and as a general officer, served as an assistant division commander, corps commander, and four-star commander of Forces Command.

The upcoming personnel management changes (crafted by a special task force led by Major General David Ohle at the behest of Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer) are designed to provide alternative ways to the top. No longer will all generals come solely from the command track, (which will be officially labeled the "operational track" starting next year). The operational track will be one of four

different career paths for Army officers. The others will be “information operations,” “operations support,” and “institutional support.”³⁹⁸

Information operations will include a new functional area specifically designed for information warfare as well as specialties for strategic intelligence, space operations, public affairs, systems automation, and modeling and simulations. Operations Support will include the acquisition corps, which monitors the R&D and procurement process, and foreign area officers -- the army’s defense attaches and political-military officers. Institutional support will include the following specialties: human resource management, comptroller, operational research and systems analysis, strategy and force development, nuclear research and operations, and permanent West Point professors. *All of these career paths will be responsible for their own promotions with each having slots authorized at the general officer level.* Because promotions are, by congressional design, limited in numbers and therefore zero-sum, those new general officer slots will have to come from somewhere. Since the only place they came from in the past was the operational track, it is obvious who the losers will be in this change.³⁹⁹

These changes are unprecedented. Those who currently hold power in the Army are the champions of the old order and got there by the old rules. The fact that they have approved a new personnel management system that will decrease the probability of field commanders making general officer is surprising. Seldom in

³⁹⁸ Jim Tice, “Four-stars to approve OPMS XXI mid-July,” Army Times, June 30, 1997, p. 6. See also, Reimer and Ohle, What is OPMS XXI? An Officer’s Guide to the Personnel Management System for the 21st Century.

³⁹⁹ Reimer and Ohle, What is OPMS XXI? An Officer’s Guide to the Officer Personnel Management System for the 21st Century, p. 4.

history have a set of leaders willingly given up power to others. Yet that is exactly what is happening.⁴⁰⁰

At its core, this initiative is attempting to replace the “warrior ethos” with a rediscovered and redefined conception of “the soldier.” Instead of celebrating and emphasizing the warrior, this personnel management system will promote the concept of soldier, broadly defined--one based upon *public service to the nation* in any capacity directed by the national leadership, including non-combat roles.⁴⁰¹

The current coterie of military elite is allowing this change out of budgetary necessity, especially in the Army. To survive in the political environment of Washington DC, the Army has had to justify its existence in the post-Soviet threat world. That requirement has changed the Army’s attitude towards non-combat missions, which were initially viewed as anathema to *Army essence*, in the words of Morton Halperin. Budgetary factors heavily influenced that attitudinal change which may ultimately cause a change in Army essence. Changes in the personnel management system were the next logical step. The “rewards” (promotions) had to be altered to reflect the change in what the Army considered important. This explains why the current Army elite has “willingly” changed the promotion structure.

As a consequence, in the next decade the Army will have some general officers with virtually no field experience. Moreover, there will be some general officers who will have served in public affairs and other political-military fields for most of their career.⁴⁰² Because of how it will affect the balance of professional

⁴⁰⁰ Rosen, Winning the Next War, pps. 20-21.

⁴⁰¹ I am indebted to Colonel Kerry K. Pierce, United States Army for this analysis. Colonel Pierce served on the committee that re-designed the personnel management system.

⁴⁰² These career paths will take effect at the senior captain level--at approximately 10 years of service. Therefore all officers will have company level command in common.

preparation in favor of the military, this development is sure to affect national security decisionmaking and the US civil-military relationship. Imagine someone with the skills of Admiral Crowe, General Powell, or General Shalikashvili with ten more years of experience in the political realm than they had. The relative advantage in professional preparation for the military may surpass the stark 76.5% advantage that McNamara's team had over the military in 1966.

Consistent with earlier analysis on Goldwater-Nichols, the new institutional approach provides the theoretical lens from which to understand these contemporary trends. These changes in (promotion) rules will affect both decisionmaking process and content. All of these developments will affect the US civil-military relationship in the future, although they also have potential to enhance both national security and civil-military relations. The key to ensuring that these developments are positive lies with the civilian component. Civilian defense expertise must keep up with military political expertise.⁴⁰³

Improvements in civilian national security professional preparation are needed to ensure a balanced civil-military relationship. As the US prepares to confront the challenges ahead, civilian leadership will be key in prodding the military to change its entire way of operating (doctrine, research and development, procurement, leader selection and development, and training) to match the new security environment. It will not be easy, and the success of the Gulf War may cause the military to resist major change. After all, conventional wisdom dictates "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." However, civilian leadership will need to convince the military

⁴⁰³ There are several promising examples of this possibility. The Harvard Project on Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations is one. Another is the initiative by Columbia University to train future civilian defense intellectuals. Columbia sponsored an off-site "Summer Workshop on Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy," which was held at Cornell University July 14 - August 1, 1997.

that history has not been kind to countries that prepare for the next war by fighting the last one.⁴⁰⁴

In his discussion of the Quadrennial Defense Review, (the panel designed to question all aspects of the defense establishment), Congressman Dellums commented on the difficulty of bringing about change in the United States political system.

...The latest QDR (in 1997) was yet another attempt to reshape the defense establishment after the Cold War but it, too, fell short of the mark although it was a cautious step away from the Bottom-Up Review (BUR). There is talk in that report of shaping the security environment and preventing potential adversaries from becoming threats, but there are still too many rice bowls that need to be broken, still turf too protected by the services...I will say, though, that this is a step in the right direction and maybe that is the best we can hope for, incremental steps towards the ultimate end goal...Our political system seldom allows for major policy directional change, but without visionaries pushing for paradigmatic change, even incremental change doesn't happen. We need advocates for major change to serve as catalysts for incremental change. That's the way our political system works.⁴⁰⁵

Dellums' comments provide a fitting conclusion. It has been argued that we need to incorporate Madisonian concepts into the normative framework of US civil-military relations. In his remarks above, Dellums highlights the importance of visionaries who push for paradigmatic changes, as they are the one who bring about incremental change. Inherent in this thinking is Madisonian logic, the extended republic line of reasoning for abandoning the Rousseauian preference for small republics.⁴⁰⁶ Only by extending the sphere will tyranny of the majority be avoided. In a similar way we need to extend the sphere in the defense establishment. New voices

⁴⁰⁴ This is the central question Rosen explores in his work, Winning the Next War.

⁴⁰⁵ Dellums interview.

⁴⁰⁶ Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses (1762, translated G.D.H. Cole, Everyman's Library Edition, 1947).

(like Dellums') must be heard and a lively debate between equally qualified and prepared civilian and military officials at all levels at the Pentagon should be encouraged. The nation's elected leaders are best served by this healthy competition. In that way both national security and civilian control are enhanced.

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List of Individuals Interviewed

Major McDonald Heston, FAO Branch, United States Army	20 June 1996
Bert Misusawa, Congressional Aide, SASC	27 March 1997
Fred Downey, Congressional Aide SASC	8 April 1997
General Wes Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe	28 April 1997
Dr. Alain Enthoven, former Assistant SecDef Systems Analysis	27 May 1997
Hon. Melvin Laird (written responses), former SecDef	28 May 1997
Hon. Walter Slocombe, Under SecDef for Policy	10 June 1997
Hon. Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, former Under SecDef for Policy	10 June 1997
Lee Halterman, Congressional Aide, HASC	12 June 1997
Hon. Ronald Dellums, (D-Cal)	12 June 1997
Admiral (retired) Stansfield Turner, former Dir CIA	12 June 1997
Hon. Lee Hamilton (D-In)	17 June 1997
Dr. David Chu, former Asst SecDef for PA&E	18 June 1997
Hon. Gerald Solomon (R-NY)	18 June 1997
General (retired) Edward "Shy" Meyer, former Chief of Staff	19 June 1997
General (ret) Bernard Rogers, former Chief of Staff and SACEUR	19 June 1997
Hon. Dr. William Perry, former SecDef	23 June 1997
Hon. Stanley Resor, former Sec Army and Under SecDef Policy	30 June 1997
Hon. Dr. Harold Brown (written responses), former Sec Def	30 June 1997
Hon. Ed Meese, former Counselor to the President and AG	30 July 1997
Admiral (retired) Jonathan Howe	4 August 1997

Interviews by others cited here

with the American Legion Magazine:

General (ret) William C. Westmoreland, former Chief of Staff	1 June 1997
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with Doug Selin:

Morton Halperin, former McNamara aide	2 May 1984
Daniel Henkin, former McNamara/Laird aide	7 May 1984
Robert Komer, former McNamara/Laird aide	7 May 1984
Hon. Melvin Laird, former SecDef	3 May 1984
Dr. Anthony Lake, former Johnson/Nixon NSC aide	9 May 1984
Laurence Lynn, former Laird aide	8 May 1984
Roger Morris, former McNamara/Laird aide	8 May 1984
Phillip Odeen, former McNamara/Laird aide	9 May 1984
Ivan Selin, former McNamara/Laird aide	7 May 1984